

**ONTARIO**  
**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**  
**(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

B E T W E E N:

**CAMERON STEPHENS MORTGAGE CAPITAL LTD.**

Applicant

-and-

**CONACHER KINGSTON HOLDINGS INC. and 5004591 ONTARIO INC.**

Respondents

**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE RECEIVER  
(RETURNABLE DECEMBER 12, 2025)**

December 4, 2025

**Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP**  
155 Wellington Street West, 35th Floor  
Toronto ON M5V 3H1  
Tel: 416.646.4300  
Fax: 416.646.4301

**Jeffrey Larry** (LSO# 44608D)  
Tel: 416.646-4330  
[jeff.larry@paliareroland.com](mailto:jeff.larry@paliareroland.com)

**Ryan Shah** (LSO# 88250C)  
Tel: 416.646-6356  
[ryan.shah@paliareroland.com](mailto:ryan.shah@paliareroland.com)

**Lawyers for the Receiver, TDB Restructuring  
Limited**

TO: **Service List**

**ONTARIO**  
**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**  
**(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

B E T W E E N:

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## **TAB 1**

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer, 2014 ONCA 851

DATE: 20141201

DOCKET: C58381

Hoy A.C.J.O., Cronk and Pepall JJ.A.

BETWEEN

The Bank of Nova Scotia

Plaintiff (Respondent)

and

Daniel A. Diemer o/a Cornacre Cattle Co.

Defendant (Respondent)

Peter H. Griffin, for the appellant PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.

James H. Cooke, for the respondent Daniel A. Diemer

No one appearing for the respondent The Bank of Nova Scotia

Heard: June 10, 2014

On appeal from the order of Justice Andrew J. Goodman of the Superior Court of Justice, dated January 22, 2014, with reasons reported at 2014 ONSC 365.

**Pepall J.A.:**

[1] The public nature of an insolvency which juxtaposes a debtor's financial hardship with a claim for significant legal compensation focuses attention on the cost of legal services.

[2] This appeal involves a motion judge's refusal to approve legal fees of \$255,955 that were requested by a court appointed receiver on behalf of its counsel in a cattle farm receivership that spanned approximately two months.

[3] For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.

## **Facts**

### **(a) Appointment of Receiver**

[4] The respondent, Daniel A. Diemer o/a Cornacre Cattle Co. (the "debtor"), is a cattle farmer. The Bank of Nova Scotia ("BNS") held security over his farm operations which were located near London, Ontario. BNS and Maxium Financial Services Inc. were owed approximately \$4.9 million (approximately \$2 million and \$2.85 million respectively). BNS applied for the appointment of a receiver pursuant to s. 243(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") and s. 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. 43. The debtor was represented by counsel and consented to the appointment.

[5] On August 20, 2013, Carey J. granted the request and appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. ("PWC" or the "Receiver") as receiver of the debtor. The initial appointment order addressed various aspects of the receivership. This included the duty of the debtor to cooperate with the Receiver and the approval of a sales process for the farm operations described in

materials filed in court by BNS. The order also contained a come-back provision allowing any interested party to apply to vary the order on seven days' notice.

[6] Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the appointment order, which dealt with the accounts of the Receiver and its counsel, stated:

17. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Receiver and counsel to the Receiver shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case at their standard rates and charges, and that the Receiver and counsel to the Receiver shall be entitled to and are hereby granted a charge (the "Receiver's Charge") on the Property, as security for such fees and disbursements, both before and after the making of this Order in respect of these proceedings, and that the Receiver's Charge shall form a first charge on the Property in priority to all security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise, in favour of any Person, but subject to sections 14.06(7), 81.4(4), and 81.6(2) of the BIA.

18. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Receiver and its legal counsel shall pass its accounts from time to time, and for this purpose the accounts of the Receiver and its legal counsel are hereby referred to a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

There is no suggestion that the materials filed in support of the request for the appointment of the Receiver provided specifics on the standard rates and charges referred to in para. 17 of the initial appointment order.

[7] Counsel to the Receiver was Borden Ladner Gervais LLP ("BLG") and the lead lawyer was Roger Jaipargas. Mr. Jaipargas was called to the Ontario bar in 2000, practises out of BLG's Toronto office, and is an experienced and capable

insolvency practitioner. Among other things, at the time of the receivership, he was the Chair of the Insolvency Section of the Ontario Bar Association.

**(b) Receiver's Activities**

[8] The activities of the Receiver and, to a certain extent, those of its counsel, were described in reports dated September 11 and October 15, 2013 filed in court by the Receiver. Both reports were subsequently approved by the court.

[9] The reports revealed that:

- Following the granting of the initial appointment order, the Receiver entered into an agreement with the debtor pursuant to which the latter was to manage the day-to-day operations of the farm and the Receiver would provide oversight.
- After the Receiver was appointed, the debtor advised the Receiver of an August 13, 2013 offer he had received. It had resulted from a robust sales process conducted by the debtor. On learning of this offer, the Receiver negotiated an agreement of purchase and sale with the offeror for the purchase of the farm for the sum of \$8.3 million. The purchase price included 170 milking cows.
- On September 17, 2013, the Receiver obtained, without objection from the debtor, a court order setting aside the sales process approved in the initial appointment order, approving the agreement of purchase and

sale it had negotiated, and approving the Receiver's September 11, 2013 report outlining its activities to date.

- The agreement of purchase and sale required that over 150 cows be removed from the farm (not including the 170 milking cows that were the subject of the agreement of purchase and sale). Complications relating to these cows and an additional 60 cows which the debtor wanted to rent to increase his milking quota arose to which the Receiver and its counsel were required to attend.
- The Receiver and BLG also negotiated an access agreement to permit certain property to remain on the farm after the closing date of the agreement of purchase and sale at no cost to the debtor. Unbeknownst to the Receiver, the debtor then removed some of that property.
- The Receiver and its counsel also had to consider numerous claims to the proceeds of the receivership by other interested creditors and an abandoned request by the debtor to change the venue of the receivership from London to Windsor.

[10] After approximately two months, the debtor asked that the Receiver be replaced. Accordingly, PWC brought a motion to substitute BDO Canada Ltd. as receiver and to approve its second report dated October 15, 2013.

**(c) Application to Approve Fees**

[11] The Receiver also asked the court to approve its fees and disbursements and those of its counsel including both of their estimates of fees to complete.

[12] The Receiver's fees amounted to \$138,297 plus \$9,702.52 in disbursements. The fees reflected 408.7 hours spent by the Receiver's representatives at an average hourly rate of \$338.38. The highest hourly rate charged by the Receiver was \$525 per hour. Fees estimated to complete were \$20,000.

[13] The Receiver's counsel, BLG, performed a similar amount of work but charged significantly higher rates. BLG's fees from August 6 to October 14, 2013 amounted to \$255,955, plus \$4,434.92 in disbursements and \$33,821.69 in taxes for a total account of \$294,211.61. The fees reflected 397.60 hours spent with an average hourly rate of \$643.75. Mr. Jaipargas's hours amounted to 195.30 hours at an hourly rate of \$750.00. The rates of the other 10 people on the account ranged from \$950 per hour for a senior lawyer to \$195 for a student and \$330 for a law clerk.

[14] Fees estimated to complete were \$20,000.

[15] In support of the request for approval of both sets of accounts, the Receiver filed an affidavit of its own representative and one from its counsel, Mr. Jaipargas.

[16] As is customary in receiver fee approval requests, the Receiver's representative stated that, to the best of his knowledge, the rates charged by its counsel were comparable to the rates charged by other law firms for the provision of similar services and that the fees and disbursements were fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

[17] In his affidavit, Mr. Jaipargas attached copies of BLG's accounts and a summary of the hourly rates and time spent by the eleven BLG timekeepers who worked on the receivership. The attached accounts included detailed block descriptions of the activities undertaken by the BLG timekeepers with total daily aggregate hours recorded. Usually the entries included multiple tasks such as e-mails and telephone calls. Time was recorded in six minute increments. Of the over 160 docket entries, a total of 11 entries reflected time of .1 (6 minutes) and .2 (12 minutes).

[18] On October 23, 2013, the motion judge granted a preliminary order. He ordered that:

- BDO Canada Ltd. be substituted as receiver;
- PWC's fees and disbursements be approved;
- the Receiver's October 15, 2013 report and the activities of the Receiver set out therein be approved;
- \$100,000 of BLG's fees be approved; and

- the determination of the approval of the balance of BLG's fees and disbursements be adjourned to January 3, 2014.

[19] Prior to the January return date, the debtor filed an affidavit of a representative from his law firm. The affiant described the billing rates of legal professionals located in the cities of London and Windsor, Ontario. These rates tended to be significantly lower than those of BLG. For example, the highest billing rate was \$500 for the services of a partner called to the bar in 1988. Mr. Jaipargas replied with an affidavit that addressed Toronto rates in insolvency proceedings in Toronto with which BLG's rates compared favourably. He also revised BLG's estimate to complete to \$30,000.

### **Motion Judge's Decision**

[20] On January 3, 2014, the motion judge heard the motion relating to approval of the balance of BLG's fees and disbursements. He refused to grant the requested fee approval and provided detailed reasons for his decision dated January 22, 2014.

[21] In his reasons, the motion judge considered and applied the principles set out in *Re Bakemates International Inc.* (2002), 164 O.A.C. 84 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 460 (also referred to as *Confectionately Yours Inc., Re*); *BT-PR Realty Holdings Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand* (1997), 29 O.T.C. 354 (S.C.); and *Federal Business Development Bank v. Belyea* (1983), 44 N.B.R. (2d) 248 (C.A.). The motion judge considered the nature, extent and

value of the assets handled, the complications and difficulties encountered, the degree of assistance provided by the debtor, and the cost of comparable services.

[22] The motion judge took into account the challenges identified by the Receiver in dealing with the debtor. However, he found that the debtor had cooperated and that there was little involvement by the Receiver and counsel that required either day-to-day management or identification of a potential purchaser.

[23] He noted, at para. 17 of his reasons, that although counsel for the debtor took specific issue with BLG counsel's rates: "I glean from submissions that the thrust of his argument evolved from a complaint about the rates being charged to an overall dispute of the unreasonableness of the entirety of the fees (and by extension – the hours) submitted for reimbursement."

[24] The motion judge considered the hourly rates, time spent and work done. He noted that the asset was a family farm worth approximately \$8.3 million and that the scope of the receivership was modest. In his view, the size of the receivership estate should have some bearing on the hourly rates. He determined that the amount of counsel's efforts and the work involved was disproportionate to the size of the receivership. After the size of the estate became known, the usual or standard rates were too high. He expressly referred to paras. 17 and 18 of the initial appointment order.

[25] The motion judge also took issue with the need for, and excessive work done by, senior counsel on routine matters. He rejected the Receiver's opinion endorsing its counsel's fees, found that the number of hours reflected a significant degree of inefficiency, and that some of the work could have been performed at a lower hourly rate. He concluded: "I have concerns about the fees claimed that involve the scope of work over the course of just over two months in what appears to be a relatively straightforward receivership. Frankly, the rates greatly exceed what I view as fair and reasonable."

[26] He acknowledged that there were several methods to achieve what he believed to be a just and reasonable amount including simply cutting the overall number of hours billed. Instead, so as to reduce the amount claimed, he adopted the average London rate of \$475 for lawyers of similar experience and expertise as shown in the affidavit filed by the debtor. He also expressly limited his case to the facts at hand, noting that his reasons should not be construed as saying that Toronto rates have no application in matters in the Southwest Region.

[27] The motion judge concluded that BLG's fees were "nothing short of excessive." He assessed them at \$157,500 from which the \$100,000 allowed in his October 23, 2013 order was to be deducted. He also allowed disbursements of \$4,434.92 and applicable HST.

## **Grounds of Appeal**

[28] The appellant advances three grounds of appeal. It submits that the motion judge erred: (1) by failing to apply the clear provisions of the appointment order which entitled BLG to charge fees at its standard rates; (2) by reducing BLG's fees in the absence of evidence that the fees were not fair and reasonable; and (3) by making unfair and unsupported criticisms of counsel.

## **Burden of Proof**

[29] The receiver bears the burden of proving that its fees are fair and reasonable: *HSBC Bank Canada v. Lechier-Kimel*, 2014 ONCA 721, at para. 16 and *Bakemates*, at para. 31.

## **Analysis**

### **(a) Appointment of a Receiver**

[30] Under s. 243(1) of the *BIA*, the court may appoint a receiver and under s. 243(6), may make any order respecting the fees and disbursements of the receiver that the court considers proper. Similarly, s.101 of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides for the appointment of a receiver and that the appointment order may include such terms as are considered just. As in the case under appeal, the initial appointment order may provide for a judicial passing of accounts. Section 248(2) of the *BIA* also permits the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, the debtor, the trustee in bankruptcy or a creditor to apply to court to have the receiver's

accounts reviewed. The court also relies on its supervisory role and inherent jurisdiction to review a receiver's requests for payment: *Bakemates*, at para. 36 and Kevin P. McElcheran, *Commercial Insolvency in Canada*, 2d ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 2011), at pp. 185-186.

[31] The receiver is an officer of the court: *Bakemates*, at para. 34. As stated by McElcheran, at p.186:

The receiver, once appointed, is said to be a “fiduciary” for all creditors of the debtor. The term “fiduciary” to describe the receiver’s duties to creditors reflects the representative nature of its role in the performance of its duties. The receiver does not have a financial stake in the outcome. It is not an advocate of any affected party and it has no client. As a court officer and appointee, the receiver has a duty of even-handedness that mirrors the court’s own duty of fairness in the administration of justice. [Footnotes omitted.]

### **(b) Passing of a Receiver’s Accounts**

[32] In *Bakemates*, this court described the purpose of the passing of a receiver’s accounts and also discussed the applicable procedure. Borins J.A. stated, at para. 31, that there is an onus on the receiver to prove that the compensation for which it seeks approval is fair and reasonable. This includes the compensation claimed on behalf of its counsel. At para. 37, he observed that the accounts must disclose the total charges for each of the categories of services rendered. In addition:

The accounts should be in a form that can be easily understood by those affected by the receivership (or by the judicial officer required to assess the accounts) so that such person can determine the amount of time spent by the receiver's employees (and others that the receiver may have hired) in respect to the various discrete aspects of the receivership.

[33] The court endorsed the factors applicable to receiver's compensation described by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in *Belyea: Bakemates*, at para. 51. In *Belyea*, at para. 9, Stratton J.A. listed the following factors:

- the nature, extent and value of the assets;
- the complications and difficulties encountered;
- the degree of assistance provided by the debtor;
- the time spent;
- the receiver's knowledge, experience and skill;
- the diligence and thoroughness displayed;
- the responsibilities assumed;
- the results of the receiver's efforts; and
- the cost of comparable services when performed in a prudent and economical manner.

These factors constitute a useful guideline but are not exhaustive: *Bakemates*, at para. 51.

[34] In Canada, very little has been written on professional fees in insolvency proceedings: see Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Virginia Torrie, "A 'Cost' Benefit

Analysis: Examining Professional Fees in CCAA Proceedings" in Janis P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law* (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) 141, at p.151.

[35] Having said that, it is evident that the fairness and reasonableness of the fees of a receiver and its counsel are the stated lynchpins in the *Bakemates* analysis. However, in actual practice, time spent, that is, hours spent times hourly rate, has tended to be the predominant factor in determining the quantum of legal fees.

[36] There is a certain irony associated with this dichotomy. A person requiring legal advice does not set out to buy time. Rather, the object of the exercise is to buy services. Moreover, there is something inherently troubling about a billing system that pits a lawyer's financial interest against that of its client and that has built-in incentives for inefficiency. The billable hour model has both of these undesirable features.

### **(c) The Rise and Dominance of the Billable Hour**

[37] For many decades now, the cornerstone of legal accounts and law firms has been the billable hour. It ostensibly provides an objective measure for both clients and law firms. For the most part, it determines the quantum of fees. From an internal law firm perspective, the billable hour also measures productivity and is an important tool in assessing the performance of associates and partners alike.

[38] The billable hour traces its roots to the mid-20th century. In 1958, the American Bar Association (“ABA”)’s Special Commission on the Economics of Law Practice published a study entitled “The 1958 Lawyer and his 1938 Dollar”. The study noted that lawyers’ incomes had not kept pace with those of other professionals and recommended improved recording of time spent and a target of 1,300 billable hours per year to boost lawyers’ profits: see Stuart L. Pardau, *“Bill, Baby, Bill: How the Billable Hour Emerged as the Primary Method of Attorney Fee Generation and Why Early Reports of its Demise May be Greatly Exaggerated”* (2013) 50 Idaho L. Rev. 1, at pp. 4-5. By 2002, in its Commission on Billable Hours, the ABA revised its proposed expectation to 2,300 hours docketed annually of which 1,900 would represent billable work: see Pardau, at p. 2. And that was in 2002.

[39] Typically, a lawyer’s record of billable hours is accompanied by dockets that record and detail the time spent on a matter. In theory, this allows for considerable transparency. However, docketing may become more of an art than a science, and the objective of transparency is sometimes elusive.

[40] This case illustrates the problem. Here, the lawyers provided dockets in blocks of time that provide little, if any, insight into the value provided by the time recorded. Moreover, each hour is divided into 10 six-minute segments, with six minutes being the minimum docket. So, for example, reading a one line e-mail could engender a 6 minute docket and associated fee. This segmenting of the

hour to be docketed does not necessarily encourage accuracy or docketing parsimony.

**(d) Fees in Context of Court Appointed Receiver**

[41] The cost of legal services is highlighted in the context of a court-supervised insolvency due to its public nature. In contrast, the cost of putting together many of the transactions that then become unravelled in court insolvency proceedings rarely attract the public scrutiny that professional fees in insolvencies do. While many of the principles described in these reasons may also be applicable to other areas of legal practice, the focus of this appeal is on legal fees in an insolvency.

[42] Bilateral relationships are not the norm in an insolvency. In a traditional solicitor/client relationship, there are built-in checks and balances, incentives, and, frequently, prior agreements on fees. These sorts of arrangements are less common in an insolvency. For example, a receiver may not have the ability or incentive to reap the benefit of any pre-agreed client percentage fee discount of the sort that is incorporated from time to time into fee arrangements in bilateral relationships.

[43] In a court-supervised insolvency, stakeholders with little or no influence on the fees may ultimately bear the burden of the largesse of legal expenditures. In the case under appeal, the recoveries were sufficient to discharge the debt owed

to BNS. As such, it did not bear the cost of the receivership. In contrast, had the receivership costs far exceeded BNS's debt recovery such that in essence it was funding the professional fees, BNS would hold the economic interest and other stakeholders would be unaffected.

[44] In a receivership, the duty to monitor legal fees and services in the first instance is on the receiver. Choice of counsel is also entirely within the purview of the receiver. In selecting its counsel, the receiver must consider expertise, complexity, location, and anticipated costs. The responsibility is on the receiver to choose counsel who best suits the circumstances of the receivership. However, subsequently, the court must pass on the fairness and reasonableness of the fees of the receiver and its counsel.

[45] In my view, it is not for the court to tell lawyers and law firms how to bill. That said, in proceedings supervised by the court and particularly where the court is asked to give its *imprimatur* to the legal fees requested for counsel by its court officer, the court must ensure that the compensation sought is indeed fair and reasonable. In making this assessment, all the *Belyea* factors, including time spent, should be considered. However, value provided should pre-dominate over the mathematical calculation reflected in the hours times hourly rate equation. Ideally, the two should be synonymous, but that should not be the starting assumption. Thus, the factors identified in *Belyea* require a consideration of the overall value contributed by the receiver's counsel. The focus of the fair

and reasonable assessment should be on what was accomplished, not on how much time it took. Of course, the measurement of accomplishment may include consideration of complications and difficulties encountered in the receivership.

[46] It is not my intention to introduce additional complexity and cost to the assessment of legal fees in insolvency proceedings. All participants must be mindful of costs and seek to minimize court appearances recognizing that the risk of failing to do so may be borne on their own shoulders.

#### **(e) Application to This Case**

[47] Applying these principles to the grounds raised, I am not persuaded that the motion judge erred in disallowing counsel's fees.

[48] The initial appointment order stating that the compensation of counsel was to be paid at standard rates and the subsequent approval of the Receiver's reports do not oust the need for the court to consider whether the fees claimed are fair and reasonable.

[49] As stated in *Bakemates*, at para. 53, there may be cases in which the fees generated by the hourly rates charged by a receiver will be reduced if the application of one or more of the *Belyea* factors so requires. Furthermore, although they would not have been determinative in any event, there is no evidence before this court that the standard rates were ever disclosed prior to the appointment of the receiver. In addition, as stated, while the receiver and its

counsel may be entitled to charge their standard rates, the ultimate assessment of what is fair and reasonable should dominate the analysis. I would therefore reject the appellant's argument that the motion judge erred in disallowing BLG's fees at its standard rates.

[50] I also reject the appellant's argument that the motion judge erred in fact in concluding that counsel's fees were not fair and reasonable.

[51] In this regard, the appellant makes numerous complaints.

[52] The appellant submits that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error of fact in finding that the debtor was cooperative. The appellant relies on the contents of the Receiver's two reports in support of this contention. The first report states that on the date of the initial appointment order, August 20, 2013, the Receiver became aware of an offer to purchase the farm dated August 13, 2013 and reviewed the offer with the debtor's counsel. The report goes on to state that the debtor was not opposed to the Receiver completing that transaction and seeking the court's approval of it. The second report does detail some issues with the debtor such as the movement of certain property and cows to two farms for storage, even though the Receiver had arranged for storage with the purchaser at no cost to the Receiver or the debtor, and the leasing by the debtor of 60 additional cows to increase milk production.

[53] While there are certain aspects of the second report indicating that some negotiation with the debtor was required, based on the facts before him, it was open to the motion judge to conclude, overall, that the debtor cooperated. The Receiver and its counsel never said otherwise. Furthermore, this finding was made in the context of the debtor having agreed to continue to operate the farm pursuant to an August 30, 2013 agreement and in the face of little involvement of the Receiver and its counsel in the day-to-day management of the farm. Indeed, in the first report, the Receiver notes the debtor's willingness to carry on the farming operations on a day-to-day basis.

[54] In my view, it was also appropriate for the motion judge to question why a senior Toronto partner had to attend court in London to address unopposed motions and, further, to find that the scope of the receivership was modest. Indeed, in his reasons at para. 40, the motion judge wrote that, in the proceedings before him, counsel for the Receiver acknowledged that the receivership was not complex. Based on the record, it was open to him to conclude that the receivership involved "the divestment of the farm and assets with some modest ancillary work."

[55] As the motion judge noted at para. 20, the fixing of costs is not an unusual task for the court. Moreover, he was fully familiar with the receivership and was well-placed to assess the value generated by the legal services rendered. He properly considered the *Belyea* factors. While a different judge might have

viewed the facts, including the debtor's conduct, differently, the motion judge made findings of fact based on the record and is owed deference. In my view, the appellant failed to establish any palpable and overriding error.

[56] Nor did the motion judge focus his decision on what remained to the debtor after the creditors, the Receiver and Receiver's counsel had been paid, as alleged by the appellant. In para. 34 of his reasons, which is the focus of the appellant's complaint on this point, the motion judge correctly considered the size of the estate. He stated that he was persuaded that "the amount of counsel's efforts and work involved may be disproportionate to the size of the receivership." After the size of the estate became known, he concluded that the "standard" rates of counsel were too high relative to the size. As observed in *Belyea*, at para. 9, the "nature, extent and value" of an estate is a factor to be considered in assessing whether fees are fair and reasonable. As such, along with counsel's knowledge, experience and skill and the other *Belyea* factors, it is a relevant consideration.

[57] In addition, the motion judge was not bound to accept the affidavit evidence filed by BLG or the two Receiver reports as determinative of the fairness and reasonableness of the fees requested. It is incumbent on the court to look to the record to assess the accounts of its court officer, but it is open to a motion judge to draw inferences from that record. This is just what the motion judge did.

[58] Having said that, I do agree with the appellant that there were some unfair criticisms made of counsel. There was no basis to state that counsel had attempted to exaggerate or had conducted himself in a disingenuous manner. I also agree with the appellant that the Receiver and its counsel cannot be faulted for failing to bring the accounts forward for approval at an earlier stage. Costly court appearances should be discouraged not encouraged.

[59] I also agree with the appellant that it was inappropriate for the motion judge to adopt a mathematical approach and simply apply the rates of London counsel. However, this was not fatal: the motion judge's decision was informed by the factors in *Belyea*. As he noted, he would have arrived at the same result in any event. He was informed by the correct principles, which led him to conclude that the fees lacked proportionality and reasonableness. This is buttressed by the motion judge's concluding comments, in para. 47 of his reasons, where he made it clear that the driving concern in his analysis was the "overall reasonableness of the fees" and that his decision should not be read as saying that Toronto rates have no application in matters in London or its surrounding areas.

[60] While certain of the motion judge's comments were unjustified, I am not persuaded that a different result should ensue.

## **Disposition**

[61] For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal. As agreed, the appellant shall pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed in the amount of \$5,500, together with disbursements and all applicable taxes.

Released:

"DEC -1 2014"

"Sarah E. Pepall J.A."

"EAC"

"I agree Alexandra Hoy A.C.J.O."

"I agree E.A. Cronk J.A."

## **TAB 2**

**CITATION:** Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd. v. 2011836 Ontario Corp. et al.,  
2024 ONSC 3507  
**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-23-00710795-00CL  
**DATE:** 2024-06-18

**ONTARIO**

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE [Commercial List]**

**BETWEEN:**

**CAMERON STEPHENS MORTGAGE CAPITAL LTD.**

Applicant

– and –

**2011836 ONTARIO CORP., JEFFERSON PROPERTIES LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP, 1000162801 ONTARIO CORP., AMERICAN CORPORATION  
and 1000199992 ONTARIO CORP.**

Respondents

**DATE HEARD:** May 27, 2024

**BEFORE:** Justice Jana Steele

**COUNSEL:**

*Jeff Larry and Ryan Shah* for the Receiver, Albert Gelman Inc.

*Wendy Greenspoon-Soer* for the Applicant

*Khaled Gheddai* for the Respondents

**ENDORSEMENT**

**Overview**

[1] The Receiver, Albert Gelman Inc., seeks, among other things, Court approval to disclaim the 28 asset purchase agreements (“APSs”) under which buyers contracted pre-construction with the debtors to buy certain freehold properties. The Receiver also seeks an increase in the borrowing limit to fund the remaining work to complete the project.

[2] The Receiver’s motion is supported by the first secured lender, Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd. (“CSMC”).

[3] The respondents oppose the Receiver's motion. The respondents are of the view that the Receiver has not taken appropriate steps to canvass all stakeholders and options before seeking to disclaim the APSs.

[4] One of the 28 purchasers, Hsin Yang Lee ("Lee"), filed evidence opposing the Receiver's motion but did not make oral submissions.

[5] None of the purchasers made oral submissions at the hearing.

[6] Affidavit evidence to oppose the Receiver's motion was also filed by a creditor of the debtors, Spectrum Realty Services Inc., Brokerage ("Spectrum"). Spectrum also did not make oral submissions.

[7] The debtors are real estate developers and the registered owners of the Jefferson Properties. The Jefferson Properties is the site of a 96-unit residential real estate development project known as Richmond Hill Grace (the "Project"), consisting of 60 stacked condominium townhome units and 36 freehold townhomes.

[8] The Project is only about 60-70% constructed.

[9] For the reasons set out below, the Receiver's motion is granted.

### **Background**

[10] The Receiver was appointed by Order of Cavanagh J., dated December 21, 2023.

[11] At the time of the Receiver's appointment, the debtors were in the middle of constructing the Project. Under the appointment order, the Receiver was empowered to borrow \$7,000,000. That borrowing limit was subsequently increased to \$9,500,000, and then to \$11,500,000.

[12] Following its appointment, the Receiver determined that stakeholder value would be maximized by completion of the Project. However, shortly after its appointment, the Receiver determined that there were construction, health and safety, and recordkeeping deficiencies with the Project.

[13] The Receiver shut down the Project on January 24, 2024, to assess the management of the Project. As part of this assessment, the Receiver obtained a report from a chartered quantity surveyor (the "Glynn Report") that assessed the cost to complete the Project at \$23,000,000.

[14] After its appointment, the Receiver retained an independent construction representative, Camcos Management Inc., because the Receiver was uncomfortable with certain construction practices and processes implemented by the Project's existing construction manager. The Receiver decided not to renew the contract with the existing construction manager and, in consultation with Camcos and CSMC, retained a new construction manager.

[15] Before the appointment of the Receiver, the debtors had entered into 51 agreements of purchase and sale with respect to condominium townhome units (the "Condos") and 28 APSs with respect to the Freehold townhome units (the "Freehold Towns").

[16] In late March 2024, CSMC advised the Receiver that it would only continue to fund the completion of the Project if the Receiver disclaimed the 28 APSs in respect of the Freehold Towns.

### **Analysis**

*Should the Court authorize the Receiver to terminate and disclaim the 28 APSs with respect to the Freehold Towns?*

[17] It is not disputed that the Court has the jurisdiction to authorize a receiver to disclaim agreements of purchase and sale in the context of real property developments: The Court has done so on numerous occasions, as set out in the Receiver's factum. For example: *Forjay Management Ltd. v. 0981478 BC Ltd.*, 2018 BCSC 527, 11 B.C.L.R. (6th) 395, at paras. 131-132; *Firm Capital Mortgage Fund Inc. v. 2012241 Ontario Ltd.*, 2012 ONSC 4816, 99 C.B.R. (5th) 120, at paras. 31-38; and *Peoples Trust Company v. Censorio Group (Hastings & Carleton) Holdings Ltd*, 2020 BCSC 1013, 80 C.B.R. (6th) 118, at para. 57.

[18] In *Forjay Management*, at paras. 41-44, Fitzpatrick J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court set out the considerations for the Court in determining whether to authorize a receiver to disclaim pre-sale purchase agreements:

- a. The respective legal priority positions as between the competing interests;
- b. Whether a disclaimer would enhance the value of the assets, and, if so, whether a failure to disclaim would amount to a preference in favour of one party; and
- c. If a preference would arise, whether the party seeking to avoid a disclaimer has established that the equities support that result.

[19] The Receiver submits that in this case, the above factors strongly support the Receiver's position. I consider each of the above factors in turn.

#### *(i) Respective Legal Priority Positions*

[20] CMSC is the debtors' senior secured creditor. As at January 8, 2024, the debtors' total indebtedness to CMSC was approximately \$50.8 million. The debtors granted as security for CMSC's loan a charge/mortgage against the Jefferson Properties.

[21] The agreements of purchase and sale that were entered into by the Freehold buyers and the debtors contained the following language, pursuant to which the buyers subordinate their interest to any mortgages or construction financing of the debtors:

The Purchaser hereby acknowledges the full priority of any construction financing or other mortgages arranged by the Vendor and secured by the Property over his interest as Purchaser for the full amount of the said mortgage or construction financing, notwithstanding any law or statute to the contrary and agrees to

execute all acknowledgments or postponements required to give full effect thereto.

[22] In addition, the Freehold buyers agreed to not register their agreements of purchase and sale on title to the property, and none of such agreements have been registered against title to the property.

[23] The purchaser that filed evidence, Hsin Yang Lee, argued that the deposits made pursuant to the Freehold APSs were trust funds under s. 81(1) of the *Condominium Act, 1998*, S.O. 1998, c. 19, and, therefore, such deposits should have priority over the secured creditors. Lee notes that the property was described in the agreement as a parcel of tied land consisting of a freehold unit and an interest in a common elements condominium corporation.

[24] The deposits made were in respect of the Freehold properties. The Freehold APSs are clear that the deposits made were not attributable to the common elements:

That portion of the Purchase Price applicable to the common interest in the Condominium shall be Two (\$2.00) Dollars which shall be payable as part of the monies due on the Unit Transfer Date from the Purchaser to the Vendor. **There is no deposit payable by the Purchaser for the purchase of the common interest in the Condominium.** [Emphasis added.]

[25] Because none of the Freehold deposits were attributable to the common elements, section 81 of the *Condominium Act*, which requires certain payments made to be held in trust, does not apply.

[26] As noted by the Receiver, the interpretation of the *Condominium Act* asserted by Mr. Lee would upset the legislative scheme of homebuyer protection. Under the regulations to the *Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.31 (“ONHWPA”), the limits on compensation for lost deposits differ between freehold and condominium homes:

- a. For freehold homes, the greater of (1) \$60,000, and (2) the lesser of 10% of the sale price of the home and \$100,000; and
- b. For condominiums, \$20,000 plus interest.

[27] Lee seeks the higher protection under the ONHWPA for freehold buyers and seeks the protection owing to condominium buyers under the *Condominium Act* (i.e., the requirement to hold certain funds in trust). As noted by the Receiver, the regulations under the ONHWPA provide for greater protection for freehold purchasers because entities selling new condominiums are required under the *Condominium Act* to hold purchaser deposits in trust. Likewise, the regulations under the ONHWPA provide lesser protection to condominium purchasers because of the requirement to hold the deposits in trust under the *Condominium Act*.

[28] I am satisfied that CSMC’s position, as the party that provided mortgage and construction financing and the first secured creditor, takes legal priority over the Freehold purchasers’ interests.

(ii) *Whether a disclaimer would enhance the value of the assets, and, if so, whether a failure to disclaim would amount to a preference in favour of one party.*

[29] The Receiver submits that the disclaimers would enhance the value of the assets.

[30] The Receiver obtained two appraisals, conducted by professional appraisers CBRE Valuation & Advisory Services and Cushman & Wakefield. The appraisal reports were provided on a confidential basis to the Court. Both appraisal reports support the Receiver's conclusion that the existing Freehold APSs are below the current market value for the properties. The appraisals indicate that the current market value of the Freehold Towns is higher than the prices at which the properties were sold.

[31] The valuation reports also support the Receiver's conclusion that if the properties were sold on an "as-is, where-is" basis, the senior secured lender, CSMC, would suffer a material loss on its indebtedness.

[32] CSMC has indicated that it will only continue to fund the Project if the Freehold APSs are disclaimed. As no other party has been identified who would be willing to fund the completion of the Project, if CSMC refused to continue to fund, this would likely result in a situation where the Receiver would be unable to complete the Project. In such a scenario, the Project would be sold on an "as-is, where-is" basis, resulting in a significant loss to the debtors' estate.

[33] As noted by the Receiver, the Receiver's business judgment that the disclaimers will enhance the value of the estate is entitled to considerable deference: *Peoples Trust*, at para. 47.

(iii) *If a preference would arise, whether the party seeking to avoid a disclaimer has established that the equities support that result.*

[34] It is my view that the equities do not support refusal of the Receiver's request to disclaim the Freehold APSs.

[35] The Receiver is required to take into account and balance the interests of all the debtor's stakeholders. In *Ravelston Corp. (Re)* (2005), 24 C.B.R. (5th) 256 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 40, Doherty J.A. stated:

Receivers will often have to make difficult business choices that require a careful cost/benefit analysis and the weighing of competing, if not irreconcilable, interests. Those decisions will often involve choosing from among several possible courses of action, none of which may be clearly preferable to the others. Usually, there will be many factors to be identified and weighed by the receiver. Viable arguments will be available in support of different options. The receiver must consider all of the available information, the interests of all legitimate stakeholders, and proceed in an evenhanded manner. That, of course, does not mean that all stakeholders must be equally satisfied with the course of conduct chosen by the receiver. If the receiver's decision is within

the broad bounds of reasonableness, and if it proceeds fairly, having considered the interests of all stakeholders, the court will support the receiver's decision.

[36] As noted above, the Receiver has determined that if it does not disclaim the Freehold APSSs, the overall recovery in the receivership would be impaired, which would be to the detriment of the entire estate.

[37] However, certain stakeholders will suffer negative impacts if the 28 Freehold APSSs are disclaimed. First, the parties that had contracted to buy properties will lose their ability to purchase the Freehold Towns pursuant to the terms of their agreements. In addition, these purchasers paid deposits to the debtors, which have been invested in the Project or otherwise spent. Although Tarion insures deposit monies on freehold purchases up to \$100,000, deposit amounts paid by the purchasers in excess of \$100,000 will likely be lost. The Receiver has calculated that the Freehold buyers will lose, on average, deposits of approximately \$45,000 under the Freehold APSSs.

[38] Second, Spectrum will suffer a loss of approximately \$1.4 million, which are the commissions that were to be payable upon closing that are attributable to the Freehold Towns. Further, as noted in the affidavit evidence filed by Spectrum, co-operating brokers, who have assisted with the sale of the Freehold units, will also be deprived of their commission.

[39] The Receiver submits that the negative impact that will be suffered by the Freehold buyers if the agreements are disclaimed does not justify overriding the secured lender's legal priority and giving the Freehold purchasers a preference they would not otherwise have. In this regard, the Receiver notes, among other things, that the Freehold buyers agreed that their interests in the real property would be subordinate to the secured lenders', and Tarion's warranty program will cover a significant portion of the Freehold buyers' deposits.

[40] While the proposed disclaimer will certainly have some negative impact on the homebuyers and real estate agents, I agree with the Receiver that this does not justify overriding CSMC's priority and giving the homebuyers a preference that they would not otherwise enjoy.

[41] I am also persuaded by the Receiver's submission that where, as here, the properties are not complete, the Court cannot effectively direct the Receiver to borrower millions of dollars from CSMC to fund the completion of the construction of the Freehold Towns. The Receiver referred the Court to *Firm Capital Mortgage Fund*, where Morawetz J. (as he then was) stated, at paras. 28 and 29:

[28] Counsel to the Receiver submits that the position taken by the Unitholders is essentially that they wish specific performance of their purchase agreements. Counsel to the Receiver submits that this court has previously held that specific performance (specifically in the context of an unregistered condominium project) should not be ordered where it would amount to "a mandatory order that requires the incurring of borrowing obligations against the subject property and completion of

construction ordered to bring the property into existence". (See: *Re 1565397 Ontario Inc.* (2009), 54 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 262.) I accept this submission.

[29] In my view, the law is clear that the Receiver is not required to borrow the required funds to close the project nor is the first secured creditor required to advance funds for such borrowing.

[42] The Receiver's decision to disclaim the 28 Freehold APSs is "within the broad bounds of reasonableness." I am satisfied that the Receiver has acted fairly and considered the interests of all stakeholders. As noted above, this "does not mean that all stakeholders must be equally satisfied with the course of conduct chosen by the receiver."

*Should the Court approve the Requested Increase to the Borrowing Limit?*

[43] As noted above, the Receiver seeks to increase the borrowing limit by \$20,000,00, from \$11,500,000 to \$31,500,000.

[44] Section 243(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, permits the court to appoint a receiver to, among other things, "take any other action that the court considers advisable." The Court has interpreted this provision broadly, including authorizing borrowing by receivers: *DGDP-BC Holdings Ltd. v. Third Eye Capital Corporation*, 2021 ABCA 226, 25 Alta. L.R. (7th) 211, at para. 20; and *KEB Hana Bank Trustee et al. v. Mizrahi Commercial (The One) LP et al.*, 2023 ONSC 5881, at paras. 54-55.

[45] The order appointing the Receiver also provides that the borrowing limit may be increased by further Court order.

[46] The Receiver submits that approving the requested increase to the borrowing limit is the only way to complete the Project and thereby maximize stakeholder benefit. There is approximately \$2.7 million currently held by the Receiver, which is not sufficient to complete the Project. The estimated cost to complete the Project, based on the Glynn Report, is at least \$23 million.

[47] I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to authorize the increase to the borrowing limit.

*Should the Court approve the activities, fees and interim SRD of the Receiver and the fees of the Receiver's legal counsel?*

[48] The Receiver seeks Court approval of its Second Report, the First Supplemental Report to the Second Report, the Second Supplemental Report to the Second Report and the activities set out in the reports. The principles set out by the Court regarding the approval of the activities of a receiver or monitor, and their reports, are well established: *Target Canada Co. Re*, 2015 ONSC 7574, 31 C.B.R. (6th) 311, at paras. 2 and 12; and *Triple-I Capital Partners Limited v. 12411300 Canada Inc.*, 2023 ONSC 3400, at para. 66.

[49] The activities of the Receiver are set out in the reports and include:

- a. Responding to correspondence and requests for information from the debtors and their principal, among others;
- b. Working with the construction consultant to carry out an assessment of the Project, including identifying health and safety issues on the site;
- c. Managing the review and remediations of health and safety issues;
- d. Commissioning appraisals of the Project, and the 2 Glynn reports; and
- e. Engaging in tendering processes for prospective trades and suppliers.

[50] As noted above, the senior lender, CSMC, supports the Receiver's activities.

[51] Jefferson Properties Limited Partnership and 2011836 Ontario Corp. oppose the conduct of the receivership. Among other things, the debtors suggest that the Receiver has not taken appropriate steps to canvass stakeholders and other options. The debtors also point to the lack of development on the Project since the Receiver's appointment.

[52] As noted by the Receiver, courts should defer to the reasonable exercise of business judgment by court appointed receivers: *Ravelston Corp. (Re)*, at para. 40.

[53] The Receiver states that it has been willing to try to accommodate the debtors, including providing certain requested information to the debtors and facilitating at least 4 site visits with potential financiers. This is supported by CSMC's evidence that "Wang and numerous financiers, developers and construction professionals have been given access to the site on multiple occasions."

[54] The Receiver is of the view that the course of action it is pursuing is the only alternative in the circumstances. Among other things, CSMC has indicated that it will only agree to increase funding to complete the Project if the proposal to terminate the 28 APSs is approved as requested by the Receiver.

[55] With regard to the lack of development on the Project, the Receiver identified serious concerns, as set out in its Report, including unpaid liens, lack of communications, health and safety issues, among other things, which caused the Receiver to halt work on the Project and assess.

[56] I am satisfied that the Receiver considered a range of options and was unable to find a viable alternative, which is why the Receiver has proceeded to ask the Court for the relief on this motion.

[57] I am satisfied that the Receiver's activities were necessary, appropriate and consistent with the Receiver's mandate. It is unfortunate that there was a stoppage of work on the Project further delaying its completion. However, I am satisfied that the Receiver, using its business judgment, determined that it was necessary and appropriate in the circumstances so that the issues with the Project could be remedied.

[58] I am also satisfied that the fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel are fair, reasonable and justified in the circumstances. I note that fee affidavits have been filed. This has been a complicated matter given, among other things, the issues with the management of the construction up to the date of the Receiver's appointment.

*Should the Court authorize the proposed sealing Order?*

[59] The Receiver seeks an order sealing the confidential appendices pending the completion of the Project and the sale of all of the units. The confidential appendices contain the appraisals, the Second Glynn Report and a summary of budgetary information related to the Project.

[60] Subsection 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, provides that the Court may order that any document filed in a civil proceeding be treated as confidential, sealed, and not form part of the public record. In addition to the jurisdiction under the *Courts of Justice Act*, the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to issue sealing orders: *Fairview Donut Inc. v. The TDL Group Corp.*, 2010 ONSC 789, 100 O.R. (3d) 510, at para. 34.

[61] As noted by the Receiver, it is common to temporarily seal bids and other commercially sensitive material in an insolvency context when assets are to be sold under a court process.


[62] The respondents oppose the requested sealing order taking the position that the Project's budget ought to be disclosed to the stakeholders so that they may assess the rationale for the increase to the borrowing limit. As was done with the Glynn Report, the Receiver is prepared to share the confidential appendices with stakeholders who sign a non-disclosure agreement. This is proportionate.

[63] The requested sealing order is limited in scope and in time. The proposed sealing order balances the open court principle and legitimate commercial requirements for confidentiality in the circumstances. In my view, the benefits of the requested sealing order outweigh the negative impact on the "open court" principle. If this information were released, it may impact the Receiver's ability to maximize value and maintain integrity of any future marketing and sale process. No stakeholder will be materially prejudiced by the time limited sealing order, which applies to only a limited amount of information.

[64] I am satisfied that the limited nature and scope of the proposed sealing order is appropriate and satisfies the *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, at para. 53, requirements, as modified in *Sherman Estate v. Donovan*, 2021 SCC 25, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 75, at para. 38.

[65] The Receiver is directed to provide the sealed confidential appendices to the Court clerk at the filing office in an envelope with a copy of this endorsement and the signed order (with the relevant provisions highlighted) so that the confidential appendices can be physically sealed.

[66] The Receiver's motion is granted. I have attached the signed order, which is effective immediately and without the necessity of issuing and entering.



J. Steele J.

**Released:** June 18, 2024.

**CITATION:** Cameron Stephens Mortgage Capital Ltd. v. 2011836 Ontario Corp. et al.,  
2024 ONSC 3507  
**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-23-00710795-00CL  
**DATE:** 2024-06-18

**ONTARIO**  
**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**

**BETWEEN:**

CAMERON STEPHENS MORTGAGE CAPITAL  
LTD.

Applicant

– and –

2011836 ONTARIO CORP., JEFFERSON  
PROPERTIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 1000162801  
ONTARIO CORP., AMERICAN CORPORATION and  
1000199992 ONTARIO CORP.

Respondents

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**REASONS FOR JUDGMENT**

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Steele, J.

**Released:** June 18, 2024

## **TAB 3**

**CITATION:** First Source Financial Management v. Chacon Strawberry Fields Inc., 2024  
ONSC 7229  
**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-24-00717742-00CL  
**DATE:** 20241223

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO**

**RE:** FIRST SOURCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INC.

Applicant

**AND:**

CHACON STRAWBERRY FIELDS INC. and SURINDER KAUR CHAHAL

Respondents

**BEFORE:** Justice Jana Steele

**COUNSEL:** *Steven L. Graff and Adrienne Ho*, for the Receiver, The Fuller Landau Group Inc.

*Wolfgang Kaufmann and Tajinder Kaur Sivia*, for the Respondents

*Ryan Shah*, for the Applicant, First Source Financial Management Inc.

*Jitseh Bhalla*, for the Second Lender, 1794523 Ontario Inc.

*Arnab Bose*, for the third-party, Ramesh Ahluwalia

**HEARD:** December 20, 2024

**ENDORSEMENT**

**Overview**

[1] This is a motion brought by The Fuller Landau Group Inc., the Receiver, for the approval of a sale process and transaction, an approval and vesting order, and an ancillary order approving the Receiver's report, fees and disbursements, and a distribution to the first secured lender, among other things.

[2] The contentious issues before the court relate to whether last ditch attempts to alter the sale process by an unsuccessful bidder, Ramesh Ahluwalia, and by the respondents should be permitted.

[3] The respondents seek access to certain sealed confidential documents and an adjournment of three weeks. The respondents say they want the time to secure financing.

[4] Mr. Ahluwalia asks that his late offer be considered when the court determines whether to approve the agreement of purchase and sale with the Purchaser.

[5] For the reasons set out below the Receiver's motion is granted.

### **Background**

[6] The application to appoint the Receiver was filed by First Source Financial Management Inc. ("First Source") on or about April 3, 2024. However, due to a forbearance agreement that was reached, the Receiver was not appointed until on or about July 19, 2024. At that time, the Receiver was appointed as receiver and manager of the lands and premises municipally known as 12550, 12560 and 12570 Kennedy Road, Caledon Ontario, (the "Real Property") owned by Chacon Strawberry Fields Inc. (the "Debtor").

[7] The Debtor is a company incorporated pursuant to the laws of Ontario.

[8] The Debtor owns and operates a mixed-use retail plaza called "Strawberry Fields Plaza," which is situated on the Real Property, a 2.32-acre piece of land. The plaza is fully leased to 15 tenants.

[9] Upon being appointed and determining the nature of the property and other preliminary steps, the Receiver undertook a process to engage a real estate broker to market and sell the Real Property. The Receiver met with five real estate brokerages, each of which were asked to provide a marketing proposal for the Real Property. All five brokerages submitted marketing proposals. The Receiver selected Lennard Commercial Realty, Brokerage ("Lennard") based on its specific expertise with properties similar to the Real Property and prior successful experience with sales in receiverships.

[10] The Receiver entered into the listing agreement with Lennard on or about September 17, 2024.

[11] Lennard listed the property on September 23, 2024. Lennard took numerous other marketing steps, resulting in 127 parties executing non-disclosure agreements to access the data room.

[12] The initial bid deadline was set at November 6, 2024, at 3 p.m. Eleven offers were submitted by the deadline and three other offers were submitted after the deadline, including Mr. Ahluwalia's bid. The top six bidders (all of which had submitted their bids by the deadline) were invited to submit another bid – Mr. Ahluwalia was not asked to re-submit because he was not among the top six bidders.

[13] The successful bidder (the "Purchaser") submitted its bid by the initial bid deadline and was among the top six asked to re-submit a bid.

[14] The second bid deadline was set at November 12, 2024, at 3 pm. Five of the six bidders who were invited to re-submit, including the Purchaser, did so in accordance with the deadline. Two other bidders who were not invited to re-submit, including Mr. Ahluwalia, made another bid.

[15] The Purchaser's bid was accepted by the Receiver on November 13, 2024. The Purchaser's bid was the highest bid delivered by the second bid deadline. The Purchaser paid the required deposit to the Receiver.

[16] On November 14, 2024, two days after the second bid deadline, and after the Receiver had accepted the Purchaser's bid, Mr. Ahluwalia made another bid.

[17] Among other things, the Receiver is asking the court to approve the transaction with the Purchaser (the "Sale Transaction"). The Sale Transaction is targeted to close on January 13, 2025.

[18] The applicant, First Source, is the first ranking secured creditor on the Real Property.

## **Analysis**

*Should the Court adjourn the proceedings to January 9, 2025, as requested by the respondents?*

[19] The respondents ask the court to adjourn the Receiver's motion to January 9, 2025 to give the respondents the opportunity to redeem. Tied in with this request, is the respondents' request that the Receiver be required to provide the respondents with access to certain sealed documents, including the sale price the Purchaser is paying pursuant to the Sale Transaction, the adjustments to the sale price, and a draft payout statement to show what each creditor is expected to receive (the "Transaction Information").

[20] The Court of Appeal in *Rose-Isli Corp. v. Smith*, 2023 ONCA 548, at para. 9, affirmed that the motions judge had not erred in applying the following principles to guide her consideration of whether the debtor should be granted leave to redeem:

- a. In considering a request by an encumbrancer to redeem a mortgage on property in receivership, a court should consider the impact that allowing the encumbrancer to exercise its right of redemption would have on the integrity of a court-approved sales process;
- b. Usually, if a court-approved sales process has been carried out in a manner consistent with the principles set out in *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), a court should not permit a latter attempt to redeem to interfere with the completion of the sales process. In our view, the reason the *Soundair* principles apply to circumstances where an encumbrancer seeks to redeem a mortgage is that once the court's process has been invoked to supervise the sale of assets under receivership, the process must take into consideration all affected economic interests in the properties in question, not just those of one creditor; and
- c. In dealing with the matter, a court should engage in a balancing analysis of the right to redeem against the impact on the integrity of the court-approved receivership process.

[21] Unlike *Rose-Isli*, in the instant case the sales process was not pre-approved by the court. The Receiver asks the court on this motion to approve the sales process that it undertook. As set out below, I am satisfied that the *Soundair* principles have been satisfied and the sales process should be approved.

[22] The respondents' evidence is that they have obtained a financing offer from Gurpreet Kainth of K.P. Financial Group for \$23.5 million (the "Financing Offer"). Further, the respondents state that their redemption plan, assuming the financing is approved, is to pay the following:

- a. First Source will be paid in full,
- b. The second mortgagee will receive 90% of the amount owing,
- c. All HST, realty taxes, Receiver's costs and real estate break fees will be satisfied, and
- d. Subsequent mortgagees will be compensated, with specific amounts allocated to obtain necessary postponements.

[23] Essentially the respondents are asking the court for more time to put together a proposal that they say will be better than the Sale Transaction. The respondents are not saying that they have "cash in hand" and can redeem the outstanding mortgages on the property. The respondents seek the confidential Transaction Information so they can ensure that their proposal is better than the deal reached pursuant to the Sale Transaction.

[24] The Receiver objects to any adjournment. As the Receiver points out an adjournment will result in a delay and will not change the outcome. Setting aside whether the Financing Offer may come to fruition, the proposed \$23.5 million in financing is not enough for the Debtor to redeem the outstanding mortgages on the property. The Receiver states that the Debtor would need more than \$32.8 million in financing to pay out the mortgagees in full.

[25] The jurisprudence provides for a balancing act that the court must engage in when faced with a debtor who wants to redeem. After a receiver has gone through an exhaustive bidding process, including the costs associated therewith, to find a purchaser, the court may still permit a last-minute redemption where the debtor comes with a cheque in hand: *Peakhill Capital Inc. v. 1000093910 Ontario Inc.*, 2024 ONSC 4000 at para. 7-9. Further, in the exceptional circumstances where the court may permit a last-minute redemption, the cheque in hand must be sufficient to cover all the outstanding obligations: *Vector Financial Services v. 33 Hawarden Crescent*, 2024 ONSC 1635, at para. 97.

[26] There is no cheque in hand in the instant case.

[27] Further, a short adjournment would not alter the situation such that the debtors would have sufficient funds to redeem the mortgages. As noted above, the Financing Offer, even if it comes to fruition, would not provide sufficient funds for the debtor to redeem all the outstanding mortgages on the Real Property. Instead, the debtors want to obtain information and financing so that they can make an offer above the sale price in the Sale Transaction. As noted by the Receiver, this is one of the reasons the purchase price is kept confidential in a situation like this until the transaction closes. Otherwise, the debtor may use the information to try to obtain financing just to beat the purchase price and attempt to negotiate with subsequent mortgagees. This would thwart the entire process.

[28] As noted by the court in *B&M Handelman Investments Limited v. Mass Properties Inc.*, 2009 CanLII 37930, 55 C.B.R. (5<sup>th</sup>) 271, at para. 22:

[...] Ms. Singh does not have an automatic right to redeem. A mockery would be made of the practice and procedures relating to receivership sales if redemption were permitted at this stage of the proceedings. A receiver would spend time and money securing an agreement of purchase and sale that was, as is common place, subject to Court approval, and the benefit of all stakeholders, only for there to be a redemption by a mortgagee at the last minute. This could act as a potential chill on securing the best offer and be to the overall detriment of stakeholders.

[29] The request for an adjournment is denied.

*Should the Court approve the Sale Agreement and the Sale Transaction with the Purchaser?*

[30] The Court of Appeal in *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.*, 1991 CanLII 2727, 4 O.R. (3d) 1 set out the factors for the court to consider when determining whether a proposed sale should be approved:

- a. Whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- b. The efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers were obtained;
- c. Whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process; and,
- d. The interest of all parties.

[31] I am satisfied that the *Soundair* factors have been met.

[32] The Receiver first sought proposals for the brokerage firm to market the property. After receiving and considering five marketing proposals, the Receiver selected Lennard, based on its expertise and experience. The activities taken to market the Real Property included listing the property on MLS, sending weekly eblasts with relevant details to prospective purchasers and agents, featuring the Real Property on the Lennard Commercial website and LinkedIn, and advertising the Real Property on three occasions in the Globe & Mail's Report on Business section. As evidenced by the fact that 127 parties executed NDAs and were granted access to the data room, the Real Property received wide market exposure. As noted above, 14 bidders submitted offers on the first round and seven bidders submitted offers on the second round. The Purchaser's offer was the highest and best offer received in the bidding process and the agreement of purchase and sale does not contain any material conditions. The Real Property is being bought by the Purchaser on an "as is where is" basis. I further note that the Sale Transaction has the support of the Debtor's first ranking secured creditor.

[33] Mr. Ahluwalia asks the court to consider his November 14, 2024 offer when determining whether to approve the sale process and the proposed Sale Transaction. As noted above, Mr. Ahluwalia missed the first bid deadline and submitted a bid significantly below the top six bidders who were asked to re-submit. Mr. Ahluwalia submitted a bid in the second round of bidding in any event, which the Receiver did consider. However, there were at least three parties who had higher bids than Mr. Ahluwalia in the second round. Accordingly, the Receiver accepted the

Purchaser's offer. Mr. Ahluwalia submitted his November 14, 2024 offer after the Receiver had accepted the Purchaser's offer.

[34] A disappointed bidder does not generally have standing to challenge a motion to approve a sale to another bidder: *Re Consumer Packaging Inc.*, 2001 CanLII 6708, at para. 7.

[35] In any event, considering Mr. Ahluwalia's bid after the bid deadline passed and the Purchaser's offer was accepted would thwart the integrity of the sales process. If a party could swoop in at the last minute and submit a bully bid, after a fair and thorough sales process has been run and the highest and best offer accepted, complete uncertainty would be created.

[36] As noted by the Receiver, courts will generally defer to a court-appointed receiver's expertise in reviewing a sale and will not second-guess their recommendation absent exceptional circumstances: *Marchant Realty Partners Inc. v. 2407553 Ontario Inc.*, 2021 ONCA 375, at para. 15.

[37] I am satisfied that the sale agreement and Sale Transaction with the Purchaser should be approved.

*Should the Approval and Vesting Order be granted?*

[38] The Receiver seeks an approval and vesting order in respect of the Real Property sale to the Purchaser.

[39] Under section 100 of the *Courts of Justice Act* the court has the power to grant approval and vesting orders:

A court may by order vest in any person an interest in real or personal property that the court has authority to order be disposed of, encumbered or conveyed.

[40] The proposed vesting order will extinguish the registered charges on the Real Property listed out in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Receiver's factum.

[41] Vesting orders are routinely granted by this court: *Third Eye Capital Corporation v. Resources Dianor Inc./Dianor Resources Inc.*, 2019 ONCA 508 at para. 106.

[42] I agree with the Receiver's submission that it is appropriate for the court to grant the requested AVO, granting the Real Property to the Purchaser free and clear of the claims and encumbrances set out at paras. 30 and 31 of the Receiver's factum (other than Permitted Encumbrances). The applicant, First Source, is supportive of the transaction being put forward. Further, as set out above, the sale was conducted in a manner that meets the *Soundair* principles.

*Should the Interim Distribution be approved?*

[43] The Receiver seeks court approval to distribute \$16 million to First Source following the completion of the Transaction. The Receiver seeks authorization to make further payments to First Source from available funds up to the amount of First Source's debt, once the Receiver has determined the amounts due in respect of certain priority claims.

[44] The court routinely grants orders authorizing interim distributions in insolvency proceedings: *e.g., Ontario Securities Commission v. Bridging Income Fund L.P.*, 2022 ONSC 4472, at paras. 8 and 12.

[45] In determining whether it is appropriate to authorize an interim distribution the court may consider: (a) whether the proposed recipient's security is valid and enforceable; (b) whether the amounts that are owed to the proposed recipient exceed the proposed interim distribution amount; and (c) whether the proposed interim distribution would result in interest savings: *Re Abitibibowater Inc.*, 2009 QCCS 6461 at para. 75.

[46] In the instant case, First Source has a valid and enforceable security interest in respect of the collateral covered by its security. Counsel to the Receiver provided the Receiver with a security opinion, subject to the usual qualifications, assumptions and disclaimers, which opinion confirms the validity of the charge granted in favour of First Source on the Real Property. The amount of First Source's indebtedness as at October 1, 2024 was \$17,752,258.56. The proposed distribution of \$16 million is less than the amount outstanding on the loan. By repaying a portion of the loan, there will be interest savings.

[47] I am satisfied that the proposed interim distribution should be approved.

*Should the Court grant the Sealing Order?*

[48] The Receiver seeks a sealing order with respect to the Confidential Appendices of the Third Report. The Confidential Appendices contain information regarding the purchase price for the transaction and information regarding the sales process, including other offers submitted.

[49] Subsection 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides that the Court may order that any document filed in a civil proceeding be treated as confidential, sealed, and not form part of the public record.

[50] For the court to grant a sealing order, the party requesting the order must establish that:

- a. Court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
- b. The order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and
- c. As a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the sealing order outweigh its negative effects;

*Sherman Estate v. Donovan*, 2021 SCC 25, at para. 38.

[51] The requested sealing order is limited in scope. The proposed sealing order balances the open court principle and legitimate commercial requirements for confidentiality in the circumstances. In my view, the benefits of the requested sealing order outweigh the negative impact on the "open court" principle. The Confidential Appendices contain commercially sensitive information that could have a detrimental impact on a future sales process, should one be required if the transaction does not close. No stakeholder will be materially prejudiced by the

sealing order, which applies to only a limited amount of information. As noted by the Receiver, there is not a reasonable alternative to a sealing order.

[52] I am satisfied that the limited nature and scope of the proposed sealing order is appropriate and satisfies the *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, at para. 53, requirements, as modified in *Sherman Estate v. Donovan*, 2021 SCC 25, at para. 38.

[53] I am satisfied that the Confidential Appendices should be sealed pending further order of this court.

*Should the Court grant the other relief sought by the Receiver?*

[54] There was no opposition to the other relief sought by the Receiver, specifically, the approval of the Second Report, Third Report, and Supplemental Third Report, and the approval of the fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel.

[55] As noted in *Re Target Canada Co.*, 2015 ONSC 7574, at para. 2, court appointed officers routinely seek court approval of their reports and activities, which relief is routinely granted where there is no opposition. The court in *Target* also recognized, at para. 22, that there are “good policy and practical reasons” for the court to provide such approval. While *Target* was a case involving court approval of Monitor’s reports and activities under a *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* proceeding, subsequent cases have confirmed that the considerations apply equally to the reports and activities of a receiver: *Re Hangfeng Evergreen Inc.*, 2017 ONSC 7161 at para. 15.

[56] I am satisfied that the activities of the Receiver set out in the Second Report, Third Report, and Supplemental Third Report were necessary and undertaken in good faith in accordance with the order appointing the Receiver and should be approved.

[57] Having reviewed the fee affidavits and considered the non-exhaustive factors in *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer*, 2014 ONCA 851, at para. 33, I am satisfied that the fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel for the applicable billing period are fair and reasonable and should be approved.

[58] Orders attached.

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J. Steele J.

**Released:** December 23, 2024

## **TAB 4**



ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

**COUNSEL/ENDORSEMENT SLIP**

**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-23-00705617-00CL

**DATE:** 22 October 2024

**NO. ON LIST:** 4

**TITLE OF PROCEEDING:** FIRST SOURCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INC. v. 2807823 ONTARIO INC.

**BEFORE:** JUSTICE CONWAY

**PARTICIPANT INFORMATION**

**For Plaintiff, Applicant, Moving Party:**

<b>Name of Person Appearing</b>	<b>Name of Party</b>	<b>Contact Info</b>
Thomas Gertner	Lawyer for the Receiver, TDB Restructuring Limited	Thomas.gertner@gowlingwlg.com
Jeffrey Larry	Lawyer for the Applicant	Jeff.larry@paliareroland.com

**For Defendant, Respondent, Responding Party:**

<b>Name of Person Appearing</b>	<b>Name of Party</b>	<b>Contact Info</b>
Ian Cantor	Lawyer for the Defendants, 8522146 Canada Inc., Elk Capital Ltd., Trevor Rabie and Matthew Elkind	Icantor@rarlitigation.com
Michael D. Magonet	Lawyer for the Defendants, Evoke Solutions Incorporated and Jon Jeffrey Howard	M@magonetlaw.com

**For Other, Self-Represented:**

<b>Name of Person Appearing</b>	<b>Name of Party</b>	<b>Contact Info</b>
Jeffrey Berger	The Receiver	jberger@tdbadvisory.ca
Bryan Tannenbaum		btannenbaum@tdbadvisory.ca

**ENDORSEMENT OF JUSTICE CONWAY:**

- [1] All defined terms used in this Endorsement shall, unless otherwise defined, have the meanings ascribed to them in the Factum of the Receiver dated October 18, 2024.
- [2] The Receiver brings this motion seeking two orders: (i) an AVO approving the Transaction for the sale of the Property; and (ii) an Ancillary Relief and Discharge Order authorizing the Receiver to make the Proposed Interim Distribution of Proceeds, approving the First Report, approving the fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel, approving the Statement of Receipts and Disbursements, sealing the Confidential Appendices to the First Report, and discharging the Receiver.
- [3] Messrs. Cantor and Magonet, counsel for the guarantors, attended today. First Source, the Applicant, has commenced litigation against the guarantors for the shortfall on any recovery from the sale of the Respondent's assets (the "**Guarantee Litigation**"). Counsel for the guarantors said that they were not seeking an adjournment of this motion or opposing the relief sought by the Receiver. However, they wanted me to include language in my endorsement that any relief granted today is without prejudice to their rights to argue in the Guarantee Litigation that the Receiver acted improvidently in selling the Property.
- [4] I refused to do so. As I told counsel in Court, now is the time for the court to assess whether the Receiver has acted reasonably and properly in marketing the Property and to decide whether the Receiver has met the *Soundair* principles. If I approve the Transaction and grant the AVO, any challenge in the Guarantee Litigation to the Receiver's conduct would, in my view, amount to a collateral attack on the APA.
- [5] I repeatedly asked Messrs. Cantor and Magonet whether they were seeking an adjournment of the Receiver's motion, in order to obtain more information and decide whether they want to oppose the Transaction. They told me clearly and repeatedly that they did not want to adjourn the motion (their reason is that interest costs are continuing to accrue). They also confirmed that they were not opposing the relief sought today. When I indicated that I would not be including their requested wording in my endorsement, they again said that they did not want an adjournment and were not opposing the motion. I therefore proceeded with the Receiver's motion.
- [6] With respect to the APA, I have reviewed the marketing process and am satisfied that the Receiver has satisfied the *Soundair* factors. The Receiver exposed the Property (vacant land) broadly to the market over a six-week period. Only four bids were received by the Bid Deadline. The Receiver negotiated an increase to the bid presented by the Purchaser and determined that the Transaction generated the highest and best recovery for creditors.
- [7] There was a Prospective Higher Bidder. However, as outlined in the Receiver's First Report and the Supplement to the First Report, the Receiver worked with that bidder but did not receive a deposit or confirmation that it had the financing to complete the transaction. As the Receiver states in the First Report, "the Receiver gave the Prospective Higher Bidder numerous opportunities to confirm its financing and submit a deposit over a

three-week time period. However, notwithstanding repeated assurances from the Prospective Higher Bider [sic] that it would provide this confirmation as well as the deposit, it failed to do so." The Receiver states that there is "significant uncertainty and the transaction risk associated with the Prospective Higher Bidder." The Receiver "has no confidence whatsoever that appropriate financing will be secured".

- [8] The Receiver is of the view that the Transaction provides for the greatest recovery in the circumstances and no further marketing of the Property will generate a superior transaction. I accept the Receiver's recommendation and grant the APA.
- [9] The relief in the Ancillary Relief and Discharge Order is appropriate. The activities, fees and disbursements are approved. The Proposed Interim Distribution of Proceeds is approved. The discharge of the Receiver on filing the discharge certificate is approved.
- [10] The order contains a sealing order for the Confidential Appendices. I am satisfied that the requested sealing order for the Confidential Appendices meets the test in *Sierra Club/Sherman Estates* and that disclosure of this information would pose a risk to the public interest in enabling stakeholders of a company in receivership to maximize the realization of assets. It is time limited up to the closing of the Transaction. It only covers information that could prejudice stakeholders if the Transaction fails to close and the Property has to be remarketed. **I direct counsel for the Receiver to file a hard copy of the Confidential Appendices with the Commercial List office in a sealed envelope with a copy of the Ancillary Relief and Discharge Order and this Endorsement.**
- [11] Counsel for the Receiver has revised the draft orders to delete the references to declaratory language. They are satisfactory to me now. Orders to go as signed by me and attached to this Endorsement. These orders are effective from today's date and are enforceable without the need for entry and filing.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Conway J.", is placed here.

## **TAB 5**

**CITATION:** GE Canada Real Estate Financing Business Property Company v. 1262354 Ontario Inc., 2014 ONSC 1173  
**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-12-9856-00CL  
**DATE:** 20140224

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO**

**COMMERCIAL LIST**

**RE:** GE Canada Real Estate Financing Business Property Company, Applicant

**AND:**

1262354 Ontario Inc., Respondent

**BEFORE:** D. M. Brown J.

**COUNSEL:** L. Pillon and Y. Katirai, for the Receiver

L. Rogers, for the applicant, GE Canada Real Estate Financing Business Property Company

C. Reed, for the Respondent and for Keith Munt, the principal of the Respondent, and 800145 Ontario Inc., a related subsequent encumbrancer

A. Grossi, for the proposed purchaser, 5230 Harvester Holdings Corp.

**HEARD:** February 18, 2014

**REASONS FOR DECISION**

**I. Debtor's request for disclosure of commercially sensitive information on a receiver's motion to approve the sale of real property**

[1] PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., the receiver of all the assets, undertaking and properties of the respondent debtor, 1262354 Ontario Inc., pursuant to an Appointment Order made November 5, 2012, moved for an order approving its execution of an agreement of purchase and sale dated December 27, 2013, with G-3 Holdings Inc., vesting title in the purchased assets in that purchaser, approving the fees and disbursements of the Receiver and authorizing the distribution of some of the net proceeds from the sale to the senior secured creditor, GE Canada Real Estate Financing Business Property Company (“GE”).

[2] The Receiver's motion was opposed by the Debtor, Keith Munt, the principal of the Debtor, and another of his companies, 800145 Ontario Inc. (“800 Inc.”), which holds a subordinate mortgage on the sale property. The Debtor wanted access to the information filed by

the Receiver in the confidential appendices to its report, but the Debtor was not prepared to execute the form of confidentiality agreement sought by the Receiver.

[3] After adjourning the hearing date once at the request of the Debtor, I granted the orders sought by the Receiver. These are my reasons for so doing.

## II. Facts

[4] The primary assets of the Debtor were two manufacturing facilities located on close to 13 acres of land at 5230 Harvester Road, Burlington (the "Property"). Prior to the initiation of the receivership the Property had been listed for sale for \$10.9 million. Following its appointment in November, 2012, the Receiver entered into a new listing agreement with Colliers Macaulay Nicolls (Ontario) Inc. at a listing price of \$9.95 million. In January, 2013, the listing price was reduced to \$8.2 million.

[5] In its Second Report dated March 14, 2013 and Third Report dated February 5, 2014, the Receiver described in detail its efforts to market and sell the Property. As of the date of the Second Report Colliers had received expressions of interest from 33 parties, conducted 8 site tours and had received 8 executed Non-Disclosure Agreements from parties to which it had provided a confidential information package. From that 5-month marketing effort the Receiver had received one offer, which it rejected because it was significantly below the asking price, and one letter of intent, to which it responded by seeking an increased price.

[6] Prior to the appointment of the Receiver the Debtor had begun the process to seek permission to sever the Property into two parcels. Understanding that severing the Property might enhance its realization value, the Receiver continued the services of the Debtor's planning consultant and in July, 2013, filed a severance application with the City of Burlington. In mid-November, 2013 the City provided the Receiver with its comments and those of affected parties. The City would not support a parking variance request. Based on discussions with its counsel, the Receiver had concerns about the attractiveness of the Property to a potential purchaser should it withdraw the parking variance request. Since the Receiver had issued its notice of a bid deadline in November, it decided to put the severance application on hold and allow the future purchaser to proceed with it as it saw fit.

[7] Returning to the marketing process, following its March, 2013 Second Report the Receiver engaged Cushman & Wakefield Ltd. to prepare a narrative report form appraisal for the Property. On June 6, 2013, Cushman & Wakefield transmitted its report stating a value as at March 31, 2013. The Receiver filed that report on a confidential basis. In its Third Report the Receiver noted that the appraised value was less than the January, 2013 listing price, as a result of which on June 4, 2013 the Receiver authorized Colliers to reduce the Property's listing price to \$6.8 million. That same day the Receiver notified the secured creditors of the reduction in the listing price and the expressions of interest for the Property it had received up until that point of time.

[8] One such letter was sent to Debtor's counsel. Accordingly, as of June 4, 2013, the Debtor and its principal, Munt: (i) were aware of the history of the listing price for the Property

under the receivership; (ii) knew of the marketing history of the Property, including the Receiver's advice that all offers and expressions of interest received up to that time had been rejected "because they were all significantly below the Listing Price and Revised Listing Price for the Property"; (iii) knew that the Receiver had obtained a new appraisal from Cushman which valued the Property at an amount "lower than the Revised Listing Price, which is consistent with the Offers and the feedback from the potential purchasers that have toured the Property"; and, (iv) learned that the listing price had been lowered to \$6.8 million.

[9] On June 18 the Receiver received an offer from an interested party (the "Initial Purchaser") and by June 24 had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale with that party. The Receiver notified new counsel for Munt and his companies of that development on July 29, 2013. The Receiver advised that the agreement contemplated a 90-day due diligence period.

[10] As the deadline to satisfy the conditions under the agreement approached, the Initial Purchaser informed the Receiver that it would not be able to waive the conditions prior to the deadline and requested an extension of the due diligence period until November 5, 2013, as well as the inclusion of an additional condition in its favour that would make the deal conditional on the negotiation of a lease with a prospective tenant. The Receiver did not agree to extend the deadline. Its reasons for so doing were fully described in paragraphs 50 and 51 of its Third Report. As a result, that deal came to an end, the fact of which the Receiver communicated to the secured parties, including Munt's counsel, on September 27, 2013.

[11] The Colliers listing agreement expired on September 30; the Receiver elected not to renew it. Instead, it entered into an exclusive listing agreement with CBRE Limited for three months with the listing price remaining at \$6.8 million. CBRE then conducted the marketing campaign described in paragraph 67 of the Third Report. Between October 7, 2013 and January 21, 2014, CBRE received expressions of interest from 56 parties, conducted 19 site tours and received 12 executed NDAs to whom it sent information packages.

[12] In October CBRE received three offers. The Receiver rejected them either because of their price or the conditions attached to them.

[13] By November, 2013, the Receiver had marketed the Property for one year, during which time GE had advanced approximately \$593,000 of the \$600,000 in permitted borrowings under the Appointment Order. The Receiver developed concerns about how long the receivership could continue without additional funding. By that point of time the Receiver had begun to accrue its fees to preserve cash.

[14] The Receiver decided to instruct CBRE to distribute an email notice to all previous bidders and interested parties announcing a December 2, 2013 offer submission deadline. Emails went out to about 1,200 persons.

[15] In response to the bid deadline notice, four offers were received. The Receiver concluded that none were acceptable.

[16] The Receiver then received five additional offers. It engaged in negotiations with those parties in an effort to maximize the purchase price. On December 13, 2013, the Receiver accepted an offer from G-3 and on December 27 executed an agreement with G-3, subject to court approval.

[17] The Receiver filed, on a confidential basis, charts summarizing the materials terms of the offers received, as well as an un-redacted copy of the G-3 APA. The G-3 offer was superior in terms of price, “clean” - in the sense of not conditional on financing, environmental site assessments, property conditions reports or other investigations – and provided for a reasonably quick closing date of February 25, 2014.

### **III. The adjournment request**

[18] The only persons who opposed the proposed sale to G-3 were the Debtor, its principal, Munt, together with the related subsequent mortgagee, 800 Inc. When the motion originally came before the Court on February 13, 2014, the Debtor asked for an adjournment in order to review the Receiver’s materials. Although the Receiver had served the Debtor with its motion materials eight days before the hearing date, the Debtor had changed counsel a few days before the hearing. I adjourned the hearing until February 18, 2014 and set a timetable for the Debtor to file responding materials, which it did.

[19] At the hearing the Debtor, Munt and 800 Inc. opposed the sale approval order on two grounds. First, they argued that they had been treated unfairly during the sale process because the Receiver would not disclose to them the terms of the G-3 APA, in particular the sales price. Second, they opposed the sale on the basis that the Receiver had used too low a listing price which did not reflect the true value of the land and was proposing an improvident sale. Let me deal with each argument in turn.

### **IV. Receiver’s request for approval of the sale: the disclosure issue**

#### **A. The dispute over the disclosure of the purchase price**

[20] The Debtor submitted that without access to information about the price in the G-3 APA, it could not evaluate the reasonableness of the proposed sale. In order to disclose that information to the Debtor, the Receiver had asked the Debtor to sign a form of confidentiality agreement (the “Receiver’s Confidentiality Agreement”). A dispute thereupon arose between the Receiver and Debtor about the terms of that proposed agreement.

[21] By way of background, on January 8, 2014, the Receiver had advised the secured creditors (other than GE) that it had entered into the G-3 APA and would seek court approval of the sale during the week of February 10. In that letter the Receiver wrote:

As you can appreciate, the economic terms of the Agreement, including the purchase price payable, are commercially sensitive. In order to maintain the integrity of the Sale Process, the Receiver is not in a position to disclose this information at this time.

[22] On January 10, 2014, counsel for the Debtor requested a copy of the G-3 APA. Receiver's counsel replied on January 13 that it would be seeking a court date during the week of February 10 and "as is normally the custom with insolvency proceedings, we will not be circulating the Agreement in advance".

[23] On January 23 Debtor's counsel wrote to the Receiver:

My clients, being both the owner, and secured and unsecured creditors of the owner, and having other interests in the outcome of the sales transaction, have a right to the production of the subject Agreement, and should be afforded a sufficient opportunity to review it and understand its terms in advance of any court hearing to approve the transaction contemplated therein. I once again request a copy of the subject Agreement as soon as possible.

According to the Receiver's Supplemental Report, in response Receiver's counsel explained that the purchase price generally was not disclosed in an insolvency sales transaction prior to the closing of the sale and that the secured claim of GE exceeded the purchase price.

[24] The Receiver's motion record served on February 5 contained a full copy of the G-3 APA, save that the Receiver had redacted the references to the purchase price. An affidavit filed on behalf of the Debtor stated that "it has been Mr. Munt's position that his position on the approval motion is largely contingent upon the terms and conditions of the subject Agreement, particularly the purchase price".

[25] The Debtor and a construction lien claimant, Centimark Ltd., continued to request disclosure of the G-3 APA. On February 11, 2014, Receiver's counsel wrote to them advising that the Receiver was prepared to disclose the purchase price upon the execution of the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement which confirmed that (i) they would not be bidding on the Property at any time during the receivership proceedings and (ii) they would maintain the confidentiality of the information provided.

[26] Centimark agreed to those terms, signed the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement and received the sales transaction information. Centimark did not oppose approval of the G-3 sales transaction.

[27] On February 12, the day before the initial return of the sales approval motion, counsel for the Receiver and Debtor discussed the terms of a confidentiality agreement, but were unable to reach an agreement. According to the Receiver's Supplement to the Third Report, "[Munt's counsel] did not inform the Receiver that Munt was prepared to waive its right to bid on the Real Property at some future date".

[28] At the initial hearing on February 13 the Debtor expanded its disclosure request to include all the confidential appendices filed by the Receiver – i.e. the June 6, 2013 Cushman & Wakefield appraisal; a chart summarizing the offers/letters of intent received while Colliers was the listing agent; a chart summarizing the offers/letters of intent received while CBRE had been

the listing agent; and, the un-redacted G-3 APA. Agreement on the terms of disclosure could not be reached between counsel; the motion was adjourned over the long weekend until February 18.

[29] The Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement contained a recital which read:

The undersigned 1262354 Ontario Inc., 800145 Ontario Inc. and Keith Munt have confirmed that it, its affiliates, related parties, directors and officers (collectively the "Recipient"), have no intention of bidding on the Property, located at 5230 Harvester Road, Burlington, Ontario.

The operative portions of the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement stated:

1. The Recipient shall keep confidential the Confidential Information, and shall not disclose the Confidential Information in any manner whatsoever including in respect of any motion materials to be filed or submissions to be made in the receivership proceedings involving 1262354 Ontario Inc. The Recipient shall use the Confidential Information solely to evaluate the Sale Agreement in connection with the Receiver's motion for an order approving the Sale Agreement and the transaction contemplated therein, and not directly or indirectly for any other purpose.
2. The Recipient will not, in any manner, directly or indirectly, alone or jointly or in concert with any other person (including by providing financing to any other person), effect, seek, offer or propose, or in any way assist, advise or encourage any other person to effect, seek, offer or propose, whether publicly or otherwise, any acquisition of some or all of the Property, during the course of the Receivership proceedings involving 1262354 Ontario Inc.
3. The Recipient may disclose the Confidential Information to his legal counsel and financial advisors (the "Advisors") but only to the extent that the Advisors need to know the Confidential Information for the purposes described in Paragraph 1 hereof, have been informed of the confidential nature of the Confidential Information, are directed by the Recipient to hold the Confidential Information in the strictest confidence, and agree to act in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The Recipient shall cause the Advisors to observe the terms of this Agreement and is responsible for any breach by the Advisors of any of the provisions of this Agreement.
4. The obligations set out in this Agreement shall expire on the earlier of: (a) an order of the Ontario Superior Court (Commercial List) (the "Court") unsealing the copy of the Sale Agreement filed with the Court; and (b) the closing of a transaction of purchase and sale by the Receiver in respect of the Property.

[30] Following the adjourned initial hearing of February 13, Debtor's counsel informed the Receiver that his client would sign the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement if (i) paragraph 3 was removed and (ii) the last sentence of paragraph 1 was revised to read as follows:

The Recipient shall use the Confidential Information solely in connection with the Receiver's motion for an order approving the Sale Agreement and other relief, and not directly or indirectly for any other purpose.

[31] By the time of the February 18 hearing the Debtor had not signed the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement.

## B. Analysis

[32] In *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*<sup>1</sup> the Supreme Court of Canada sanctioned the making of a sealing order in respect of materials filed with a court when (i) the order was necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, because reasonably alternative measures would not prevent the risk and (ii) the salutary effects of the order outweighed its deleterious effects.<sup>2</sup> As applied in the insolvency context that principle has led this Court to adopt a standard practice of sealing those portions of a report from a court-appointed officer – receiver, monitor or trustee – filed in support of a motion to approve a sale of assets which disclose the valuations of the assets under sale, the details of the bids received by the court-appointed officer and the purchase price contained in the offer for which court approval is sought.

[33] The purpose of granting such a sealing order is to protect the integrity and fairness of the sales process by ensuring that competitors or potential bidders do not obtain an unfair advantage by obtaining sensitive commercial information about the asset up for sale while others have to rely on their own resources to place a value on the asset when preparing their bids.<sup>3</sup>

[34] To achieve that purpose a sealing order typically remains in place until the closing of the proposed sales transaction. If the transaction closes, then the need for confidentiality disappears and the sealed materials can become part of the public court file. If the transaction proposed by the receiver does not close for some reason, then the materials remain sealed so that the confidential information about the asset under sale does not become available to potential bidders in the next round of bidding, thereby preventing them from gaining an unfair advantage in their subsequent bids. The integrity of the sales process necessitates keeping all bids confidential until a final sale of the assets has taken place.

[35] From that it follows that if an interested party requests disclosure from a receiver of the sensitive commercial information about the sales transaction, the party must agree to refrain from participating in the bidding process. Otherwise, the party would gain an unfair advantage over those bidders who lacked access to such information.

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<sup>1</sup> 2002 SCC 41

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 53.

<sup>3</sup> 8857574 Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd. (1994), 23 B.L.R. (2d) 239 (Gen. Div.).

[36] Applying those principles to the present case, I concluded that the Receiver had acted in a reasonable fashion in requesting the Debtor to sign the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement before disclosing information about the transaction price and other bids received. The provisions of the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement were tailored to address the concerns surrounding the disclosure of sensitive commercial information in the context of an insolvency asset sale:

- (i) Paragraph 1 of the agreement specified that the disclosed confidential information could be used "solely to evaluate the Sale Agreement in connection with the Receiver's motion for an order approving the Sale Agreement". In other words, the disclosure would be made solely to enable the Debtor to assess whether the proposed sales transaction had met the criteria set out in *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.*,<sup>4</sup> specifically that (i) the Receiver had obtained the offers through a process characterized by fairness, efficiency and integrity, (ii) the Receiver had made a sufficient effort to get the best price and had not acted improvidently, and (iii) the Receiver had taken into account the interests of all parties. The Debtor was not prepared to agree to that language in the agreement and, instead, proposed more general language. The Debtor did not offer any evidence as to why it was not prepared to accept the tailored language of paragraph 1 of the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement;
- (ii) The recital and paragraphs 2 and 4 of the agreement would prevent the Debtor, its principal and related company, from bidding on the Property during the course of the receivership – a proper request. The Debtor was prepared to agree to that term;
- (iii) However, the Debtor was not prepared to agree with paragraph 3 of the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement which limited disclosure of the confidential information to the Debtor's financial advisors only for the purpose of evaluating the Receiver's proposed sale transaction. Again, the Debtor did not file any evidence explaining its refusal to agree to this reasonable provision. Although Munt filed an affidavit sworn on February 14, he did not deal with the issue of the form of the confidentiality agreement.

[37] In sum, I concluded that the form of confidentiality agreement sought by Receiver from the Debtor as a condition of disclosing the commercially sensitive sales transaction information was reasonable in scope and tailored to the objective of maintaining the integrity of the sales process. I regarded the Debtor's refusal to sign the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement as unreasonable in the circumstances and therefore I was prepared to proceed to hear and dispose of the sales approval motion in the absence of disclosure of the confidential information to the Debtor.

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<sup>4</sup> (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.)

## V. Receiver's request for approval of the sale: The *Soundair* analysis

[38] The Receiver filed detailed evidence describing the lengthy marketing process it had undertaken with the assistance of two listing agents, the offers received, and the bid-deadline process it ultimately adopted which resulted in the proposed G-3 APA. I was satisfied that the process had exposed the Property to the market in a reasonable fashion and for a reasonable period of time. In order to provide an updated benchmark against which to assess received bids the Receiver had obtained the June, 2013 valuation of the Property from Cushman & Wakefield.

[39] The offer received from the Initial Purchaser had contained the highest purchase price of all offers received and that price closely approximated the "as is value" estimated by Cushman & Wakefield. That offer did not proceed. The purchase price in the G-3 APA was the second highest received, although it was below the appraised value. However, it was far superior to any of the other 11 offers received through CBRE in the last quarter of 2013. From that circumstance I concluded that the appraised value of the Property did not accurately reflect prevailing market conditions and had over-stated the fair market value of the Property on an "as is" basis. That said, the purchase price in the G-3 APA significantly exceeded the appraised land value and the liquidation value estimated by Cushman & Wakefield.

[40] Nevertheless, Munt gave evidence of several reasons why he viewed the Receiver's marketing efforts as inadequate:

- (i) Munt deposed that had the Receiver proceeded with the severance application, it could have marketed the Property as one or two separate parcels. As noted above, the Receiver explained why it had concluded that proceeding with the severance application would not likely enhance the realization value, and that business judgment of the Receiver was entitled to deference;
- (ii) Munt pointed to appraisals of various sorts obtained in the period 2000 through to January, 2011 in support of his assertion that the ultimate listing price for the Property was too low. As mentioned, the June, 2013 appraisal obtained by the Receiver justified the reduction in the listing price and, in any event, the bids received from the market signaled that the valuation had over-estimated the value of the Property;
- (iii) Finally, Munt complained that the MLS listing for the Property was too narrowly limited to the Toronto Real Estate Board, whereas the Property should have been listed on all boards from Windsor to Peterborough. I accepted the explanation of the Receiver that it had marketed the Property drawing on the advice of two real estate professionals as listing agents and was confident that the marketing process had resulted in the adequate exposure of the Property.

[41] Consequently, I concluded that the Receiver's marketing of the Property and the proposed sales transaction with G-3 had satisfied the *Soundair* criteria. I approved the sale agreement and granted the requested vesting order.

## VI. Request to approve Receiver's activities and fees

[42] As part of its motion the Receiver sought approval of its fees and disbursements, together with those of its counsel, for the period up to January 31, 2014, as well as authorization to make distributions from the net sale proceeds for Priority Claims and an initial distribution to the senior secured, GE. The Debtor sought an adjournment of this part of the motion until after any sale had closed and the confidential information had been unsealed. I denied that request.

[43] As Marrocco J., as he then was, stated in *Bank of Montreal v. Dedicated National Pharmacies Inc.*,<sup>5</sup> motions for the approval of a receiver's actions and fees, as well as the fees of its counsel, should occur at a time that makes sense, having regard to the commercial realities of the receivership. For several reasons I concluded that it was appropriate to consider the Receiver's approval request at the present time.

[44] First, one had to take into account the economic reality of this receivership – i.e. that given the cash-flow challenges of this receivership, the Receiver had held off seeking approval of its fees and disbursements for a considerable period of time during which it had been accruing its fees.

[45] Second, the Receiver filed detailed information concerning the fees it and its legal counsel had incurred from September, 2012 until January 31, 2014, including itemized invoices and supporting dockets. The Receiver had incurred fees and disbursements amounting to \$356,301.40, and its counsel had incurred fees approximating \$188,000.00. That information was available for the Debtor to review prior to the hearing of the motion.

[46] Third, with the approval of the G-3 sale, little work remained to be done in this receivership. By its terms the G-3 APA contemplated a closing date prior to February 27, 2014, and the main condition of closing in favour of the purchaser was the securing of the approval and vesting order.

[47] Fourth, the Receiver reported that GE's priority secured claim exceeded the purchase price. Accordingly, GE had the primary economic interest in the receivership; it had consented to the Receiver's fees. Also, the next secured in line, Centimark, had not opposed the Receiver's motion.

[48] Which leads me to the final point. Like any other civil proceeding, receiverships before a court are subject to the principle of procedural proportionality. That principle requires taking account of the appropriateness of the procedure as a whole, as well as its individual component parts, their cost, timeliness and impact on the litigation given the nature and complexity of the litigation.<sup>6</sup> In this receivership the Receiver had served this motion over a week in advance of

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<sup>5</sup> 2011 ONSC 346, para. 7.

<sup>6</sup> *Hryniak v. Mauldin*, 2014 SCC 7, para. 31.

the hearing date and the Debtor had secured an adjournment over a long weekend; the Debtor had adequate time to review, consider and respond to the motion. I considered it unreasonable that the Debtor was not prepared to engage in a review of the Receiver's accounts in advance of the second hearing date, while at the same time the Debtor took advantage of the adjournment to file evidence in response to the sales approval part of the motion.

[49] Debtor's counsel submitted that an adjournment of the fees request was required so that the Debtor could assess the reasonableness of the fees in light of the purchase price. Yet, it was the Debtor's unreasonable refusal to sign the Receiver's Confidentiality Agreement which caused its inability to access the purchase price at this point of time, and such unreasonable behavior should not be rewarded by granting an adjournment of the fees portion of the motion.

[50] Further, to adjourn the fees portion of the motion to a later date would increase the litigation costs of this receivership. From the report of the Receiver the Debtor's economic position was "out of the money", so to speak, with the senior secured set to suffer a shortfall. It appeared to me that the Debtor's request to adjourn the fees part of the motion would result in additional costs without any evident benefit. I asked Debtor's counsel whether his client would be prepared to post security for costs as a term of any further adjournment; counsel did not have instructions on the point. In my view, courts should scrutinize with great care requests for adjournments that will increase the litigation costs of a receivership proceeding made by a party whose economic interests are "out of the money", especially where the party is not prepared to post security for the incremental costs it might cause.

[51] For those reasons, I refused the Debtor's second adjournment request.

[52] Having reviewed the detailed dockets and invoices filed by the Receiver and its counsel, as well as the narrative in the Third Report and its supplement, I was satisfied that its activities were reasonable in the circumstances, as were its fees and those of its counsel. I therefore approved them.

## **VII. Partial distribution**

[53] Given that upon the closing of the sale to G-3 the Receiver will have completed most of its work, I considered reasonable its request for authorization to make an interim distribution of funds upon the closing. In its Third Report the Receiver described certain Priority Claims which it had concluded ranked ahead of GE's secured claim, including the amounts secured by the Receiver's Charge, the Receiver's Borrowing Charge and an H.S.T. claim. As well, it reported that it had received an opinion from its counsel about the validity, perfection and priority of the GE security, and it had concluded that GE was the only secured creditor with an economic interest in the receivership. In light of those circumstances, I accepted the Receiver's request that, in order to maximize efficiency and to avoid the need for an additional motion to seek approval for a distribution, authorization should be given at this point in time to the Receiver to pay out of the sale proceeds the priority claims and a distribution to GE, subject to the Receiver maintaining sufficient reserves to complete the administration of the receivership.

### **VIII. Summary**

[54] For these reasons I granted the Receiver's motion, including its request to seal the Confidential Appendices until the closing of the sales transaction.

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D. M. Brown J.

**Date:** February 24, 2014

## **TAB 6**



ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

**COUNSEL/ENDORSEMENT SLIP**

COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00730779-00CL

DATE: October 29, 2025

NO. ON LIST: 3

**TITLE OF PROCEEDING: KING CAPITAL MORTGAGE INVESTMENT CORPORATION v. 2353110 ONTARIO LIMITED**

**BEFORE: JUSTICE J. DIETRICH**

**PARTICIPANT INFORMATION**

**For Plaintiff, Applicant, Moving Party:**

Name of Person Appearing	Name of Party	Contact Info
Ryan Shah	Counsel for Applicant – King Capital Mortgage Investment Corp	Ryan.shah@paliareroland.com

**For Defendant, Respondent, Responding Party:**

Name of Person Appearing	Name of Party	Contact Info
Jason Bogle	Principle of Respondent – 2353110 Ontario Limited	jason@bogleslawoffice.com

**For Other, Self-Represented:**

Name of Person Appearing	Name of Party	Contact Info
Catherine Francis	Independent Counsel for the Receiver	cfrancis@foglers.com
Sherif M. Foda	Counsel for Purchaser	sherif@fodalaw.com
Bryan Tannenbaum Margarita Cargher	Proposed Receiver	<a href="mailto:btannenbaum@tdbadvisory.ca">btannenbaum@tdbadvisory.ca</a> <a href="mailto:mcargher@tdbadvisory.ca">mcargher@tdbadvisory.ca</a>

## **ENDORSEMENT OF JUSTICE J. DIETRICH:**

### **Introduction**

1. TDB Restructuring Limited (“**TDB**”) in its capacity as the Court-appointed receiver (the “**Receiver**”) over the real property municipally known as 137 Berkeley Street, Toronto, Ontario (the “**Real Property**”), owned by 2353110 Ontario Limited (the “**Debtor**”), seeks two Orders.
2. First, an approval and vesting order (the “**AVO**”) is sought approving an asset purchase agreement (the “**APA**”) dated September 11, 2025 between the Receiver and 16523978 Canada Inc. (the “**Purchaser**”) for a sale of the Real Property free and clear of all claims and encumbrances.
3. Second, an order (the “**Administration and Discharge Order**”) is sought:
  - a. approving the First Report of the Receiver dated October 15, 2025 (the “**First Report**”), the activities and conduct of the Receiver as described therein and the Receiver’s statement of receipts and disbursements to October 8, 2025 (the “**R&D**”) attached thereto;
  - b. approving the Receiver’s fees and disbursements, and those of its counsel, and the estimated costs to complete the receivership administration as described in the First Report;
  - c. approving the proposed distribution of proceeds from the transaction contemplated by the APA (the “**Transaction**”);
  - d. sealing the confidential appendices to the First Report until closing of the Transaction or until further order of the Court; and
  - e. discharging and releasing the Receiver upon the filing of a certificate (the “**Discharge Certificate**”).
4. The relief sought was originally returnable on October 23, 2025. At that time, motion was adjourned until today at the request of Mr. Bogle and Farrage Developments Inc. (“**Farrage**”). Justice Steele in her endorsement of October 23, 2025 noted that Mr. Bogle indicated at that time he was in the process of retaining new counsel. On that basis and because the Receiver’s material was short served she granted a brief adjournment until today.

5. Farrage did not appear today. Mr. Bogle appeared in person today as a representative of the Debtor. He again requested an adjournment, this time of two weeks so he could obtain counsel and prepare responding material. I declined to grant a further adjournment given that Justice Steele had already granted him an adjournment for that purpose. Further, applicant, King Capital Mortgage Investment Corporation (“**King Capital**”) is expected to suffer a shortfall in repayment of the amounts owed and that loss is growing each day.
6. Mr. Bogle expressed opposition to the relief sought by the Receiver. His submissions indicated that he was hoping to attempt to redeem the first mortgage or develop a redemption transaction of some kind given he now knows the purchase price of the APA for which approval is now sought.
7. Defined terms used but not defined herein have the meaning provided for in the factum of the Receiver filed for use on this motion.

## Background

8. TDB was appointed as Receiver by my Order dated February 26, 2024, (the “**Appointment Order**”). At that hearing the Debtor was represented by counsel and opposed the appointment of the Receiver. The Debtor did not dispute that at least \$1.9 million was owing to King Capital at that point, but indicated that the full amount claimed by King Capital was disputed. They were provided an opportunity to bring a motion to address the disputed amounts by Justice Kimmel by January 15, 2025, but failed to do so.
9. The Real Property is the site of a commercial office building in Toronto, Ontario. King Capital is a secured lender of the Debtor, who currently claims to be owed in excess of \$2.4 million in connection with a mortgage loan advanced to the Debtor (the “**Loan**”). A subsequent mortgage is registered in favour of Farrage Developments Inc.
10. The Receiver has obtained an independent legal opinion that, subject to the usual qualifications and assumptions, King Capital holds valid and enforceable security over the Real Property.
11. With respect to the sale of the Real Property, the Receiver retained Lennard Realty Group (“**Lennard**”) to market the Real Property for sale. Lennard launched a marketing campaign for the Real Property on April 21, 2025 which included preparing a brochure and teaser letter that was mailed on a targeted basis, listing the Real Property on Lennard’s website and on MLS, social media posts, emails to Lennard’s distribution list of approximately 3,000 parties, targeted outreach of buyers and listing agents in Toronto, advertisement in the Globe and Mail, and establishment of an electronic data room accessible to parties that executed a confidentiality agreement.

12. The Receiver received three offers for the purchase of the Real Property and the Receiver selected the highest offer, which was subject to conditions. The conditions were not satisfied/waived and the Receiver then re-engaged with the next highest bidder – being the Purchaser. After a period of negotiations the Receiver entered into the APA with the Purchaser.

13. No submissions were made before me that the sale process was improvident in any way.

14. Following closing of the Transaction, Receiver proposing the following distribution of Proceeds, more particularly described at paragraph 68 of the First Report:

- a. Payment to Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) on account of unpaid HST remittances by the Debtor in respect of which CRA claims a deemed trust under the Excise Tax Act;
- b. Payment to the City of Toronto of property taxes owing by the Debtor;
- c. Payment to Lennard of commissions owing upon closing of the Transaction;
- d. Payment of the unpaid fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel;
- e. Payment of the Receiver’s borrowings secured by the Receiver’s Borrowing Charge; and
- f. Payment to the Lender, up to the amount owing by the Debtor to King Capital.

15. As noted above, King Capital is expected to suffer a significant shortfall in repayment on its Loan.

16. As set out in the First Report, along with closing of the Transaction, the Receiver's remaining duties include, making the distributions discussed above, issuing further notices under section 245(2) of the BIA; preparing the Interim and Final Statements of the Receiver pursuant to sections 246(2) and 246(3) of the BIA; filing HST returns in respect of the Receiver's administration, as required; and attending to other administrative matters, as necessary.

## Issues

17. The following issues are to be determined today should the Court:

- a. approve the Transaction contemplated by the APA;
- b. approve the requested Distributions;

- c. approve the First Report, the activities of the Receiver set out therein, the R&D and the fees and activities of the Receiver and its counsel
- d. grant the limited sealing order requested; and
- e. approve the discharge of the Receiver, upon the filing of the Discharge Certificate?

## Analysis

18. The principles to be applied when determining whether to approve a sale transaction were articulated by the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Royal Bank of Canada v Soundair Corp.* 1991 ONCA 2727 (“*Soundair*”): (a) whether the receiver has made sufficient effort to obtain the best price and has not acted improvidently; (b) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; (c) whether the interests of all parties have been considered; and (d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

19. I am satisfied that the *Soundair* principles have been met.

20. There was an extensive marketing process undertaken that included a public listing on MLS for approximately 21 weeks in total. After the first offeror withdrew its offer, the APA represents the highest offer received for the Real Property. The APA is only subject to court-approval. The Receiver does not believe that further exposure to the market would result in a superior offer.

21. As noted in *Soundair*, a Court should defer to a Receiver’s recommendation in respect of a sale, only in exceptional circumstances: see *Soundair* at para 21. I am not persuaded any such exceptional circumstances exist in this case. There is no evidence before me that the sale process was not sufficient, fair or that it was improvident. Accordingly, the requested AVO, with the amendments discussed during the hearing is substantively consistent with the form of Commercial List Model Order is approved.

22. I am satisfied that the requested amounts to be paid as part of the Distribution appropriate in the circumstances. They include amounts to be paid in priority to the Loan, including to CRA, tax amounts, Receiver’s costs and repayment of Receiver’s Borrowings. As noted, it is expected there will be a significant shortfall in repayment to King Capital of the Loan.

23. The request to approve the First Report is not unusual and there are good policy and practical reasons for doing so. The approval of the First Report is appropriate in the circumstances as the Receiver has acted reasonably and in good faith. The draft order provided contains the typical language that only the Receiver is entitled to rely on the approval. Similarly, the R&D is approved.

24. The Receiver also seeks approval of the fees and disbursements of the itself and its legal counsel, including a fee accrual to complete matters. In this respect, as the Court of Appeal for Ontario held in *Bank of Nova Scotia v Diemer* 2014 ONCA 851 at paras 33 and 45, this Court does not undertake a line-by-line analysis of the invoices. Rather, the guiding principles on fee approvals of this nature are whether the fees are fair, reasonable, and proportionate given the value of the Property and liabilities as well as the complexity of the Proceeding. In considering these guiding principles, subject to the comments below regarding the fee accrual, the fees of the Receiver and its counsel as set out in the First Report are appropriate and are approved.

25. The limited sealing order being sought is necessary to preserve the Receiver's ability to maximize the value of the Real Property in the event of the Transaction does not close. I am satisfied that the requested sealing order for the confidential appendix to the First Report (being an unredacted version of the APS and list of the financial terms of the offers received by the Receiver for the purchaser of the Real Property) meets the test in *Sherman Estate v. Donovan* 2021 SCC 25 at para 38 and that disclosure of this information would pose a risk to the public interest in enabling stakeholders of a company in receivership to maximize the realization of assets. I direct counsel for the Receiver to file a hard copy of the confidential appendices with the Commercial List Office in a sealed envelope with a copy of the relevant order and this endorsement.

26. As for the requested discharge, as discussed at today's hearing, in the circumstances I am not prepared at this time to grant that relief and discharge the Receiver. That relief is adjourned to a further hearing to be scheduled following the closing of the Transaction and completions of the Distribution. Counsel to the Receiver should file a notice of return of motion in respect of such relief when it is brought back on as well as supplemental evidence.

## **Disposition**

27. Orders to go in the form signed by me this day.



## **TAB 7**

**Court of Appeal for Ontario  
Ravelston Corp. (Re)  
Date: 2005-11-10**

Docket: CA M33075, CA M33076, CA M33049, CA C44249

*Alan H. Mark, Edward Greenspan for Conrad Black*

*Robert Staley for Hollinger International Inc.*

*Derek Bell for Hollinger Inc.*

*Alex MacFarlane for R.S.M. Richter Inc.*

***Doherty J.A.:***

**I**

[1] The receiver, R.S.M. Richter Inc. ("Richter") seeks an order quashing an appeal brought by Lord Conrad Black ("Black") as of right from the order of Farley J. Black resists the motion to quash and, by way of alternative, seeks leave to appeal the order of Farley J. Black's application for leave to appeal need be considered only if Richter successfully quashes Black's appeal.

[2] I would hold that Black does not have a right of appeal and would quash his appeal. I would refuse leave to appeal.

**II**

[3] In April 2005, Ravelston Corporation Limited ("RCL") was placed into receivership in proceedings taken under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") and the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"). Richter was appointed receiver/monitor with wide powers to manage the affairs of the company. In making the order, Farley J. indicated that Black and others had resigned as officers and directors of RCL and that the objective of the proceedings was to place RCL (and associated entities) under the control of a court appointed officer:

The draft orders are to be adjusted to make it absolutely clear that the old guard (Black and Radier — and any other officer and director including Messrs. White and Boulbee) are "out" — out in the sense of not being able to, directly or indirectly, pull any of the strings and that Richter as an officer of the court, responsible to the court and the stakeholders of the applicants, is "in" — in in the sense of being able to pull all the strings and thereby direct the fortunes, business and affairs of the applicants.

[4] Richter has filed a series of reports with the Superior Court summarizing its activities since April 2005. Various stakeholders have raised issues before Farley J. and

he has made several orders in the course of his ongoing supervision of the insolvency proceedings.

[5] On August 18, 2005, a federal grand jury in Chicago, Illinois indicted RCL and others on fraud charges. RCL has no assets or place of business in the United States. It is currently engaged in civil litigation in Illinois. In its Ninth Report filed on September 16, 2005, Richter outlined the issues raised by the criminal proceedings against RCL in federal court in the United States and advised Farley J. that it needed more time to formulate recommendations as to what steps, if any, RCL should take in response to the indictment.

[6] On September 28, 2005, Richter filed its Tenth Report with Farley J. That report contains a detailed examination of the legal, practical and "special" considerations that Richter had evaluated in formulating RCL's proposed response to the criminal charges in the United States federal court. Richter concluded that it should accept service of the summons in the criminal proceedings on RCL's behalf, voluntarily appear in those proceedings and plead not guilty to the charges. Richter set out several reasons for its recommendation. It then moved before Farley J. for an order allowing it to accept service of the summons, appear in the U.S. federal court, and enter a not guilty plea on behalf of RCL. Richter was supported on the motion by various stakeholders, including Hollinger International Inc. and Hollinger Inc. Black, whose control over RCL had been terminated by the receivership, but who remained a shareholder and creditor, opposed the receiver's motion. His was the only opposition.

[7] On the motion, counsel for Black argued that under the terms of the relevant American "long arm" statute, RCL could not be served with a criminal summons because RCL had no place of business in the United States. Counsel further contended that absent proper service of the summons on RCL, the U.S. federal court had no jurisdiction to proceed against RCL. Counsel urged Farley J. to find that it could not be in the best interests of any of the RCL stakeholders for RCL to attorn to the federal court's jurisdiction, thereby opening itself to potential additional criminal charges and massive penalties, when under the applicable American statute, the American criminal court could not exercise jurisdiction over RCL absent attornment.

[8] The Tenth Report prepared by Richter was the only material before Farley J. on the motion. As I understand the submissions before Farley J., no objection was taken to the facts outlined in the report or the relevance of the various factors identified by Richter in reaching its conclusion as to the appropriate response by RCL to the American indictment.

[9] Farley J. made the order sought by Richter. In doing so, he said:

The Receiver has had the opportunity of a thorough analysis, assisted by its Canadian counsel, but importantly by its U.S. counsel, and it has concluded that on balance it would be appropriate to attorn and plead not guilty; and further that that would be the right and proper thing to do and that it would likely be to the advantage of the estate. I see no reason to quarrel with or second guess that considered analysis ...

[10] Black appealed the order of Farley J. He relied on s. 193(a) of the *BIA*, which provides a right of appeal from an order "if the point at issue involves future rights". Alternatively, if s. 193(a) was inapplicable, Black applied for leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the *BIA*.

[11] Pursuant to s. 195 of the *BIA*, the filing of the Notice of Appeal stayed the order under appeal. If Black is found not to have a right of appeal, but is granted leave to appeal, the granting of leave also stays the order. RCL has not yet attorned to the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal criminal court.

### III

#### ***The motion to quash***

[12] Richter, supported by Hollinger Inc. and Hollinger International Inc., argues that the order of Farley J. does not involve future rights and therefore does not provide an automatic right of appeal pursuant to s. 193 (a). If Richter's submission is correct, the appeal must be quashed for want of jurisdiction.

[13] In addition to a right of appeal where the issue "involves future rights" under s. 193(a), ss. 193(b), (c) and (d) provide a right of appeal in a variety of other circumstances. Black does not rely on any of these provisions and I need not set them out here. There does not appear to be any unifying principle underlying the situations in which an appeal lies as of right via s. 193 of the *BIA*.

[14] The specific rights of appeal granted under s. 193 of the *BIA* are combined with s. 193(e), which provides for appeals where leave is granted by a judge of the Court of Appeal. Leave may be granted from any order made under the *BIA* on any ground.

[15] By combining limited specific rights of appeal with a broad power to appeal with leave, s. 193 of the *BIA* both allows access to the appeal court on meritorious appeals and limits the availability of multiple appeals in ongoing insolvency proceedings where those appeals would inevitably delay and fracture the proceedings.

[16] The *BIA* does not provide any definition of the phrase "future rights". As with any exercise in statutory interpretation, the words must be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense, and in keeping with the scheme and object of the Act: *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re* (1998), 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) at para. 21; *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex* (2002), 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) at para. 26.

[17] Earlier cases such as *Amalgamated Rare Earth Mines Ltd. (No. 2), Re* (1958), 37 C.B.R. 228 (Ont. C.A.) that would give the phrase "future rights" a "wide and liberal interpretation" are inconsistent with the contemporary approach to statutory interpretation. These cases also take the interpretation of "future rights" from earlier insolvency cases. Those earlier cases were, however, interpreting insolvency legislation that did not grant any right of appeal from orders made in insolvency proceedings, but only provided for appeal with leave from specific orders, including orders "involving future rights". It was within the context of statutory provisions that provided only a limited right of appeal with leave that the courts gave a wide and generous reading to the phrase "future rights". Any other reading could have closed the appeal court door on many meritorious appeals. Under the scheme of appeals set out in the present *BIA*, there is no need to give the phrase "future rights" a broad meaning to ensure that meritorious appeals can be heard.<sup>1</sup>

[18] The meaning of the phrase "future rights" is not obvious. Caselaw holds that it refers to future legal rights and not to procedural rights or commercial advantages or disadvantages that may accrue from the order challenged on appeal: *Ditchburn Boats & Aircraft (1936) Ltd., Re* (1938), 19 C.B.R. 240 (Ont. C.A.), at 242; *Dominion Foundry Co., Re* (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 79 (Man. C.A.), at 84. Rights that presently exist, but may be exercised in the future or altered by the order under appeal are present rights and not future rights: *Simonelli v. Mackin* (2003), 320 A.R. 330 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) at paras. 9-11 (C.A., Wittmann J.A. in chambers); *Fiber Connections Inc. v. SVCM Capital Ltd.* (2005), 10 C.B.R. (5th) 201 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]) at paras. 11-12 (Ont. C.A., Armstrong J.A. in chambers); *Devcor Investment Corp., Re* (2001), 277 A.R. 93 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 7 (C.A., Picard J.A. in chambers).

[19] A definition of the phrase "future rights" appears in the judgment of McGillivray C.J.A. in *Elias v. Hutchison* (1981), 121 D.L.R. (3d) 95 (Alta. C.A.), at 100-101:

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<sup>1</sup> The earlier insolvency legislation which provided for leave to appeal from orders involving future rights was in issue in *Clarke v. Union Fire Insurance Co.* (1886), 13 O.A.R. 268 (Ont. C.A.), at 294 -95; *J. McCarthy & Sons Co., Re* (1916), 32 D.L.R. 441 (Ont. C.A.), at 442 -43. Those cases were in turn cited with approval in cases such as *Amalgamated Rare Earth Mines Ltd. (No. 2), Re*, *supra*, without reference to the important difference in the rights of appeal created by the relevant legislation.

A right in a legal sense exists when one is entitled to enforce a claim against another or to resist the enforcement of a claim advanced by another. A present right exists presently: a future right is inchoate in that while it does not now exist, it may arise in the future. For the adjective "future" to have any meaning, it cannot refer to that which presently exists. ...

To give "future" the meaning that includes that which a litigant may obtain by success in litigation in the future is to say that a right of appeal exists in all cases. Any claim advanced is, in that sense, a future right to a judgment which does not yet exist. It would seem to me for para, (a) of s. 163 [now 193] to have any meaning that it must refer to rights which could not at the present time be asserted but which will come into existence at a future time

[emphasis added].

*Elias* has been repeatedly cited with approval in various appellate courts: see e.g. *TFP Investments Inc. (Trustee of) v. Singhal* (1991), 44 O.A.C. 234 (Ont. C.A.), at 236 (Catzman J.A. in chambers).

[20] Black does not argue that the order of Farley J. involves the future rights of RCL. That order directs RCL to attorn to the jurisdiction of the American court and to plead not guilty to the outstanding indictment. RCL clearly had the right to appear in answer to the criminal allegations and enter a plea after the grand jury had returned the indictment against RCL. The order of Farley J. does not affect RCL's future rights, but rather tells RCL how it should exercise its present rights.

[21] Counsel for Black also does not argue that his future rights are affected by the order.

[22] Counsel does argue that the future rights of the American prosecutor (the U.S. Attorney) who Farley J. has held to be a stakeholder in the insolvency proceedings, are affected by the order. Counsel contends that the U.S. Attorney presently has no right to proceed against RCL in the U.S. criminal proceedings, but that an order directing RCL to attorn would give the U.S. Attorney the right to proceed against RCL in the future.

[23] The order of Farley J. may impact on the right of the U.S. Attorney to proceed against RCL, but it does not involve any future right of the U.S. Attorney. The U.S. Attorney's rights against RCL, including its right to proceed if RCL attorns to the jurisdiction, existed when Farley J. made his order. His order may remove an impediment to the U.S. Attorney's proceeding against RCL, but that does not make the U.S. Attorney's right to proceed a future right. I would analogize this to a situation where a litigant needs leave to pursue a civil proceeding in the insolvency context. An order granting leave does

not create the right to sue which existed all along, but merely removes an impediment to the exercise of that right: see *Simonelli, supra*, at paras. 9-11.

[24] As I have rejected the submission that the order of Farley J. involves the future rights of the U.S. Attorney, I need not decide whether Black can rely on the future rights of another stakeholder to gain a right of appeal. I leave that question for another day.

[25] The order of Farley J. does not involve future rights. The appeal must be quashed.

## IV

### ***The leave to appeal application***

[26] Having concluded that Black has no right of appeal, I turn to his application for leave to appeal. In seeking leave, Black argues that Farley J.'s exercise of his discretion directing RCL to attorn to the jurisdiction of the American court was based on a misinterpretation of the relevant American statute. He contends that the proper interpretation of that statute raises a significant legal question upon which leave to appeal should be granted under s. 193(e) of the *BIA*.

[27] As indicated above, s. 193(e) permits leave to appeal from any order on any issue that the court determines warrants leave to appeal. There are no statutory criteria governing the granting of leave. Appellate courts, using different formulations, have identified various factors that should be addressed when deciding whether to grant leave under s. 193(e) of the *BIA*. The cases recognize, however, that the granting of leave to appeal is an exercise in judicial discretion that must be case-specific, and cannot be completely captured in any single formulation of the relevant criteria: see e.g. *Baker, Re* (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 376 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]), at 381 (C.A., Osborne J.A. in chambers); *Fiber Connections Inc. v. SVCM Capital Ltd., supra*, at para. 19; *GMAC Commercial Credit Corp. - Canada v. T.C.T. Logistics Inc.*, [2003] O.J. No. 5761 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]) (C.A., Feldman J.A. in chambers).

[28] The inquiry into whether leave to appeal should be granted must, however, begin with some consideration of the merits of the proposed appeal. If the appeal cannot possibly succeed, there is no point in granting leave to appeal regardless of how many other factors might support the granting of leave to appeal.

[29] A leave to appeal application is not the time to assess, much less decide, the ultimate merits of a proposed appeal. However, the applicant must be able to convince the

court that there are legitimately arguable points raised so as to create a realistic possibility of success on the appeal. Granting leave to appeal if the merits fall short of even that relatively low bar would be a waste of court resources and would needlessly delay and complicate insolvency proceedings.

[30] In *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 261 A.R. 120 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) at para. 35, Wittmann J.A. (in chambers) was faced with an application for leave under the CCAA. He referred to earlier cases which had listed four criteria for the granting of leave, one of which was that "the appeal is *prima facie* meritorious". He described the necessary merits inquiry in this way:

... There must appear to be an error in principle of law or a palpable and overriding error of fact. Exercise of discretion by a supervising judge, so long as it is exercised judicially, is not a matter for interference by an appellate court, even if the appellate court were inclined to decide the matter another way. It is precisely this kind of a factor which breathes life into the modifier "*prima facie*" meritorious.

[31] I think the same level of merits inquiry is warranted on an application for leave to appeal under the *BIA*. I would describe an appeal which raises an apparent error in law or apparent palpable and overriding factual error as an appeal that has a realistic possibility of success.

[32] The court need address the other matters relevant to the exercise of its discretion on a leave to appeal application only if the applicant demonstrates that the appeal has *prima facie* merit. I do not reach those other considerations on this motion.

[33] Black's proposed appeal focuses on two aspects of the reasons of Farley J. He submits that Farley J. erred in holding that the applicable U.S. federal legislation contemplated service of a summons in a criminal matter on RCL even though RCL had no assets or a place of business in the United States. Black also contends that at most, Farley J. should have directed Richter to enter an appearance in the federal court in the United States solely for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of that court. An appearance limited to the jurisdictional issue would have permitted RCL to determine whether in fact the American court had jurisdiction without attorneying to that jurisdiction.

[34] The federal prosecutor's right to effect service of a summons on RCL in Canada was canvassed in Richter's Tenth Report:

The Receiver has been unable to determine the existence of any U.S. judicial decision that confirms the effectiveness of service of a summons outside the United States. Given the language of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 4(c) (Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(c)), the uncertainty of the language of the MLAT [Mutual Legal Assistance

in Criminal Matters Treaty], the absence of any apparent practice of serving an originating process for criminal prosecution under the MLAT, and the lack of any U.S. caselaw to support effective service *ex juris* of an originating criminal process, it appears to the Receiver that the U.S. Attorney's Office would have significant difficulty effecting service, in Canada, on the Receiver or RCL

[emphasis added]. ...

[35] Richter did not put forward a definitive interpretation of the relevant U.S. legislation. Nor did it rest its advice that RCL should attorn to the U.S. federal jurisdiction on its interpretation of any American legislation. Richter referred to the possibility of service under the legislation, and to several other possible ways that a U.S. federal court might find that it had jurisdiction over RCL. Richter concluded that the question of the court's criminal jurisdiction over RCL raised several difficult legal issues that would have to be litigated to be resolved. Richter believed that the litigation would be lengthy and expensive and the outcome uncertain.

[36] Richter did not limit its analysis to the possible bases upon which the U.S. prosecutor might successfully assert that the U.S. federal court had jurisdiction over RCL. Richter considered practical factors including the benefits that might inure to RCL through cooperation with the U.S. authorities. Richter also addressed what it called "special circumstances" that arose because of Richter's status as a court appointed receiver. When referring to these "special considerations", Richter observed:

A receiver has a further duty to consider and respect the interests of comity between this Honourable Court and the U.S. Court, and the public's interest in the administration of justice generally.

[37] Black argues that Farley J. misconstrued the American legislation that provides for the service of a summons on a corporation in a criminal matter. Black contends that on a plain reading of the statute and its accompanying commentary, it is crystal clear that since RCL had no place of business in the United States, it could not be served with a summons requiring it to appear in a criminal proceeding in federal court in the United States. Black maintains that Farley J. found that RCL could be served under the relevant statute and that this led him to accept Richter's recommendation that RCL should attorn to the American jurisdiction.

[38] Farley J. did not decide whether RCL could be served with a summons under the relevant American legislation. He referred to counsel for Black's interpretation of the legislation and identified what he considered to be weaknesses in the argument advanced by counsel. He did not ultimately accept or reject counsel's contention.

[39] It was unnecessary for Farley J. to come to any conclusion as to the proper meaning of the American legislation. He based the exercise of his discretion on the absence of any reason to "quarrel with or second guess" Richter's analysis. That analysis included, but was not limited to, Richter's assessment of the U.S. Attorney's ability to effectively summons RCL in answer to the charges. Farley J. did not make the order he did because he was satisfied that RCL could be properly summonsed under the American legislation, but because he was satisfied that Richter had done its job as the court appointed receiver and there was no reason for the court to interfere with Richter's judgment as to RCL's best course of conduct.

[40] Receivers do not often have to decide whether to attorn to the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign court on behalf of those in receivership. While the specific decision Richter had to make was an unusual one, it was not essentially different from many decisions that receivers must make. Receivers will often have to make difficult business choices that require a careful cost/benefit analysis and the weighing of competing, if not irreconcilable, interests. Those decisions will often involve choosing from among several possible courses of action, none of which may be clearly preferable to the others. Usually, there will be many factors to be identified and weighed by the receiver. Viable arguments will be available in support of different options. The receiver must consider all of the available information, the interests of all legitimate stakeholders, and proceed in an evenhanded manner. That, of course, does not mean that all stakeholders must be equally satisfied with the course of conduct chosen by the receiver. If the receiver's decision is within the broad bounds of reasonableness, and if it proceeds fairly, having considered the interests of all stakeholders, the court will support the receiver's decision. Richter's Tenth Report demonstrates that it fully analyzed the situation at hand before arriving at its decision as to RCL's best course of conduct.

[41] The second argument made by Black that Farley J. should have at least limited RCL's appearance to a challenge of the American federal court's jurisdiction fails for the same reason as his first argument. Richter was aware of this option. The determination that RCL should attorn and plead not guilty reflected its considered opinion that RCL had much to lose should it engage in and ultimately lose a jurisdictional fight with the U.S. Attorney. Richter also properly took into account its court appointed status in deciding against a jurisdictional battle with the U.S. Attorney. Finally, Richter weighed the views expressed by other stakeholders, particularly Hollinger Inc. and Hollinger International, the

principal stakeholders. All stakeholders save Black wanted RCL to attorn to the American jurisdiction.

[42] I see no viable argument that Farley J. erred in principle in the exercise of his discretion. There is no realistic possibility that Black could succeed on appeal were leave to appeal granted. I would refuse leave to appeal.

**V**

***Conclusion***

[43] I would quash the appeal brought by Black and refuse leave to appeal.

[44] The successful parties, Richter, Hollinger Inc., and Hollinger International, are entitled to their costs on a partial indemnity basis. As the two motions were closely related, one order of costs is appropriate. Counsel for the successful parties will have five days from the release of these reasons to provide written submissions of no more than five pages. Black will have five days from receipt of those submissions to respond with written submissions of no more than five pages.

***S. Borins J.A.:***

I agree

***H.S. LaForme J.A.:***

I agree

*Application granted.*

## **TAB 8**

Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp., Canadian Pension Capital Ltd. and Canadian Insurers Capital Corp.

Indexed as: Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.  
(C.A.)

4 O.R. (3d) 1  
[1991] O.J. No. 1137  
Action No. 318/91

ONTARIO  
Court of Appeal for Ontario  
Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.  
July 3, 1991

Debtor and creditor -- Receivers -- Court-appointed receiver accepting offer to purchase assets against wishes of secured creditors -- Receiver acting properly and prudently -- Wishes of creditors not determinative -- Court approval of sale confirmed on appeal.

Air Toronto was a division of Soundair. In April 1990, one of Soundair's creditors, the Royal Bank, appointed a receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. The receiver was authorized to sell Air Toronto to Air Canada, or, if that sale could not be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person. Air Canada made an offer which the receiver rejected. The receiver then entered into negotiations with Canadian Airlines International (Canadian); two subsidiaries of Canadian, Ontario Express Ltd. and Frontier Airlines Ltd., made an offer to purchase on March 6, 1991 (the OEL offer). Air Canada and a creditor of Soundair, CCFL, presented an offer to purchase to the receiver on March 7, 1991 through 922, a company formed for that purpose (the 922 offer). The receiver declined the 922 offer because it contained an unacceptable condition and accepted the OEL offer. 922 made a

second offer, which was virtually identical to the first one except that the unacceptable condition had been removed. In proceedings before Rosenberg J., an order was made approving the sale of Air Toronto to OEL and dismissing the 922 offer. CCFL appealed.

Held, the appeal should be dismissed.

Per Galligan J.A.: When deciding whether a receiver has acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer, and should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. The decision to sell to OEL was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Prices in other offers received after the receiver has agreed to a sale have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the accepted offer was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. If they do not do so, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If the 922 offer was better than the OEL offer, it was only marginally better and did not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was improvident.

While the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of creditors, a secondary but important consideration is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. The court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

The failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto did not result in the process being unfair, as there was no proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely

distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL.

The fact that the 922 offer was supported by Soundair's secured creditors did not mean that the court should have given effect to their wishes. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets (and therefore insulated themselves from the risks of acting privately) should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale by the receiver. If the court decides that a court-appointed receiver has acted providently and properly (as the receiver did in this case), the views of creditors should not be determinative.

Per McKinlay J.A. (concurring in the result): While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it was not a procedure which was likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

Per Goodman J.A. (dissenting): The fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. The creditors in this case were convinced that acceptance of the 922 offer was in their best interest and the evidence supported that belief. Although the receiver acted in good faith, the process which it used was unfair insofar as 922 was concerned and improvident insofar as the secured creditors were concerned.

#### Cases referred to

Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (Re) (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.); British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Inc. (1977), 5 B.C.L.R. 94, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28 (S.C.); Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.); Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C.

(2d) 131, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note), 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.); Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 (C.A.); Selkirk (Re) (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.); Selkirk (Re) (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. Bkcy.)

Statutes referred to

Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137

Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141

APPEAL from the judgment of the General Division, Rosenberg J., May 1, 1991, approving the sale of an airline by a receiver.

J.B. Berkow and Steven H. Goldman, for appellants.

John T. Morin, Q.C., for Air Canada.

L.A.J. Barnes and Lawrence E. Ritchie, for Royal Bank of Canada.

Sean F. Dunphy and G.K. Ketcheson for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of Soundair Corp., respondent.

W.G. Horton, for Ontario Express Ltd.

Nancy J. Spies, for Frontier Air Ltd.

GALLIGAN J.A.--- This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991 (Gen. Div.). By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation (Soundair) is a corporation

engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the Royal Bank) is owed at least \$65,000,000. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers Capital Corporation (collectively called CCFL) are owed approximately \$9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of \$50,000,000 on the winding-up of Soundair.

On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the receiver) as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

(b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person ...

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the receiver:

(c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale

to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario

Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited (922) for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the 922 offers.

The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

- (1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?
- (2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

I will deal with the two issues separately.

#### I. DID THE RECEIVER ACT PROPERLY

## IN AGREEING TO SELL TO OEL?

Before dealing with that issue there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person". The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.), at pp. 92-94 O.R., pp. 531-33 D.L.R., of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.
2. It should consider the interests of all parties.
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

1. Did the receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over ten months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer which was acceptable, and the 922 offer which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust v. Rosenberg*, *supra*, at p. 112 O.R., p. 551 D.L.R.:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment on the elements then available to it. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

(Emphasis added)

I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A.

in Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (C.A.), at p. 11 C.B.R., p. 314 N.S.R.:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

(Emphasis added)

On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the Receiver determined that it would not be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL. Air Canada had the benefit of an "exclusive" in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention to take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it

contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.

(Emphasis added)

I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after ten months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second 922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the Receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In *Crown Trust v. Rosenberg*, *supra*, Anderson J., at p. 113 O.R., p. 551 D.L.R., discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a

sale should be considered by the court. The first is *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 247:

If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

The second is *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 243:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

In *Re Selkirk* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

(Emphasis added)

What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to

show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was, that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that

the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

The 922 offer provided for \$6,000,000 cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of five years up to a maximum of \$3,000,000. The OEL offer provided for a payment of \$2,000,000 on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a five-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced

that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.

## 2. Consideration of the interests of all parties

It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, *supra*, and *Re Selkirk* (1986, Saunders J.), *supra*. However, as Saunders J. pointed out in *Re Beauty Counsellors*, *supra*, at p. 244 C.B.R., "it is not the only or overriding consideration".

In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, *supra*, *Re Selkirk* (1986, Saunders J.), *supra*, *Re Beauty Counsellors*, *supra*, *Re Selkirk* (1987, McRae J.), *supra*, and *Cameron*, *supra*, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

3. Consideration of the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the offer was obtained

While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to *Re Selkirk* (1986), *supra*, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 C.B.R.:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in *Cameron v. Bank of N.S.* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a finding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard -- this would be an intolerable situation.

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a

bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

In *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 (C.A.), at p. 61 Alta. L.R., p. 476 D.L.R., the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, *supra*, at p. 124 O.R., pp. 562-63 D.L.R.:

While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.

(Emphasis added)

It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways

in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, *supra*, at p. 109 O.R., p. 548 D.L.R.:

The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of the circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

#### 4. Was there unfairness in the process?

As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated

purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand why it was unfair for OEL to have a similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

Moreover, I am not prepared to find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it

contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested, as a possible resolution of this appeal, that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within seven days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair nor did it prejudice the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991, than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, *supra*, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 O.R., p. 548 D.L.R.:

The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 O.R., p. 550 D.L.R.:

It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this [at p. 31 of the reasons]:

They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline

which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

II. THE EFFECT OF THE SUPPORT OF THE 922 OFFER  
BY THE TWO SECURED CREDITORS

As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work or change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as

to which offer ought to be accepted is something to be taken into account. But, if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtors' assets.

The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an interlender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the interlender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive \$3,375,000 of the \$6,000,000 cash payment and the balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the interlender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only \$1,000,000 and the Royal Bank would receive \$5,000,000 plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by

the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the interlender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline, if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that

Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-and-client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or interveners.

MCKINLAY J.A. (concurring in the result):-- I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.). While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors, shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefrom), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in

no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

GOODMAN J.A. (dissenting):-- I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of Frontier Airlines Ltd. and Ontario Express Limited (OEL) and that of 922246 Ontario Limited (922), a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers Capital Corporation (collectively CCFL) and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal Bank of Canada (the Bank). Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were not referred to nor am I aware of any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

In *British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Inc.* (1977), 5 B.C.L.R. 94, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28 (S.C.), Berger J. said at p. 95 B.C.L.R., p. 30 C.B.R.:

Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not have a roving commission to decide what

is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall of approximately \$50,000,000. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I agree with the finding of Rosenberg J., Gen. Div., May 1, 1991, that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If on the other hand he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons [pp. 17-18]:

I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately \$3,000,000 to \$4,000,000. The Bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer, in effect, supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial downpayment on closing.

In Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (C.A.), Hart J.A., speaking for the majority

of the court, said at p. 10 C.B.R., p. 312 N.S.R.:

Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that the contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers nor are

they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.) Saunders J. said at p. 243:

This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

I agree with that statement of the law. In Re Selkirk (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.) Saunders J. heard an application for court approval for the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246 C.B.R.:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with the commercial efficacy and integrity.

I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in Cameron, *supra*, at pp. 92-94 O.R., pp. 531-33 D.L.R., quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In Cameron, the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a

deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 C.B.R., p. 314 N.S.R.:

There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons [p. 15]:

On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The receiver at that time had no other

offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1. The receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on this appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase which was eventually refused by the receiver that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing Air Canada may have been playing "hard ball" as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position as it was entitled to do.

Furthermore there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event although it is clear that 922 and through it CCFL and Air Canada were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg

J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

I would also point out that, rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was no unconditional offer before it.

In considering the material and evidence placed before the court I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of \$18,000,000. After the appointment of the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver "shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada", it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the Receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

As a result of due diligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the month of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to 8.1 million dollars conditional upon there being \$4,000,000 in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990 and was open for acceptance until June

29, 1990.

By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990 the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada in these circumstances was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990 Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto Division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990 in part as follows:

Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

This statement together with other statements set forth in the letter was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990 the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between \$10,000,000 and \$12,000,000.

In August 1990 the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of \$3,000,000 for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes but did not

include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

In December 1990 the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991 culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

On or before December, 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

By late January CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the Receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be

noted that exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers and specifically with 922.

It was not until March 1, 1991 that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at any time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL) it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid and, indeed, suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime by entering into the letter of intent with OEL it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

By letter dated March 1, 1991 CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an interlender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however,

contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately three months the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining:

... a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions acceptable to them. In the event that such a financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period.

The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

In effect the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

In my opinion the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991 to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991 and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to

negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver, then, on March 8, 1991 chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of three months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of three months notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

In his reasons Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said [p. 31]:

They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of

its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "acceptable to them".

It should be noted that on March 13, 1991 the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991 and at the request of the receiver withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991 OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFL was given until April 5, 1991 to submit a bid and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the interlender condition removed.

In my opinion the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes approximately two-thirds of the contemplated sale price whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately \$3,000,000 to \$4,000,000.

In Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., *supra*, Saunders J. said at p. 243 C.B.R.:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the

law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J. the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as a fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors who have already been seriously hurt more unnecessary contingencies.

Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer and the court should so order.

Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and

procedure adopted by the receiver.

I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991 and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied with the contemplated price nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent, it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to

court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

In conclusion I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991 and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

For the above reasons I would allow the appeal with one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-and-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of the other parties or interveners.

Appeal dismissed.

## **TAB 9**

**Atomic Energy of Canada  
Limited** *Appellant*

v.

**Sierra Club of Canada** *Respondent*

and

**The Minister of Finance of Canada, the  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada,  
the Minister of International Trade of  
Canada and the Attorney General of  
Canada** *Respondents*

**INDEXED AS: SIERRA CLUB OF CANADA v. CANADA  
(MINISTER OF FINANCE)**

**Neutral citation: 2002 SCC 41.**

File No.: 28020.

2001: November 6; 2002: April 26.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF  
APPEAL

*Practice — Federal Court of Canada — Filing of confidential material — Environmental organization seeking judicial review of federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Crown corporation for construction and sale of nuclear reactors — Crown corporation requesting confidentiality order in respect of certain documents — Proper analytical approach to be applied to exercise of judicial discretion where litigant seeks confidentiality order — Whether confidentiality order should be granted — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 151.*

Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), a Crown corporation, for the construction and sale to China of two CANDU reactors. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where AECL is the main contractor and project manager. Sierra Club maintains that the authorization of financial assistance

**Énergie atomique du Canada  
Limitée** *Appelante*

c.

**Sierra Club du Canada** *Intimé*

et

**Le ministre des Finances du Canada, le  
ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada,  
le ministre du Commerce international  
du Canada et le procureur général du  
Canada** *Intimés*

**RÉPERTORIÉ : SIERRA CLUB DU CANADA c. CANADA  
(MINISTRE DES FINANCES)**

**Référence neutre : 2002 CSC 41.**

N° du greffe : 28020.

2001 : 6 novembre; 2002 : 26 avril.

Présents : Le juge en chef McLachlin et les juges Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour et LeBel.

EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL FÉDÉRALE

*Pratique — Cour fédérale du Canada — Production de documents confidentiels — Contrôle judiciaire demandé par un organisme environnemental de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de donner une aide financière à une société d'État pour la construction et la vente de réacteurs nucléaires — Ordonnance de confidentialité demandée par la société d'État pour certains documents — Analyse applicable à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité — Faut-il accorder l'ordonnance? — Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106, règle 151.*

Un organisme environnemental, Sierra Club, demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière à Énergie atomique du Canada Ltée (« ÉACL »), une société de la Couronne, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs CANDU. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où ÉACL est l'entrepreneur principal et le gestionnaire de projet. Sierra Club soutient que

by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* (“CEAA”), requiring an environmental assessment as a condition of the financial assistance, and that the failure to comply compels a cancellation of the financial arrangements. AECL filed an affidavit in the proceedings which summarized confidential documents containing thousands of pages of technical information concerning the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities. AECL resisted Sierra Club’s application for production of the confidential documents on the ground, *inter alia*, that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have the authority to disclose them. The Chinese authorities authorized disclosure of the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, under which they would only be made available to the parties and the court, but with no restriction on public access to the judicial proceedings. AECL’s application for a confidentiality order was rejected by the Federal Court, Trial Division. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

*Held:* The appeal should be allowed and the confidentiality order granted on the terms requested by AECL.

In light of the established link between open courts and freedom of expression, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a confidentiality order is whether the right to freedom of expression should be compromised in the circumstances. The court must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles because a confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression. A confidentiality order should only be granted when (1) such an order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings. Three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of the test. First, the risk must be real and substantial, well grounded in evidence, posing a serious threat to the commercial interest in question. Second, the important commercial interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality, where there is a general principle at stake. Finally, the judge is required to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available to such an order but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

l’autorisation d’aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l’application de l’al. 5(1)b) de la *Loi canadienne sur l’évaluation environnementale* (« LCÉE ») exigeant une évaluation environnementale comme condition de l’aide financière, et que le défaut d’évaluation entraîne l’annulation des ententes financières. ÉACL dépose un affidavit qui résume des documents confidentiels contenant des milliers de pages d’information technique concernant l’évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises. ÉACL s’oppose à la communication des documents demandée par Sierra Club pour la raison notamment qu’ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu’elle n’est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Les autorités chinoises donnent l’autorisation de les communiquer à la condition qu’ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité n’y donnant accès qu’aux parties et à la cour, mais n’imposant aucune restriction à l’accès du public aux débats. La demande d’ordonnance de confidentialité est rejetée par la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale. La Cour d’appel fédérale confirme cette décision.

*Arrêt :* L’appel est accueilli et l’ordonnance demandée par ÉACL est accordée.

Vu le lien existant entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d’expression, la question fondamentale pour la cour saisie d’une demande d’ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d’expression. La cour doit s’assurer que l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’accorder est conforme aux principes de la *Charte* parce qu’une ordonnance de confidentialité a des effets préjudiciables sur la liberté d’expression garantie à l’al. 2b). On ne doit l’accorder que (1) lorsqu’elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d’un litige, en l’absence d’autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque, et (2) lorsque ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l’emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d’expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l’intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires. Trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l’analyse. Premièrement, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, être bien étayé par la preuve et menacer gravement l’intérêt commercial en question. Deuxièmement, l’intérêt doit pouvoir se définir en termes d’intérêt public à la confidentialité, mettant en jeu un principe général. Enfin le juge doit non seulement déterminer s’il existe d’autres options raisonnables, il doit aussi restreindre l’ordonnance autant qu’il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l’intérêt commercial en question.

Applying the test to the present circumstances, the commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality, which is sufficiently important to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met. The information must have been treated as confidential at all relevant times; on a balance of probabilities, proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by disclosure of the information; and the information must have been accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential. These requirements have been met in this case. Disclosure of the confidential documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of AECL, and there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

Under the second branch of the test, the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial. Disclosure of the confidential documents would cause AECL to breach its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. If a confidentiality order is denied, AECL will be forced to withhold the documents in order to protect its commercial interests, and since that information is relevant to defences available under the *CEAA*, the inability to present this information hinders AECL's capacity to make full answer and defence. Although in the context of a civil proceeding, this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental principle of justice. Further, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the confidential documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents, assisting in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression. Finally, given the technical nature of the information, there may be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

The deleterious effects of granting a confidentiality order include a negative effect on the open court principle, and therefore on the right to freedom of expression. The more detrimental the confidentiality order would be to the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons, the harder it will be to justify the confidentiality order. In the hands of the parties and their experts, the confidential documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the highly technical nature of the documents, the important value of the search for the truth which underlies

En l'espèce, l'intérêt commercial en jeu, la préservation d'obligations contractuelles de confidentialité, est suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l'analyse, pourvu que certaines conditions soient remplies : les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels; il est raisonnable de penser que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation comprometttrait des droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques; et les renseignements ont été recueillis dans l'expectative raisonnable qu'ils resteraient confidentiels. Ces conditions sont réunies en l'espèce. La divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de ÉACL et il n'existe pas d'options raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

À la deuxième étape de l'analyse, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable. Si ÉACL divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Le refus de l'ordonnance obligerait ÉACL à retenir les documents pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et comme ils sont pertinents pour l'exercice des moyens de défense prévus par la *LCÉE*, l'impossibilité de les produire empêcherait ÉACL de présenter une défense pleine et entière. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la *Charte*, le droit à un procès équitable est un principe de justice fondamentale. L'ordonnance permettrait aux parties et au tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu, favorisant ainsi la recherche de la vérité, une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression. Il peut enfin y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ce type de renseignements techniques.

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et donc sur la liberté d'expression. Plus l'ordonnance porte atteinte aux valeurs fondamentales que sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun, (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique, plus il est difficile de justifier l'ordonnance. Dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, et donc pour aider la cour à parvenir à des conclusions de fait exactes. Compte tenu de leur nature hautement technique, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance demandée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui

both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the confidential documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order.

Under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions relate to the public distribution of the documents, which is a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, the second core value of promoting individual self-fulfilment would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order. The third core value figures prominently in this appeal as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. By their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection, so that the public interest is engaged here more than if this were an action between private parties involving private interests. However, the narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the confidential documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts. The core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. The salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects and the order should be granted. A balancing of the various rights and obligations engaged indicates that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, while the deleterious effects on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal.

### Cases Cited

**Applied:** *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; *R. v. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76; *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; **referred to:** *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and*

sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le refus de l'ordonnance.

Aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions ont trait à la distribution publique des documents, une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Même si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, la deuxième valeur fondamentale, l'épanouissement personnel, ne serait pas touchée de manière significative. La troisième valeur joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection, de sorte que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés. Toutefois la portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. Ses effets bénéfiques l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et il y a lieu de l'accorder. Selon la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression, et ses effets préjudiciables sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes.

### Jurisprudence

**Arrêts appliqués :** *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326; *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480; *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835; *R. c. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76; *M. (A.) c. Ryan*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927; *R. c. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 R.C.S. 697; **arrêts mentionnés :** *AB Hassle c.*

*Welfare*), [2000] 3 F.C. 360, aff'g (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428; *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 CSC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 CSC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

### Statutes and Regulations Cited

*Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, ss. 1, 2(b).  
*Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37, ss. 5(1)(b), 8, 54, 54(2)(b).  
*Federal Court Rules*, 1998, SOR/98-106, rr. 151, 312.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (QL), affirming a decision of the Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (QL). Appeal allowed.

*J. Brett Ledger and Peter Chapin*, for the appellant.

*Timothy J. Howard and Franklin S. Gertler*, for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada.

*Graham Garton, Q.C.*, and *J. Sanderson Graham*, for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

IACOBUCCI J. —

#### I. Introduction

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In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important

*Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [2000] 3 C.F. 360, conf. [1998] A.C.F. n° 1850 (QL); *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103; *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

### Lois et règlements cités

*Charte canadienne des droits et libertés*, art. 1, 2b).  
*Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*, L.C. 1992, ch. 37, art. 5(1)b), 8, 54, 54(2) [abr. & rempl. 1993, ch. 34, art. 37].  
*Règles de la Cour fédérale* (1998), DORS/98-106, règles 151, 312.

POURVOI contre un arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, [2000] 4 C.F. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] A.C.F. n° 732 (QL), qui a confirmé une décision de la Section de première instance, [2000] 2 C.F. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] A.C.F. n° 1633 (QL). Pourvoi accueilli.

*J. Brett Ledger et Peter Chapin*, pour l'appelante.

*Timothy J. Howard et Franklin S. Gertler*, pour l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada.

*Graham Garton, c.r.*, et *J. Sanderson Graham*, pour les intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada.

Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par

LE JUGE IACOBUCCI —

#### I. Introduction

Dans notre pays, les tribunaux sont les institutions généralement choisies pour résoudre au mieux les différends juridiques par l'application de principes juridiques aux faits de chaque espèce. Un des principes sous-jacents au processus judiciaire est la transparence, tant dans la procédure suivie que dans les éléments pertinents à la solution du litige. Certains de ces éléments peuvent toutefois faire l'objet d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Le

issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and accordingly would allow the appeal.

## II. Facts

The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (“AECL”) is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervenor with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada (“Sierra Club”). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government’s decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a \$1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37 (“CEAA”), which requires that an environmental assessment be undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the *CEAA* does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(b) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the *CEAA*.

In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant

pourvoi soulève les importantes questions de savoir à quel moment et dans quelles circonstances il y a lieu de rendre une ordonnance de confidentialité.

Pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d’avis de rendre l’ordonnance de confidentialité demandée et par conséquent d’accueillir le pourvoi.

## II. Les faits

L’appelante, Énergie atomique du Canada Limitée (« EACL »), société d’État propriétaire et vendeuse de la technologie nucléaire CANDU, est une intervenante ayant reçu les droits de partie dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire présentée par l’intimé, Sierra Club du Canada (« Sierra Club »), un organisme environnemental. Sierra Club demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière, sous forme de garantie d’emprunt de 1,5 milliard de dollars, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs nucléaires CANDU par l’appelante. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où l’appelante est entrepreneur principal et gestionnaire de projet.

L’intimé soutient que l’autorisation d’aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l’application de l’al. 5(1)b) de la *Loi canadienne sur l’évaluation environnementale*, L.C. 1992, ch. 37 (« LCÉE »), qui exige une évaluation environnementale avant qu’une autorité fédérale puisse fournir une aide financière à un projet. Le défaut d’évaluation entraîne l’annulation des ententes financières.

Selon l’appelante et les ministres intimés, la LCÉE ne s’applique pas à la convention de prêt et si elle s’y applique, ils peuvent invoquer les défenses prévues aux art. 8 et 54 de cette loi. L’article 8 prévoit les circonstances dans lesquelles les sociétés d’État sont tenues de procéder à des évaluations environnementales. Le paragraphe 54(2) reconnaît la validité des évaluations environnementales effectuées par des autorités étrangères pourvu qu’elles soient compatibles avec les dispositions de la LCÉE.

Dans le cadre de la requête de Sierra Club en annulation des ententes financières, l’appelante a

filed an affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the “Confidential Documents”). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Mr. Feng, one of AECL’s experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang’s evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the appellant sought to introduce the Confidential Documents under Rule 312 of the *Federal Court Rules*, 1998, SOR/98-106, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

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Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

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The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the “EIRs”), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the “PSAR”), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

déposé un affidavit de M. Simon Pang, un de ses cadres supérieurs. Dans l’affidavit, M. Pang mentionne et résume certains documents (les « documents confidentiels ») qui sont également mentionnés dans un affidavit de M. Feng, un expert d’ÉACL. Avant de contre-interroger M. Pang sur son affidavit, Sierra Club a demandé par requête la production des documents confidentiels, au motif qu’il ne pouvait vérifier la validité de sa déposition sans consulter les documents de base. L’appelante s’oppose pour plusieurs raisons à la production des documents, dont le fait qu’ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu’elle n’est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Après avoir obtenu des autorités chinoises l’autorisation de communiquer les documents à la condition qu’ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, l’appelante a cherché à les produire en invoquant la règle 312 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale* (1998), DORS/98-106, et a demandé une ordonnance de confidentialité à leur égard.

Aux termes de l’ordonnance demandée, seules les parties et la cour auraient accès aux documents confidentiels. Aucune restriction ne serait imposée à l’accès du public aux débats. On demande essentiellement d’empêcher la diffusion des documents confidentiels au public.

Les documents confidentiels comprennent deux Rapports d’impact environnemental (« RIE ») sur le site et la construction, un Rapport préliminaire d’analyse sur la sécurité (« RPAS ») ainsi que l’affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang qui résume le contenu des RIE et du RPAS. S’ils étaient admis, les rapports seraient joints en annexe de l’affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang. Les RIE ont été préparés en chinois par les autorités chinoises, et le RPAS a été préparé par l’appelante en collaboration avec les responsables chinois du projet. Les documents contiennent une quantité considérable de renseignements techniques et comprennent des milliers de pages. Ils décrivent l’évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises en vertu des lois chinoises.

As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order, otherwise it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Mr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

### III. Relevant Statutory Provisions

*Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106*

**151.** (1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.

(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

### IV. Judgments Below

#### A. *Federal Court, Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400*

Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to Rule 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondent would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought

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Comme je le note plus haut, l'appelante prétend ne pas pouvoir produire les documents confidentiels en preuve sans qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, parce que ce serait un manquement à ses obligations envers les autorités chinoises. L'intimé soutient pour sa part que son droit de contre-interroger M. Pang et M. Feng sur leurs affidavits serait pratiquement futile en l'absence des documents auxquels ils se réfèrent. Sierra Club entend soutenir que le juge saisi de la demande de contrôle judiciaire devrait donc leur accorder peu de poids.

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La Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale du Canada a rejeté la demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité et la Cour d'appel fédérale, à la majorité, a rejeté l'appel. Le juge Robertson, dissident, était d'avis d'accorder l'ordonnance.

### III. Dispositions législatives

*Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106*

**151.** (1) La Cour peut, sur requête, ordonner que des documents ou éléments matériels qui seront déposés soient considérés comme confidentiels.

(2) Avant de rendre une ordonnance en application du paragraphe (1), la Cour doit être convaincue de la nécessité de considérer les documents ou éléments matériels comme confidentiels, étant donné l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires.

### IV. Les décisions antérieures

#### A. *Cour fédérale, Section de première instance, [2000] 2 C.F. 400*

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Le juge Pelletier examine d'abord s'il y a lieu, en vertu de la règle 312, d'autoriser la production de l'affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang auquel sont annexés les documents confidentiels. À son avis, il s'agit d'une question de pertinence et il conclut que les documents se rapportent à la question de la réparation. En l'absence de préjudice pour l'intimé, il y a donc lieu d'autoriser la signification et le dépôt de l'affidavit. Il note que des retards seraient préjudiciables à l'intimé mais que, puisque les deux parties ont présenté des requêtes

interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

14 Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the

interlocutoires qui ont entraîné les délais, les avantages de soumettre le dossier au complet à la cour compensent l'inconvénient du retard causé par la présentation de ces documents.

Sur la confidentialité, le juge Pelletier conclut qu'il doit être convaincu que la nécessité de protéger la confidentialité l'emporte sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Il note que les arguments en faveur de la publicité des débats judiciaires en l'espèce sont importants vu l'intérêt du public envers le rôle du Canada comme vendeur de technologie nucléaire. Il fait aussi remarquer que les ordonnances de confidentialité sont une exception au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et ne devraient être accordées que dans des cas de nécessité absolue.

Le juge Pelletier applique le même critère que pour une ordonnance conservatoire en matière de brevets, qui est essentiellement une ordonnance de confidentialité. Pour obtenir l'ordonnance, le requérant doit démontrer qu'il croit subjectivement que les renseignements sont confidentiels et que leur divulgation nuirait à ses intérêts. De plus, si l'ordonnance est contestée, le requérant doit démontrer objectivement qu'elle est nécessaire. Cet élément objectif l'oblige à démontrer que les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme étant confidentiels et qu'il est raisonnable de croire que leur divulgation risque de compromettre ses droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques.

Ayant conclu qu'il est satisfait à l'élément subjectif et aux deux volets de l'élément objectif du critère, il ajoute : « J'estime toutefois aussi que, dans les affaires de droit public, le critère objectif comporte, ou devrait comporter, un troisième volet, en l'occurrence la question de savoir si l'intérêt du public à l'égard de la divulgation l'emporte sur le préjudice que la divulgation risque de causer à une personne » (par. 23).

Il estime très important le fait qu'il ne s'agit pas en l'espèce de production obligatoire de documents. Le fait que la demande vise le dépôt volontaire de documents en vue d'étayer la thèse de l'appelante,

appellant's own cause as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

par opposition à une production obligatoire, joue contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

En soupesant l'intérêt du public dans la divulgation et le préjudice que la divulgation risque de causer à ÉACL, le juge Pelletier note que les documents que l'appelante veut soumettre à la cour ont été rédigés par d'autres personnes à d'autres fins, et il reconnaît que l'appelante est tenue de protéger la confidentialité des renseignements. À cette étape, il examine de nouveau la question de la pertinence. Si on réussit à démontrer que les documents sont très importants sur une question cruciale, « les exigences de la justice militent en faveur du prononcé d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Si les documents ne sont pertinents que d'une façon accessoire, le caractère facultatif de la production milite contre le prononcé de l'ordonnance de confidentialité » (par. 29). Il conclut alors que les documents sont importants pour résoudre la question de la réparation à accorder, elle-même un point important si l'appelante échoue sur la question principale.

Le juge Pelletier considère aussi le contexte de l'affaire et conclut que, puisque la question du rôle du Canada comme vendeur de technologies nucléaires est une importante question d'intérêt public, la charge de justifier une ordonnance de confidentialité est très onéreuse. Il conclut qu'ÉACL pourrait retrancher les éléments délicats des documents ou soumettre à la cour la même preuve sous une autre forme, et maintenir ainsi son droit à une défense complète tout en préservant la publicité des débats judiciaires.

Le juge Pelletier signale qu'il prononce l'ordonnance sans avoir examiné les documents confidentiels puisqu'ils n'ont pas été portés à sa connaissance. Bien qu'il mentionne la jurisprudence indiquant qu'un juge ne devrait pas se prononcer sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité sans avoir examiné les documents eux-mêmes, il estime qu'il n'aurait pas été utile d'examiner les documents, vu leur volume et leur caractère technique, et sans savoir quelle part d'information était déjà dans le domaine public.

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Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

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At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under Rule 312.

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With respect to Rule 312, Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(b) which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(b) of the *CEAA* was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the *CEAA*. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under Rule 312.

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On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered Rule 151, and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in

Dans son ordonnance, le juge Pelletier autorise l'appelante à déposer les documents sous leur forme actuelle ou sous une version révisée, à son gré. Il autorise aussi l'appelante à déposer des documents concernant le processus réglementaire chinois en général et son application au projet, à condition qu'elle le fasse sous 60 jours.

B. *Cour d'appel fédérale*, [2000] 4 C.F. 426

(1) Le juge Evans (avec l'appui du juge Sharlow)

ÉACL fait appel en Cour d'appel fédérale, en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, et Sierra Club forme un appel incident en vertu de la règle 312.

Sur la règle 312, le juge Evans conclut que les documents en cause sont clairement pertinents dans une défense que l'appelante a l'intention d'invoquer en vertu du par. 54(2) si la cour conclut que l'al. 5(1)(b) de la *LCÉE* doit s'appliquer, et pourraient l'être aussi pour l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la cour de refuser d'accorder une réparation dans le cas où les ministres auraient enfreint la *LCÉE*. Comme le juge Pelletier, le juge Evans est d'avis que l'avantage pour l'appelante et pour la cour d'une autorisation de déposer les documents l'emporte sur tout préjudice que le retard pourrait causer à l'intimé, et conclut par conséquent que le juge des requêtes a eu raison d'accorder l'autorisation en vertu de la règle 312.

Sur l'ordonnance de confidentialité, le juge Evans examine la règle 151 et tous les facteurs que le juge des requêtes a appréciés, y compris le secret commercial attaché aux documents, le fait que l'appelante les a reçus à titre confidentiel des autorités chinoises, et l'argument de l'appelante selon lequel, sans les documents, elle ne pourrait assurer effectivement sa défense. Ces facteurs doivent être pondérés avec le principe de la publicité des documents soumis aux tribunaux. Le juge Evans convient avec le juge Pelletier que le poids à accorder à l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats varie selon le contexte, et il conclut que lorsqu'une affaire soulève des questions de grande importance pour le public, le principe de la publicité des débats a plus de poids

the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)*, [2000] 3 F.C. 360 (C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the *CEAA*, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the inclusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without

comme facteur à prendre en compte dans le processus de pondération. Le juge Evans note l'intérêt du public à l'égard de la question en litige ainsi que la couverture médiatique considérable qu'elle a suscitée.

À l'appui de sa conclusion que le poids accordé au principe de la publicité des débats peut varier selon le contexte, le juge Evans invoque les décisions *AB Hassle c. Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [2000] 3 C.F. 360 (C.A.), où la cour a tenu compte du peu d'intérêt du public, et *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (C. Ont. (Div. gén.)), p. 283, où la cour a ordonné la divulgation après avoir déterminé qu'il s'agissait d'une affaire constitutionnelle importante et qu'il importait que le public comprenne ce qui était en cause. Le juge Evans fait remarquer que la transparence du processus d'évaluation et la participation du public ont une importance fondamentale pour la *LCÉE*, et il conclut qu'on ne peut prétendre que le juge des requêtes a accordé trop de poids au principe de la publicité des débats, même si la confidentialité n'est demandée que pour un nombre relativement restreint de documents hautement techniques.

Le juge Evans conclut que le juge des requêtes a donné trop de poids au fait que la production des documents était volontaire mais qu'il ne s'ensuit pas que sa décision au sujet de la confidentialité doive être écartée. Le juge Evans est d'avis que l'erreur n'entâche pas sa conclusion finale, pour trois motifs. Premièrement, comme le juge des requêtes, il attache une grande importance à la publicité du débat judiciaire. Deuxièmement, il conclut que l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des rapports peut, dans une large mesure, compenser l'absence des rapports, si l'appelante décide de ne pas les déposer sans ordonnance de confidentialité. Enfin, si ÉACL déposait une version modifiée des documents, la demande de confidentialité reposera sur un facteur relativement peu important, savoir l'argument que l'appelante perdrat des occasions d'affaires si elle violait son engagement envers les autorités chinoises.

Le juge Evans rejette l'argument selon lequel le juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en statuant

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reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

**(2) Robertson J.A. (dissenting)**

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Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

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In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence, or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

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Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

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To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

sans avoir examiné les documents réels, affirmant que cela n'était pas nécessaire puisqu'il y avait des précis et que la documentation était hautement technique et partiellement traduite. L'appel et l'appel incident sont donc rejetés.

**(2) Le juge Robertson (dissident)**

Le juge Robertson se dissocie de la majorité pour trois raisons. En premier lieu, il estime que le degré d'intérêt du public dans une affaire, l'importance de la couverture médiatique et l'identité des parties ne devraient pas être pris en considération pour statuer sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon lui, il faut plutôt examiner la nature de la preuve que protégerait l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

Il estime aussi qu'à défaut d'ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante doit choisir entre deux options inacceptables : subir un préjudice financier irréparable si les renseignements confidentiels sont produits en preuve, ou être privée de son droit à un procès équitable parce qu'elle ne peut se défendre pleinement si la preuve n'est pas produite.

Finalement, il dit que le cadre analytique utilisé par les juges majoritaires pour arriver à leur décision est fondamentalement défectueux en ce qu'il est fondé en grande partie sur le point de vue subjectif du juge des requêtes. Il rejette l'approche contextuelle sur la question de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, soulignant la nécessité d'un cadre d'analyse objectif pour combattre la perception que la justice est un concept relatif et pour promouvoir la cohérence et la certitude en droit.

Pour établir ce cadre plus objectif appelé à régir la délivrance d'ordonnances de confidentialité en matière de renseignements commerciaux et scientifiques, il examine le fondement juridique du principe de la publicité du processus judiciaire, en citant l'arrêt de notre Cour, *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326, qui conclut que la publicité des débats favorise la recherche de la vérité et témoigne de l'importance de soumettre le travail des tribunaux à l'examen public.

Robertson J.A. stated that although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made to rules or principles.

He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns “trade secrets”, this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner’s proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

(1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) comparatively, the information is “necessary” to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a *prima facie* right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

31 Selon le juge Robertson, même si le principe de la publicité du processus judiciaire reflète la valeur fondamentale que constitue dans une démocratie l’imputabilité dans l’exercice du pouvoir judiciaire, le principe selon lequel il faut que justice soit faite doit, à son avis, l’emporter. Il conclut que la justice vue comme principe universel signifie que les règles ou les principes doivent parfois souffrir des exceptions.

32 Il fait observer qu’en droit commercial, lorsque les renseignements qu’on cherche à protéger ont trait à des « secrets industriels », ils ne sont pas divulgués au procès lorsque cela aurait pour effet d’annihiler les droits du propriétaire et l’exposerait à un préjudice financier irréparable. Il conclut que, même si l’espèce ne porte pas sur des secrets industriels, on peut traiter de la même façon des renseignements commerciaux et scientifiques acquis sur une base confidentielle, et il établit les critères suivants comme conditions à la délivrance d’une ordonnance de confidentialité (au par. 13) :

1) les renseignements sont de nature confidentielle et non seulement des faits qu’une personne désire ne pas divulguer; 2) les renseignements qu’on veut protéger ne sont pas du domaine public; 3) selon la prépondérance des probabilités, la partie qui veut obtenir une ordonnance de confidentialité subirait un préjudice irréparable si les renseignements étaient rendus publics; 4) les renseignements sont pertinents dans le cadre de la résolution des questions juridiques soulevées dans le litige; 5) en même temps, les renseignements sont « nécessaires » à la résolution de ces questions; 6) l’octroi d’une ordonnance de confidentialité ne cause pas un préjudice grave à la partie adverse; 7) l’intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires ne prime pas les intérêts privés de la partie qui sollicite l’ordonnance de confidentialité. Le fardeau de démontrer que les critères un à six sont respectés incombe à la partie qui cherche à obtenir l’ordonnance de confidentialité. Pour le septième critère, c’est la partie adverse qui doit démontrer que le droit *prima facie* à une ordonnance de non-divulgation doit céder le pas au besoin de maintenir la publicité des débats judiciaires. En utilisant ces critères, il y a lieu de tenir compte de deux des fils conducteurs qui sous-tendent le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires : la recherche de la vérité et la sauvegarde de la primauté du droit. Comme je l’ai dit au tout début, je ne crois pas que le degré d’importance qu’on croit que le public accorde à une affaire soit une considération pertinente.

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In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

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Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a Web site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

## V. Issues

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- A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules*, 1998?
- B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

## VI. Analysis

### A. *The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order*

#### (1) The General Framework: Herein the Dagenais Principles

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The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the

Appliquant ces critères aux circonstances de l'espèce, le juge Robertson conclut qu'il y a lieu de rendre l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon lui, l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires ne prime pas l'intérêt de ÉACL à préserver le caractère confidentiel de ces documents hautement techniques.

Le juge Robertson traite aussi de l'intérêt du public à ce qu'il soit garanti que les plans de site d'installations nucléaires ne seront pas, par exemple, affichés sur un site Web. Il conclut qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait aucun impact négatif sur les deux objectifs primordiaux du principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, savoir la vérité et la primauté du droit. Il aurait par conséquent accueilli l'appel et rejeté l'appel incident.

## V. Questions en litige

- A. Quelle méthode d'analyse faut-il appliquer à l'exercice du pouvoir judiciaire discrétionnaire lorsqu'une partie demande une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale* (1998)?
- B. Y a-t-il lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité en l'espèce?

## VI. Analyse

### A. *Méthode d'analyse applicable aux ordonnances de confidentialité*

#### (1) Le cadre général : les principes de l'arrêt Dagenais

Le lien entre la publicité des procédures judiciaires et la liberté d'expression est solidement établi dans *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480. Le juge La Forest l'exprime en ces termes au par. 23 :

Le principe de la publicité des débats en justice est inextricablement lié aux droits garantis à l'al. 2b). Grâce à ce principe, le public a accès à l'information concernant les tribunaux, ce qui lui permet ensuite de discuter des pratiques des tribunaux et des procédures qui s'y déroulent, et d'émettre des opinions et des critiques à cet égard. La liberté d'exprimer des idées et des opinions sur

freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under Rule 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

*Dagenais* dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at

le fonctionnement des tribunaux relève clairement de la liberté garantie à l'al. 2b), mais en relève également le droit du public d'obtenir au préalable de l'information sur les tribunaux.

L'ordonnance sollicitée aurait pour effet de limiter l'accès du public aux documents confidentiels et leur examen public; cela porteraient clairement atteinte à la garantie de la liberté d'expression du public.

L'examen de la méthode générale à suivre dans l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'accorder une ordonnance de confidentialité devrait commencer par les principes établis par la Cour dans *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835. Cette affaire portait sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire, issu de la common law, de rendre des ordonnances de non-publication dans le cadre de procédures criminelles, mais il y a de fortes ressemblances entre les interdictions de publication et les ordonnances de confidentialité dans le contexte des procédures judiciaires. Dans les deux cas, on cherche à restreindre la liberté d'expression afin de préserver ou de promouvoir un intérêt en jeu dans les procédures. En ce sens, la question fondamentale que doit résoudre le tribunal auquel on demande une interdiction de publication ou une ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d'expression.

Même si, dans chaque cas, la liberté d'expression entre en jeu dans un contexte différent, le cadre établi dans *Dagenais* fait appel aux principes déterminants de la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés* afin de pondérer la liberté d'expression avec d'autres droits et intérêts, et peut donc être adapté et appliqué à diverses circonstances. L'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire sous le régime de la règle 151 devrait par conséquent refléter les principes sous-jacents établis par *Dagenais*, même s'il faut pour cela l'ajuster aux droits et intérêts précis qui sont en jeu en l'espèce.

L'affaire *Dagenais* porte sur une requête par laquelle quatre accusés demandaient à la cour de rendre, en vertu de sa compétence de common law, une ordonnance interdisant la diffusion d'une émission de télévision décrivant des abus physiques et

religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accused's right to a fair trial.

40

Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

- (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41

In *New Brunswick, supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42

La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick*, at para. 33;

sexuels infligés à de jeunes garçons dans des établissements religieux. Les requérants soutenaient que l'interdiction était nécessaire pour préserver leur droit à un procès équitable, parce que les faits racontés dans l'émission ressemblaient beaucoup aux faits en cause dans leurs procès.

Le juge en chef Lamer conclut que le pouvoir discrétionnaire de common law d'ordonner l'interdiction de publication doit être exercé dans les limites prescrites par les principes de la *Charte*. Puisque les ordonnances de non-publication restreignent nécessairement la liberté d'expression de tiers, il adapte la règle de common law qui s'appliquait avant l'entrée en vigueur de la *Charte* de façon à établir un juste équilibre entre le droit à la liberté d'expression et le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, d'une façon qui reflète l'essence du critère énoncé dans *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103. À la page 878 de *Dagenais*, le juge en chef Lamer énonce le critère reformulé :

Une ordonnance de non-publication ne doit être rendue que si :

- a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter le risque réel et important que le procès soit inéquitable, vu l'absence d'autres mesures raisonnables pouvant écarter ce risque;
- b) ses effets bénéfiques sont plus importants que ses effets préjudiciables sur la libre expression de ceux qui sont touchés par l'ordonnance. [Souligné dans l'original.]

Dans *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, la Cour modifie le critère de l'arrêt *Dagenais* dans le contexte de la question voisine de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'ordonner l'exclusion du public d'un procès en vertu du par. 486(1) du *Code criminel*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-46. Il s'agissait d'un appel d'une décision du juge du procès d'ordonner l'exclusion du public de la partie des procédures de détermination de la peine pour agression sexuelle et contacts sexuels portant sur les actes précis commis par l'accusé, au motif que cela éviterait un « préjudice indu » aux victimes et à l'accusé.

Le juge La Forest conclut que le par. 486(1) limite la liberté d'expression garantie à l'al. 2b) en créant un « pouvoir discrétionnaire permettant d'interdire au public et aux médias l'accès aux

however he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with the *Charter*. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

- (a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;
- (b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and
- (c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in *R. v. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76, and its companion case *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77. In *Mentuck*, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(d) of the *Charter*. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the

tribunaux » (*Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 33). Il considère toutefois que l'atteinte peut être justifiée en vertu de l'article premier pourvu que le pouvoir discrétionnaire soit exercé conformément à la *Charte*. Donc l'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire en vertu du par. 486(1) du *Code criminel*, décrite par le juge La Forest au par. 69, concorde étroitement avec le critère de common law établi par *Dagenais* :

- a) le juge doit envisager les solutions disponibles et se demander s'il existe d'autres mesures de rechange raisonnables et efficaces;
- b) il doit se demander si l'ordonnance a une portée aussi limitée que possible; et
- c) il doit comparer l'importance des objectifs de l'ordonnance et de ses effets probables avec l'importance de la publicité des procédures et l'activité d'expression qui sera restreinte, afin de veiller à ce que les effets positifs et négatifs de l'ordonnance soient proportionnels.

Appliquant cette analyse aux faits de l'espèce, le juge La Forest conclut que la preuve du risque de préjudice indu consiste principalement en la prétention de l'avocat du ministère public quant à la « nature délicate » des faits relatifs aux infractions et que cela ne suffit pas pour justifier l'atteinte à la liberté d'expression.

La Cour a récemment réexaminé la question des interdictions de publication prononcées par un tribunal en vertu de sa compétence de common law dans *R. c. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76, et l'arrêt connexe *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77. Dans *Mentuck*, le ministère public demandait l'interdiction de publication en vue de protéger l'identité de policiers banalisés et leurs méthodes d'enquête. L'accusé s'opposait à la demande en soutenant que l'interdiction porterait atteinte à son droit à un procès public et équitable protégé par l'al. 11d) de la *Charte*. Deux journaux intervenants s'opposaient aussi à la requête, en faisant valoir qu'elle porterait atteinte à leur droit à la liberté d'expression.

La Cour fait remarquer que *Dagenais* traite de la pondération de la liberté d'expression, d'une part, et du droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, d'autre part, tandis que dans l'affaire dont elle est saisie, le

accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45

In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve any important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46

The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the “necessity” branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase “proper administration of justice” must be carefully interpreted so as not to

droit de l'accusé à un procès public et équitable tout autant que la liberté d'expression militent en faveur du rejet de la requête en interdiction de publication. Ces droits ont été soupesés avec l'intérêt de la bonne administration de la justice, en particulier la protection de la sécurité des policiers et le maintien de l'efficacité des opérations policières secrètes.

Malgré cette distinction, la Cour note que la méthode retenue dans *Dagenais* et *Nouveau-Brunswick* a pour objectif de garantir que le pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux d'ordonner des interdictions de publication n'est pas assujetti à une norme de conformité à la *Charte* moins exigeante que la norme applicable aux dispositions législatives. Elle vise cet objectif en incorporant l'essence de l'article premier de la *Charte* et le critère *Oakes* dans l'analyse applicable aux interdictions de publication. Comme le même objectif s'applique à l'affaire dont elle est saisie, la Cour adopte une méthode semblable à celle de *Dagenais*, mais en élargissant le critère énoncé dans cet arrêt (qui portait spécifiquement sur le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable) de manière à fournir un guide à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux dans les requêtes en interdiction de publication, afin de protéger tout aspect important de la bonne administration de la justice. La Cour reformule le critère en ces termes (au par. 32) :

Une ordonnance de non-publication ne doit être rendue que si :

a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter le risque sérieux pour la bonne administration de la justice, vu l'absence d'autres mesures raisonnables pouvant écarter ce risque;

b) ses effets bénéfiques sont plus importants que ses effets préjudiciables sur les droits et les intérêts des parties et du public, notamment ses effets sur le droit à la libre expression, sur le droit de l'accusé à un procès public et équitable, et sur l'efficacité de l'administration de la justice.

La Cour souligne que dans le premier volet de l'analyse, trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous la notion de « nécessité ». En premier lieu, le risque en question doit être sérieux et bien étayé par la preuve. En deuxième lieu, l'expression « bonne administration de la justice » doit être interprétée

allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to “reflec[t] the substance of the *Oakes* test”, we cannot require that *Charter* rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the *Charter* be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another *Charter* right. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

*Mentuck* is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais*, *New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles.

judicieusement de façon à ne pas empêcher la divulgation d'un nombre excessif de renseignements. En troisième lieu, le critère exige non seulement que le juge qui prononce l'ordonnance détermine s'il existe des mesures de rechange raisonnables, mais aussi qu'il limite l'ordonnance autant que possible sans pour autant sacrifier la prévention du risque.

Au paragraphe 31, la Cour fait aussi l'importante observation que la bonne administration de la justice n'implique pas nécessairement des droits protégés par la *Charte*, et que la possibilité d'invoquer la *Charte* n'est pas une condition nécessaire à l'obtention d'une interdiction de publication :

Elle [la règle de common law] peut s'appliquer aux ordonnances qui doivent parfois être rendues dans l'intérêt de l'administration de la justice, qui englobe davantage que le droit à un procès équitable. Comme on veut que le critère « reflète [...] l'essence du critère énoncé dans l'arrêt *Oakes* », nous ne pouvons pas exiger que ces ordonnances aient pour seul objectif légitime les droits garantis par la *Charte*, pas plus que nous exigeons que les actes gouvernementaux et les dispositions législatives contreviennent à la *Charte* soient justifiés exclusivement par la recherche d'un autre droit garanti par la *Charte*. [Je souligne.]

La Cour prévoit aussi que, dans les cas voulus, le critère de *Dagenais* pourrait être élargi encore davantage pour régir des requêtes en interdiction de publication mettant en jeu des questions autres que l'administration de la justice.

*Mentuck* illustre bien la souplesse de la méthode *Dagenais*. Comme elle a pour objet fondamental de garantir que le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'interdire l'accès du public aux tribunaux est exercé conformément aux principes de la *Charte*, à mon avis, le modèle *Dagenais* peut et devrait être adapté à la situation de la présente espèce, où la question centrale est l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal d'exclure des renseignements confidentiels au cours d'une procédure publique. Comme dans *Dagenais*, *Nouveau-Brunswick* et *Mentuck*, une ordonnance de confidentialité aura un effet négatif sur le droit à la liberté d'expression garanti par la *Charte*, de même que sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et, comme dans ces affaires, les tribunaux doivent veiller à ce que le

However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

## (2) The Rights and Interests of the Parties

49

The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

50

Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the *CEAA*, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence, or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone

pouvoir discrétionnaire d'accorder l'ordonnance soit exercé conformément aux principes de la *Charte*. Toutefois, pour adapter le critère au contexte de la présente espèce, il faut d'abord définir les droits et intérêts particuliers qui entrent en jeu.

## (2) Les droits et les intérêts des parties

L'objet immédiat de la demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité d'ÉACL a trait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Les renseignements en question appartiennent aux autorités chinoises. Si l'appelante divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Il ressort clairement des conclusions de fait du juge des requêtes qu'ÉACL est tenue, par ses intérêts commerciaux et par les droits de propriété de son client, de ne pas divulguer ces renseignements (par. 27), et que leur divulgation risque de nuire aux intérêts commerciaux de l'appelante (par. 23).

Indépendamment de cet intérêt commercial direct, en cas de refus de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante devra, pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux, s'abstenir de produire les documents. Cela soulève l'importante question du contexte de la présentation de la demande. Comme le juge des requêtes et la Cour d'appel fédérale concluent tous deux que l'information contenue dans les documents confidentiels est pertinente pour les moyens de défense prévus par la *LCÉE*, le fait de ne pouvoir la produire nuit à la capacité de l'appelante de présenter une défense pleine et entière ou, plus généralement, au droit de l'appelante, en sa qualité de justiciable civile, de défendre sa cause. En ce sens, empêcher l'appelante de divulguer ces documents pour des raisons de confidentialité porte atteinte à son droit à un procès équitable. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la *Charte*, le droit à un procès équitable peut généralement être considéré comme un principe de justice fondamentale : *M. (A.) c. Ryan*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157, par. 84, le juge L'Heureux-Dubé (dissidente, mais non sur ce point). Le droit à un procès équitable intéresse directement l'appelante, mais le public a aussi un intérêt général à la protection du droit à un procès équitable. À vrai dire, le principe

demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(b) of the *Charter*: *New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is seen to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as “the very soul of justice”, guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick*, at para. 22.

### (3) Adapting the *Dagenais* Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

- such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

général est que tout litige porté devant les tribunaux doit être tranché selon la norme du procès équitable. La légitimité du processus judiciaire n'exige pas moins. De même, les tribunaux ont intérêt à ce que toutes les preuves pertinentes leur soient présentées pour veiller à ce que justice soit faite.

Ainsi, les intérêts que favoriserait l'ordonnance de confidentialité seraient le maintien de relations commerciales et contractuelles, de même que le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable. Est lié à ce dernier droit l'intérêt du public et du judiciaire dans la recherche de la vérité et la solution juste des litiges civils.

Milite contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité le principe fondamental de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Ce principe est inextricablement lié à la liberté d'expression constitutionnalisée à l'al. 2b) de la *Charte* : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, par. 23. L'importance de l'accès du public et des médias aux tribunaux ne peut être sous-estimée puisque l'accès est le moyen grâce auquel le processus judiciaire est soumis à l'examen et à la critique. Comme il est essentiel à l'administration de la justice que justice soit faite et soit perçue comme l'étant, cet examen public est fondamental. Le principe de la publicité des procédures judiciaires a été décrit comme le « souffle même de la justice », la garantie de l'absence d'arbitraire dans l'administration de la justice : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 22.

### (3) Adaptation de l'analyse de *Dagenais* aux droits et intérêts des parties

Pour appliquer aux droits et intérêts en jeu en l'espèce l'analyse de *Dagenais* et des arrêts subséquents précités, il convient d'énoncer de la façon suivante les conditions applicables à une ordonnance de confidentialité dans un cas comme l'espèce :

Une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 ne doit être rendue que si :

- elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque;

(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

54 As in *Mentuck*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well grounded in the evidence, and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

55 In addition, the phrase “important commercial interest” is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an “important commercial interest”, the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no “important commercial interest” for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35, at para. 10, the open court rule only yields “where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness” (emphasis added).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an “important commercial interest”. It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second

b) ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires.

Comme dans *Mentuck*, j'ajouterais que trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. En premier lieu, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, en ce qu'il est bien étayé par la preuve et menace gravement l'intérêt commercial en question.

De plus, l'expression « intérêt commercial important » exige une clarification. Pour être qualifié d’« intérêt commercial important », l'intérêt en question ne doit pas se rapporter uniquement et spécifiquement à la partie qui demande l'ordonnance de confidentialité; il doit s'agir d'un intérêt qui peut se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité. Par exemple, une entreprise privée ne pourrait simplement prétendre que l'existence d'un contrat donné ne devrait pas être divulguée parce que cela lui ferait perdre des occasions d'affaires, et que cela nuirait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Si toutefois, comme en l'espèce, la divulgation de renseignements doit entraîner un manquement à une entente de non-divulgation, on peut alors parler plus largement de l'intérêt commercial général dans la protection des renseignements confidentiels. Simplement, si aucun principe général n'entre en jeu, il ne peut y avoir d’« intérêt commercial important » pour les besoins de l'analyse. Ou, pour citer le juge Binnie dans *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35, par. 10, la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne cède le pas que « dans les cas où le droit du public à la confidentialité l'emporte sur le droit du public à l'accessibilité » (je souligne).

Outre l'exigence susmentionnée, les tribunaux doivent déterminer avec prudence ce qui constitue un « intérêt commercial important ». Il faut rappeler qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité implique une atteinte à la liberté d'expression. Même si la pondération de l'intérêt commercial et de la liberté d'expression intervient à la deuxième étape

branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 439.

Finally, the phrase “reasonably alternative measures” requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

#### B. Application of the Test to this Appeal

##### (1) Necessity

At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself, or to its terms.

The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the Confidential Documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed

de l’analyse, les tribunaux doivent avoir pleinement conscience de l’importance fondamentale de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Voir généralement *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (C.F. 1<sup>re</sup> inst.), p. 439, le juge Muldoon.

Enfin, l’expression « autres options raisonnables » oblige le juge non seulement à se demander s’il existe des mesures raisonnables autres que l’ordonnance de confidentialité, mais aussi à restreindre l’ordonnance autant qu’il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l’intérêt commercial en question.

#### B. Application de l’analyse en l’espèce

##### (1) Nécessité

À cette étape, il faut déterminer si la divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de l’appelante, et s’il existe d’autres solutions raisonnables que l’ordonnance elle-même, ou ses modalités.

L’intérêt commercial en jeu en l’espèce a trait à la préservation d’obligations contractuelles de confidentialité. L’appelante fait valoir qu’un préjudice irréparable sera causé à ses intérêts commerciaux si les documents confidentiels sont divulgués. À mon avis, la préservation de renseignements confidentiels est un intérêt commercial suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l’analyse dès lors que certaines conditions relatives aux renseignements sont réunies.

Le juge Pelletier souligne que l’ordonnance sollicitée en l’espèce s’apparente à une ordonnance conservatoire en matière de brevets. Pour l’obtenir, le requérant doit démontrer que les renseignements en question ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels et que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, il est raisonnable de penser que leur divulgation risquerait de compromettre ses droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques : *AB Hassle c. Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [1998] A.C.F. n° 1850 (QL) (C.F. 1<sup>re</sup> inst.), par. 29-30. J’ajouterais à cela

by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a “confidential nature” in that it has been “accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential” as opposed to “facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed” (para. 14).

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Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant’s commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL’s competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

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The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the *CEAA* and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal’s assertion (at para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant’s case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

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Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunged of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be

l’exigence proposée par le juge Robertson que les renseignements soient « de nature confidentielle » en ce qu’ils ont été « recueillis dans l’expectative raisonnable qu’ils resteront confidentiels », par opposition à « des faits qu’une partie à un litige voudrait garder confidentiels en obtenant le huis clos » (par. 14).

Le juge Pelletier constate que le critère établi dans *AB Hassle* est respecté puisque tant l’appelante que les autorités chinoises ont toujours considéré les renseignements comme confidentiels et que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation risque de nuire aux intérêts commerciaux de l’appelante (par. 23). Le juge Robertson conclut lui aussi que les renseignements en question sont clairement confidentiels puisqu’il s’agit de renseignements commerciaux, uniformément reconnus comme étant confidentiels, qui présentent un intérêt pour les concurrents d’ÉACL (par. 16). Par conséquent, l’ordonnance est demandée afin de prévenir un risque sérieux de préjudice à un intérêt commercial important.

Le premier volet de l’analyse exige aussi l’examen d’options raisonnables autres que l’ordonnance de confidentialité, et de la portée de l’ordonnance pour s’assurer qu’elle n’est pas trop vaste. Les deux jugements antérieurs en l’espèce concluent que les renseignements figurant dans les documents confidentiels sont pertinents pour les moyens de défense offerts à l’appelante en vertu de la *LCÉE*, et cette conclusion n’est pas portée en appel devant notre Cour. De plus, je suis d’accord avec la Cour d’appel lorsqu’elle affirme (au par. 99) que vu l’importance des documents pour le droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière, l’appelante est pratiquement forcée de les produire. Comme les renseignements sont nécessaires à la cause de l’appelante, il ne reste qu’à déterminer s’il existe d’autres options raisonnables pour communiquer les renseignements nécessaires sans divulguer de renseignements confidentiels.

Deux options autres que l’ordonnance de confidentialité sont mentionnées dans les décisions antérieures. Le juge des requêtes suggère de retrancher des documents les passages commercialement délicats et de produire les versions ainsi modifiées.

filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expungement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary, and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal, in the sense that, at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese

La majorité en Cour d'appel estime que, outre cette possibilité d'épuration des documents, l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des documents confidentiels pourrait, dans une large mesure, compenser l'absence des originaux. Si l'une ou l'autre de ces deux options peut raisonnablement se substituer au dépôt des documents confidentiels aux termes d'une ordonnance de confidentialité, alors l'ordonnance n'est pas nécessaire et la requête ne franchit pas la première étape de l'analyse.

Il existe deux possibilités pour l'épuration des documents et, selon moi, elles comportent toutes deux des problèmes. La première serait que ÉACL retranche les renseignements confidentiels sans divulguer les éléments retranchés ni aux parties ni au tribunal. Toutefois, dans cette situation, la documentation déposée serait encore différente de celle utilisée pour les affidavits. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que la requête découle de l'argument de Sierra Club selon lequel le tribunal ne devrait accorder que peu ou pas de poids aux résumés sans la présence des documents de base. Même si on pouvait totalement séparer les renseignements pertinents et les renseignements confidentiels, ce qui permettrait la divulgation de tous les renseignements sur lesquels se fondent les affidavits, l'appréciation de leur pertinence ne pourrait pas être mise à l'épreuve en contre-interrogatoire puisque la documentation retranchée ne serait pas disponible. Par conséquent, même dans le meilleur cas de figure, où l'on n'aurait qu'à retrancher les renseignements non pertinents, les parties se retrouveraient essentiellement dans la même situation que celle qui a donné lieu au pourvoi, en ce sens qu'au moins une partie des documents ayant servi à la préparation des affidavits en question ne serait pas mise à la disposition de Sierra Club.

De plus, je partage l'opinion du juge Robertson que ce meilleur cas de figure, où les renseignements pertinents et les renseignements confidentiels ne se recoupent pas, est une hypothèse non confirmée (par. 28). Même si les documents eux-mêmes n'ont pas été produits devant les tribunaux dans le cadre de la présente requête, parce qu'ils comprennent des milliers de pages de renseignements détaillés, cette hypothèse est au mieux optimiste. L'option de

authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

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The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are reasonably alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

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A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits "may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

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With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

## (2) The Proportionality Stage

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As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free

l'épuration serait en outre compliquée par le fait que les autorités chinoises exigent l'approbation préalable de toute demande de divulgation de renseignements de la part d'ÉACL.

La deuxième possibilité serait de mettre les documents supprimés à la disposition du tribunal et des parties en vertu d'une ordonnance de confidentialité plus restreinte. Bien que cela permettrait un accès public un peu plus large que ne le ferait l'ordonnance de confidentialité sollicitée, selon moi, cette restriction mineure à la requête n'est pas une option viable étant donné les difficultés liées à l'épuration dans les circonstances. Il s'agit de savoir s'il y a d'autres options raisonnables et non d'adopter l'option qui soit absolument la moins restrictive. Avec égards, j'estime que l'épuration des documents confidentiels serait une solution virtuellement impraticable et inefficace qui n'est pas raisonnable dans les circonstances.

Une deuxième option autre que l'ordonnance de confidentialité serait, selon le juge Evans, l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des documents confidentiels pour « dans une large mesure, compenser [leur] absence » (par. 103). Il ne semble toutefois envisager ce fait qu'à titre de facteur à considérer dans la pondération des divers intérêts en cause. Je conviens qu'à cette étape liminaire, se fonder uniquement sur les résumés en connaissant l'intention de Sierra Club de plaider leur faiblesse ou l'absence de valeur probante, ne semble pas être une « autre option raisonnable » à la communication aux parties des documents de base.

Vu les facteurs susmentionnés, je conclus que l'ordonnance de confidentialité est nécessaire en ce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de l'appelante, et qu'il n'existe pas d'autres options raisonnables.

## (2) L'étape de la proportionnalité

Comme on le mentionne plus haut, à cette étape, les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, y compris ses effets sur le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable, doivent être pondérés avec ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur le droit

expression, which in turn is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

(a) *Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order*

As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case, or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a *Charter* right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: *Ryan, supra*, at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected *Charter* right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: *Mentuck, supra*, at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the *CEAA* is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and

à la liberté d'expression, qui à son tour est lié au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Cette pondération déterminera finalement s'il y a lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

a) *Les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité*

Comme nous l'avons vu, le principal intérêt qui serait promu par l'ordonnance de confidentialité est l'intérêt du public à la protection du droit du justiciable civil de faire valoir sa cause ou, de façon plus générale, du droit à un procès équitable. Puisque l'appelante l'invoque en l'espèce pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et non son droit à la liberté, le droit à un procès équitable dans ce contexte n'est pas un droit visé par la *Charte*; toutefois, le droit à un procès équitable pour tous les justiciables a été reconnu comme un principe de justice fondamentale : *Ryan*, précité, par. 84. Il y a lieu de rappeler qu'il y a des circonstances où, en l'absence de violation d'un droit garanti par la *Charte*, la bonne administration de la justice exige une ordonnance de confidentialité : *Mentuck*, précité, par. 31. En l'espèce, les effets bénéfiques d'une telle ordonnance sur l'administration de la justice tiennent à la capacité de l'appelante de soutenir sa cause, dans le cadre du droit plus large à un procès équitable.

Les documents confidentiels ont été jugés pertinents en ce qui a trait aux moyens de défense que l'appelante pourrait invoquer s'il est jugé que la *LCÉE* s'applique à l'opération attaquée et, comme nous l'avons vu, l'appelante ne peut communiquer les documents sans risque sérieux pour ses intérêts commerciaux. De ce fait, il existe un risque bien réel que, sans l'ordonnance de confidentialité, la capacité de l'appelante à mener à bien sa défense soit gravement réduite. Je conclus par conséquent que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait d'importants effets bénéfiques pour le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable.

En plus des effets bénéfiques pour le droit à un procès équitable, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait aussi des incidences favorables sur d'autres droits et intérêts importants. En premier lieu, comme je l'exposerai plus en détail ci-après, l'ordonnance de confidentialité permettrait aux parties ainsi qu'au

permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

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Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

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Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(b) *Charter* right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: *New Brunswick, supra*, at paras. 22-23. Although as a general principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the particular deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

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Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good; (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit; and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R.

tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu. En facilitant l'accès aux documents pertinents dans une procédure judiciaire, l'ordonnance sollicitée favoriserait la recherche de la vérité, qui est une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression.

En deuxième lieu, je suis d'accord avec l'observation du juge Robertson selon laquelle puisque les documents confidentiels contiennent des renseignements techniques détaillés touchant la construction et la conception d'une installation nucléaire, il peut être nécessaire, dans l'intérêt public, d'empêcher que ces renseignements tombent dans le domaine public (par. 44). Même si le contenu exact des documents demeure un mystère, il est évident qu'ils comprennent des détails techniques d'une installation nucléaire et il peut bien y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ces renseignements.

b) *Les effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité*

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, puisqu'elle priverait le public de l'accès au contenu des documents confidentiels. Comme on le dit plus haut, le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires est inextricablement lié au droit à la liberté d'expression protégé par l'al. 2b) de la *Charte*, et la vigilance du public envers les tribunaux est un aspect fondamental de l'administration de la justice : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, par. 22-23. Même si, à titre de principe général, l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne peut être sous-estimée, il faut examiner, dans le contexte de l'espèce, les effets préjudiciables particuliers que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait sur la liberté d'expression.

Les valeurs fondamentales qui sous-tendent la liberté d'expression sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun; (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées; et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique : *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927, p. 976; *R. c. Keegstra*, [1990]

927, at p. 976; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at pp. 762-64, *per* Dickson C.J. Charter jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the Charter: *Keegstra*, at pp. 760-61. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to Charter principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: *Edmonton Journal, supra*, at pp. 1357-58, *per* Wilson J. Clearly the confidentiality order, by denying public and media access to documents relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be promoted by the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination. In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or

3 R.C.S. 697, p. 762-764, le juge en chef Dickson. La jurisprudence de la *Charte* établit que plus l'expression en cause est au cœur de ces valeurs fondamentales, plus il est difficile de justifier, en vertu de l'article premier de la *Charte*, une atteinte à l'al. 2b) à son égard : *Keegstra*, p. 760-761. Comme l'objectif principal en l'espèce est d'exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire dans le respect des principes de la *Charte*, l'examen des effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur la liberté d'expression devrait comprendre une appréciation des effets qu'elle aurait sur les trois valeurs fondamentales. Plus l'ordonnance de confidentialité porte préjudice à ces valeurs, plus il est difficile de la justifier. Inversement, des effets mineurs sur les valeurs fondamentales rendent l'ordonnance de confidentialité plus facile à justifier.

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La recherche de la vérité est non seulement au cœur de la liberté d'expression, elle est aussi reconnue comme un objectif fondamental de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires, puisque l'examen public des témoins favorise l'efficacité du processus de présentation de la preuve : *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1357-1358, le juge Wilson. À l'évidence, enlevant au public et aux médias l'accès aux documents invoqués dans les procédures, l'ordonnance de confidentialité nuirait jusqu'à un certain point à la recherche de la vérité. L'ordonnance n'exclurait pas le public de la salle d'audience, mais le public et les médias n'auraient pas accès aux documents pertinents quant à la présentation de la preuve.

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Toutefois, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, la recherche de la vérité peut jusqu'à un certain point être favorisée par l'ordonnance de confidentialité. La présente requête résulte de l'argument de Sierra Club selon lequel il doit avoir accès aux documents confidentiels pour vérifier l'exactitude de la déposition de M. Pang. Si l'ordonnance est refusée, le scénario le plus probable est que l'appelante s'abstiendra de déposer les documents, avec la conséquence fâcheuse que des preuves qui peuvent être pertinentes ne seront pas portées à la connaissance de Sierra Club ou du tribunal. Par conséquent, Sierra Club ne sera pas en mesure de vérifier complètement l'exactitude de la preuve de M. Pang en contre-

documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

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As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would in turn assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

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In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

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The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focusses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would

interrogatoire. De plus, le tribunal ne bénéficiera pas du contre-interrogatoire ou de cette preuve documentaire, et il lui faudra tirer des conclusions fondées sur un dossier de preuve incomplet. Cela nuira manifestement à la recherche de la vérité en l'espèce.

De plus, il importe de rappeler que l'ordonnance de confidentialité ne restreindrait l'accès qu'à un nombre relativement peu élevé de documents hautement techniques. La nature de ces documents est telle que le public en général est peu susceptible d'en comprendre le contenu, de sorte qu'ils contribuerait peu à l'intérêt du public à la recherche de la vérité en l'espèce. Toutefois, dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts respectifs, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, ce qui devrait aussi aider le tribunal à tirer des conclusions de fait exactes. À mon avis, compte tenu de leur nature, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sollicitée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le rejet de la demande qui aurait pour effet d'empêcher les parties et le tribunal de se fonder sur les documents au cours de l'instance.

De plus, aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions imposées à l'égard de ces documents ont trait à leur distribution publique. Les documents confidentiels seraient mis à la disposition du tribunal et des parties, et il n'y aurait pas d'entrave à l'accès du public aux procédures. À ce titre, l'ordonnance représente une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires et elle n'aurait donc pas d'effets préjudiciables importants sur ce principe.

La deuxième valeur fondamentale sous-jacente à la liberté d'expression, la promotion de l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement de la pensée et des idées, est centrée sur l'expression individuelle et n'est donc pas étroitement liée au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires qui concerne l'expression institutionnelle. Même

restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in *Edmonton Journal, supra*, at p. 1339:

It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will always be engaged where the open court

si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, j'estime que cette valeur ne serait pas touchée de manière significative.

La troisième valeur fondamentale, la libre participation au processus politique, joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Ce lien est souligné par le juge Cory dans *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1339 :

On voit que la liberté d'expression est d'une importance fondamentale dans une société démocratique. Il est également essentiel dans une démocratie et fondamental pour la primauté du droit que la transparence du fonctionnement des tribunaux soit perçue comme telle. La presse doit être libre de commenter les procédures judiciaires pour que, dans les faits, chacun puisse constater que les tribunaux fonctionnent publiquement sous les regards pénétrants du public.

Même si on ne peut douter de l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires dans une société démocratique, les décisions antérieures divergent sur la question de savoir si le poids à accorder au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires devrait varier en fonction de la nature de la procédure.

Sur ce point, le juge Robertson estime que la nature de l'affaire et le degré d'intérêt des médias sont des considérations dénuées de pertinence. Le juge Evans estime quant à lui que le juge des requêtes a eu raison de tenir compte du fait que la demande de contrôle judiciaire suscite beaucoup d'intérêt de la part du public et des médias. À mon avis, même si la nature publique de l'affaire peut être un facteur susceptible de renforcer l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires dans une espèce particulière, le degré d'intérêt des médias ne devrait pas être considéré comme facteur indépendant.

Puisque les affaires concernant des institutions publiques ont généralement un lien plus étroit avec la valeur fondamentale de la participation du public au processus politique, la nature publique d'une instance devrait être prise en considération dans l'évaluation du bien-fondé d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Il importe de noter que cette valeur

principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the substance of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below where he stated, at para. 87:

While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

84

This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nuclear energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the *CEAA*. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

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However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish public interest, from media interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public nature of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case.

fondamentale sera toujours engagée lorsque sera mis en cause le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, vu l'importance de la transparence judiciaire dans une société démocratique. Toutefois, le lien entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la participation du public dans le processus politique s'accentue lorsque le processus politique est également engagé par la substance de la procédure. Sous ce rapport, je suis d'accord avec ce que dit le juge Evans (au par. 87) :

Bien que tous les litiges soient importants pour les parties, et qu'il en va de l'intérêt du public que les affaires soumises aux tribunaux soient traitées de façon équitable et appropriée, certaines affaires soulèvent des questions qui transcendent les intérêts immédiats des parties ainsi que l'intérêt du public en général dans la bonne administration de la justice, et qui ont une signification beaucoup plus grande pour le public.

La requête est liée à une demande de contrôle judiciaire d'une décision du gouvernement de financer un projet d'énergie nucléaire. La demande est clairement de nature publique, puisqu'elle a trait à la distribution de fonds publics en rapport avec une question dont l'intérêt public a été démontré. De plus, comme le souligne le juge Evans, la transparence du processus et la participation du public ont une importance fondamentale sous le régime de la *LCÉE*. En effet, par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection. À cet égard, je suis d'accord avec le juge Evans pour conclure que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés.

J'estime toutefois avec égards que, dans la mesure où il se fonde sur l'intérêt des médias comme indice de l'intérêt du public, le juge Evans fait erreur. À mon avis, il est important d'établir une distinction entre l'intérêt du public et l'intérêt des médias et, comme le juge Robertson, je note que la couverture médiatique ne peut être considérée comme une mesure impartiale de l'intérêt public. C'est la nature publique de l'instance qui accentue le besoin de transparence, et cette nature publique ne se reflète

I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in *Keegstra, supra*, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values, “we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity”.

Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application as a whole is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in *Edmonton Journal, supra*, at pp. 1353-54:

One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to pre-judge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

pas nécessairement dans le désir des médias d'examiner les faits de l'affaire. Je réitère l'avertissement donné par le juge en chef Dickson dans *Keegstra*, précité, p. 760, où il dit que même si l'expression en cause doit être examinée dans ses rapports avec les valeurs fondamentales, « nous devons veiller à ne pas juger l'expression en fonction de sa popularité ».

Même si l'intérêt du public à la publicité de la demande de contrôle judiciaire dans son ensemble est important, à mon avis, il importe tout autant de prendre en compte la nature et la portée des renseignements visés par l'ordonnance demandée, lorsqu'il s'agit d'apprécier le poids de l'intérêt public. Avec égards, le juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en ne tenant pas compte de la portée limitée de l'ordonnance dans son appréciation de l'intérêt du public à la communication et en accordant donc un poids excessif à ce facteur. Sous ce rapport, je ne partage pas la conclusion suivante du juge Evans (au par. 97) :

Par conséquent, on ne peut dire qu'après que le juge des requêtes eut examiné la nature de ce litige et évalué l'importance de l'intérêt du public à la publicité des procédures, il aurait dans les circonstances accordé trop d'importance à ce facteur, même si la confidentialité n'est demandée que pour trois documents parmi la montagne de documents déposés en l'instance et que leur contenu dépasse probablement les connaissances de ceux qui n'ont pas l'expertise technique nécessaire.

La publicité des débats judiciaires est un principe fondamentalement important, surtout lorsque la substance de la procédure est de nature publique. Cela ne libère toutefois aucunement de l'obligation d'apprécier le poids à accorder à ce principe en fonction des limites particulières qu'imposerait l'ordonnance de confidentialité à la publicité des débats. Comme le dit le juge Wilson dans *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1353-1354 :

Une chose semble claire et c'est qu'il ne faut pas évaluer une valeur selon la méthode générale et l'autre valeur en conflit avec elle selon la méthode contextuelle. Agir ainsi pourrait fort bien revenir à préjuger de l'issue du litige en donnant à la valeur examinée de manière générale plus d'importance que ne l'exige le contexte de l'affaire.

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In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

88

In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the *CEAA*, in which case the Confidential Documents would be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations, or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the *CEAA*, or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the *CEAA* are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive information released into the public domain, with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

89

In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the *CEAA*, it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on either the public interest in freedom of expression or the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the

À mon avis, il importe de reconnaître que, malgré l'intérêt significatif que porte le public à ces procédures, l'ordonnance demandée n'entraverait que légèrement la publicité de la demande de contrôle judiciaire. La portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires.

Pour traiter des effets qu'aurait l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur la liberté d'expression, il faut aussi se rappeler qu'il se peut que l'appelante n'ait pas à soulever de moyens de défense visés par la *LCÉE*, auquel cas les documents confidentiels perdraient leur pertinence et la liberté d'expression ne serait pas touchée par l'ordonnance. Toutefois, puisque l'utilité des documents confidentiels ne sera pas déterminée avant un certain temps, l'appelante n'aurait plus, en l'absence d'ordonnance de confidentialité, que le choix entre soit produire les documents en violation de ses obligations, soit les retenir dans l'espoir de ne pas avoir à présenter de défense en vertu de la *LCÉE* ou de pouvoir assurer effectivement sa défense sans les documents pertinents. Si elle opte pour le premier choix et que le tribunal conclut par la suite que les moyens de défense visés par la *LCÉE* ne sont pas applicables, l'appelante aura subi le préjudice de voir ses renseignements confidentiels et délicats tomber dans le domaine public sans que le public n'en tire d'avantage correspondant. Même si sa réalisation est loin d'être certaine, la possibilité d'un tel scénario milite également en faveur de l'ordonnance sollicitée.

En arrivant à cette conclusion, je note que si l'appelante n'a pas à invoquer les moyens de défense pertinents en vertu de la *LCÉE*, il est également vrai que son droit à un procès équitable ne sera pas entravé même en cas de refus de l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Je ne retiens toutefois pas cela comme facteur militant contre l'ordonnance parce que, si elle est accordée et que les documents confidentiels ne sont pas nécessaires, il n'y aura alors aucun effet préjudiciable ni sur l'intérêt du public à la liberté d'expression ni sur les droits commerciaux ou le droit de l'appelante à un procès

scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

## VII. Conclusion

In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the *CEAA*, there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*.

équitable. Cette issue neutre contraste avec le scénario susmentionné où il y a refus de l'ordonnance et possibilité d'atteinte aux droits commerciaux de l'appelante sans avantage correspondant pour le public. Par conséquent, le fait que les documents confidentiels puissent ne pas être nécessaires est un facteur en faveur de l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

En résumé, les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, dans le contexte en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. À ce titre, l'ordonnance n'aurait pas d'effets préjudiciables importants sur la liberté d'expression.

## VII. Conclusion

Dans la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, je note que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable et sur la liberté d'expression. D'autre part, les effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes. En outre, si l'ordonnance est refusée et qu'au cours du contrôle judiciaire l'appelante n'est pas amenée à invoquer les moyens de défense prévus dans la *LCÉE*, il se peut qu'elle subisse le préjudice d'avoir communiqué des renseignements confidentiels en violation de ses obligations sans avantage correspondant pour le droit du public à la liberté d'expression. Je conclus donc que les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et qu'il y a lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance.

Je suis donc d'avis d'accueillir le pourvoi avec dépens devant toutes les cours, d'annuler l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, et d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité selon les modalités demandées par l'appelante en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*.

*Appeal allowed with costs.*

*Solicitors for the appellant: Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.*

*Solicitors for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada: Timothy J. Howard, Vancouver; Franklin S. Gertler, Montréal.*

*Solicitor for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada: The Deputy Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.*

*Pourvoi accueilli avec dépens.*

*Procureurs de l'appelante : Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.*

*Procureurs de l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada : Timothy J. Howard, Vancouver; Franklin S. Gertler, Montréal.*

*Procureur des intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada : Le sous-procureur général du Canada, Ottawa.*

## **TAB 10**

**CITATION:** Triple-I Capital Partners Limited v. 12411300 Canada Inc., 2023 ONSC 3400  
**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-22-00684372-00CL  
**DATE:** 20230606

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO – COMMERCIAL LIST**

APPLICATION UNDER Section 243(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended, and Section 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended

**RE:** Triple-I Capital Partners Limited, Applicant

**AND:**

12411300 Canada Inc., Respondent / Debtor

**BEFORE:** Peter J. Osborne J.

**COUNSEL:** Kevin Sherkin and Monica Faheim, for Crow Soberman Inc., Receiver

Hans Rizarri, for Crow Soberman Inc., Receiver

Avi Freedland, for the Respondent / Debtor

**HEARD:** June 6, 2023

**ENDORSEMENT**

1. Crowe Soberman Inc., in its capacity as Receiver, moves for approval of the Third Report of the Receiver dated January 4, 2023, and the activities set out therein, approval of the statement of receipts and disbursements, approval of fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel, and discharge.
2. The Respondent, 12411300 Canada Inc. (the “Debtor”), does not oppose approval of the Third Report or the activities, but it does oppose approval of the fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel. Neither the Lender Applicant, Triple-I Capital Partners Limited (the “Applicant”), nor the Second Mortgagees (defined below) appeared.

**Chronology of This Matter**

3. The Applicant advanced to the Debtor \$6,400,000 in December 2021, to purchase an industrial property in Brampton, Ontario, secured by a mortgage registered against title to the property. The maturity date of the mortgage was May 1, 2022. The Debtor failed to repay the principal and interest owing, and the Applicant commenced this proceeding.
4. The Receiver was appointed by order of Cavanagh J. dated July 22, 2022 (the “Receivership Order”). It is not disputed that the primary asset of the Debtor is that piece of industrial land and a building located on that land of approximately 18,200 ft.<sup>2</sup>.

5. As of the date of the Receivership Order, the Debtor was indebted to the Applicant in the amount of \$6,865,154 plus additional interest and accrued expenses.
6. Eight individuals who hold mortgages in second position subordinate to Triple-I, (collectively, the “Second Mortgagees”), were owed \$2 million, although on October 10 the Debtor made a payment to them in the amount of \$410,000, with the result that the principal amount owing to them was in the amount of \$1,590,000. There were no other significant creditors.
7. After being appointed, the Receiver took certain steps, in accordance with the Receivership Order by which it was appointed, to prepare for the implementation of a sales process to market and sell the property.
8. The Receiver then brought a motion for approval of a sales process.
9. Following the service and filing of those motion materials, the Receiver was advised that the Debtor was in the process of finalizing an imminent refinancing of the property.
10. On October 14, 2022, Cavanagh J. issued a sale process approval order and an ancillary order, which had the effect of pausing the implementation of the sales process by the Receiver as approved, pending refinancing efforts being undertaken by the Debtor.
11. That ancillary order also approved the First Report of the Receiver dated August 8, 2022, the Second Report of the Receiver dated October 7, 2022, and the activities of the Receiver as described in both Reports.
12. On October 21, 2022, the Court extended the temporary pause for an additional four days until October 25, to permit the Debtor additional time to complete the closing of the refinancing transaction.
13. On October 28, 2022, this Court issued an order directing the payment of certain funds, by the Debtor to the Applicant and the Receiver, discharging various charges on the property, and addressing other steps to be taken in connection with the closing of the Debtor’s refinancing transaction.
14. That same day, funds in the amount of \$6,861,223.16 were paid by the Debtor to the Applicant and Receiver (through counsel), for the purpose of satisfying the secured debt owed by the Debtor to the Applicant.
15. The payment was made in two tranches given the dispute that underlies this motion. The first tranche of \$6,464,232.96 represented the net amount owing with respect to the principal loan and interest to October 26, together with taxes owing to the municipality. The second tranche in the amount of \$396,990.20 represented the portion that the Debtor disputes related to professional fees and disbursements of the Receiver, its counsel and counsel to the Applicant.

**Should the Fees of the Receiver and its Counsel be Approved?****Material Filed and Positions of the Parties**

16. The Receiver relies on all of its Reports, but principally the Third Report and appendices thereto, including fee affidavits of the Receiver and its counsel.
17. The Debtor relies on an affidavit from its own counsel who argued the motion sworn in support of its position. This practice is not to be preferred, particularly for matters that are contentious. Here, the Receiver submits that the affidavit should not be relied upon. In the main, it appears to contain a summary of the chronology of certain key events and other statements that are more in the nature of argument or submissions and therefore more properly belong in a factum.
18. Today, the Receiver seeks approval of fees of \$106,722.25 plus disbursements of \$32,851.56 and HST in the amount of \$17,364.40, together with fees for its counsel (inclusive of HST and disbursements) of \$91,014.94. That would bring the total amount of fees and disbursements charged by the Receiver together with those of its counsel since its appointment to \$247,953.15.
19. The Receiver submits that the fees are fair and reasonable in the circumstances and have been properly incurred in respect of activities undertaken all in accordance with the Receivership Order.
20. The Respondent submits that the fees are unreasonable, the Receiver has duties to all stakeholders, including the Debtor, and that the receivership itself was opposed by both the Debtor and the Second Mortgagors.
21. The Respondent submits that this Court ought to approve 50 percent of total fees (\$53,361.13 instead of \$106,722.25) and 80 percent of disbursements (\$26,281.25 instead of \$32,851.56), plus HST in each case. The Respondent submits that the Receiver's counsel fees and disbursements (inclusive of HST) also ought to be approved at a rate of 50 percent (\$45,507.47 instead of \$91,014.94). That would bring the total amount of fees and disbursements for the Receiver and its counsel to \$125,149.85.
22. The Debtor notes that this motion addresses only the fees of the Receiver and its counsel, and states that the Debtor is disputing the fees of the Applicant and mortgage charges through an assessment officer.

**The Test**

23. The factors to be considered have been sent out by the Court of Appeal for Ontario: *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer*, 2014 ONCA 851, 327 O.A.C. 376, at para. 33:
  - a. the nature, extent and value of the assets;
  - b. the complications and difficulties encountered;
  - c. the degree of assistance provided by the debtor;

- d. the time spent;
- e. the receiver's knowledge, experience and skill;
- f. the diligence and thoroughness displayed;
- g. the responsibilities assumed;
- h. the results of the receiver's efforts; and
- i. the cost of comparable services when performed in a prudent and economical manner.

24. The Court of Appeal noted that these factors constitute a useful guidance but are not exhaustive: *Diemer*, at para. 33, citing with approval *Confectionately Yours Inc., Re* (2002), 164 O.A.C. 84 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 460.

25. The Court of Appeal went on to observe that the cost of legal services is highlighted in the context of a court-supervised insolvency due to its public nature. While observing that it is not for the court to tell lawyers and law firms how to bill, the Court noted that proceedings supervised by the court and particularly where the court is asked to give its *imprimatur* to legal fees, the court must ensure that the compensation sought is indeed fair and reasonable.

26. While the above factors, including time spent, should be considered, value provided should predominate over the mathematical calculation reflected in the hours times hourly rate equation. The focus of the fair and reasonable assessment should be on what was accomplished, not on how much time it took. The measurement of accomplishment may include consideration of complications and in difficulties encountered in the receivership (*Diemer*, at para. 45).

#### Application of the Test to This Case

27. In this case, the Receivership Order provides that the Receiver and its counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time. For this purpose, the accounts of the Receiver and its counsel are referred to a judge of the Commercial List. Accordingly, the issue is properly before this Court.

28. The Receiver submits that its work consisted of two phases: lead up and preparatory work; and possession of the premises and preparation for the sales process.

29. The Receiver further submits and the Record reflects, that the activities of the Receiver as set out in its First and Second Reports have already been approved. The sales process approval order of Cavanagh J. dated October 14, 2022 approving the first two reports and the activities described therein, was not opposed. Moreover, there was no reservation of rights by the Debtor (or any other party such as the Second Mortgagees) to seek to challenge the fees associated with those activities in the future.

30. The Receiver submits, therefore, that the Debtor cannot challenge the fees related to those activities. In my view, that does not follow. While I agree that it is too late for the Debtor to challenge the activities that have already been approved by this Court (and therefore the

fair and reasonable fees and disbursements in respect thereof), nothing in Cavanagh's J. October 14 sales process approval order approved any fees or disbursements in respect of the activities set out in the first two Reports. Indeed, there was no request for such relief and none of that material was before the Court. The issue of approval of all of the fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel are now before the Court for the first time.

31. The Receiver submits that the fees and disbursements are fair and reasonable in what was a challenging receivership. Detailed invoices from the professionals involved are appended to the Third Report. Rates charged are consistent with rates charged by law firms practising in the insolvency and restructuring area in the Toronto market, and the time spent is reasonable.
32. The accounts submitted meet the technical requirements and disclose in detail the name of each professional who rendered services, the applicable rate, the total charge, and the date on which services were rendered. The accounts of both the Receiver and its counsel are verified by a sworn affidavit from and on behalf of each.
33. The Receiver submits that this receivership proceeding was not simple or straightforward, and a number of the complications arose specifically due to the conduct of the Debtor. These include, for example, what appeared to the Receiver to be a break and enter at the premises of the Debtor and the removal of locks, which ultimately turned out to have been done by the Debtor, who submitted that it was unaware that it was not entitled to show the property to prospective purchasers or investors. The Receiver was therefore obliged to arrange for a bailiff to change the locks, replace fence chains and secure equipment.
34. Most substantively, the Receiver and its counsel had to prepare a sale and marketing process to prepare for the implementation of a process to market and sell the property, and engage a commercial real estate broker. The Receiver argues that the fact that the sale process never ultimately proceeded does not make the work completed in the course of preparing for the sale, in accordance with the sales process already approved by the Court (and not challenged by the Debtor at that time), non-compensable and nor does it make the fees automatically unfair or unreasonable. That assessment must focus on the circumstances as they existed at the time the fees were incurred.
35. At that time, as submitted by the Receiver, the Debtor did not have, contrary to its promises, the "imminent refinancing", and the Receivership Order was in full force and effect.
36. The Receiver further submits that the Receiver and the Debtor, through counsel, spent significant time and effort negotiating the terms of proposed orders in advance of numerous hearings before this Court, including in particular the October 13 motion. The Debtor was to a large extent uncooperative and therefore increased the challenges of the work carried out by the Receiver which are now under attack. It submits that the Disbursements are reasonable, and included such necessary expenses as insurance premiums for the property which were necessary to preserve the asset of the value for the estate.
37. The fees claimed by the Receiver are supported by the Affidavit of Hans Rizarri sworn January 4, 2023. Mr. Rizarri is a Licensed Insolvency Trustee with the Receiver firm. His affidavit states that he has reviewed the detailed statement of account and considers the

time expended and the fees charged to be reasonable in light of the services performed and the prevailing market rates for such services.

38. As Exhibit 1 to his affidavit, Mr. Rizarri sets out the Billing Worksheet Report which in turn reflects individual docket entries for all of the time spent by the Receiver.
39. The fees claimed by counsel to the Receiver are supported by the Affidavit of Monica Faheim sworn January 3, 2023. Ms. Faheim is a lawyer with the firm of counsel to the Receiver. The exhibits to her affidavit set out true copies of the detailed invoices for fees, and a schedule including a summary of the invoices, itemizing fees charged, disbursements and HST, and a further schedule summarizing billing rates, year of call, total hours and total fees charged, organized by billing professional (lawyer or law clerk), together with an estimate for remaining fees to complete all work not to exceed \$5000 including HST. Ms. Faheim states that to the best of her knowledge, the rates charged are comparable for the provision of similar services to the rates charged by other law firms in the Toronto market.
40. The Debtor challenges the quantum of fees and disbursements. It relies on the affidavit of counsel sworn January 23, 2023. No other evidence is filed in support of its position on this motion. Notwithstanding that counsel who swore the affidavit appeared to argue this motion, I heard the submissions.
41. The Debtor submits, essentially, that the receivership was straightforward because the Debtor had only one major asset, being the real property and building referred to above. The value of that property is dependent upon the premises being used for the production of cannabis. That in turn required the cannabis licence referred to above.
42. Boiled down, the Debtor argues that the receivership only came about in the first place since the Debtor was unable to obtain refinancing prior to maturity of a mortgage in turn because it was in the final stages of obtaining the cannabis licence but that had not yet been issued.
43. In my view, this argument does not advance the position of the Debtor. The facts as submitted may well be accurate but do not change certain key facts. The mortgage went into default. This Court concluded that the test for the appointment of a receiver was established by the Applicant. This Court then concluded that a sale process should be approved, with a view to monetizing and maximizing the recovery in respect of the sale of the one key asset: the land and building.
44. The argument of the Debtor really amounts to another version of the argument advanced earlier in this proceeding that implementation of the Receivership Order should be delayed to permit imminent refinancing. None of that changes the fact that a receivership was appropriate, just as this Court previously concluded.
45. The Receiver submits, and I accept, that its efforts undertaken with respect to the sale process were appropriate, in accordance with Court approval, and the fact that ultimately, a refinancing was concluded such that a sale was not necessary, does not render, retroactively, those efforts unnecessary nor the fees in respect of those efforts inappropriate and unrecoverable.

46. The Debtor submits that the receivership did not take an extended length of time, noting that the hearing for the Receivership Order took place less than two months after the mortgage default. The Debtor submits in its materials (and in argument on this motion) that given the dates in respect of which the stay period was in effect, there were a very limited number of days, or “workdays” when the receiver and its counsel could have been actually working on the file (and the amounts charged for those periods of time are excessive).
47. Counsel for the Debtor submits in his affidavit the hearsay evidence that he received advice from the broker that represents the Second Mortgagees (whom, I pause to observe again, did not take a position on this motion or file any evidence on this motion) that the Receiver’s work over that period of time [late July and early August, see para. 18 of the Debtor’s factum] “brought no value to the Corporation or its creditors, including the Second Mortgagees”. I cannot give any weight to this submission based on that evidence.
48. The Debtor then, in the same manner, challenges as unreasonable the fees of the Receiver and its counsel charged for the period from late September until mid-October 2022 [factum, paras. 18-19], submitting that once the Health Canada licence was issued in late September, a commitment for mortgage refinancing was finalized shortly thereafter, resulting in the request by the Debtor for an extension of the stay or pause of the receivership until November 4, 2022.
49. The Debtor made vigorous submissions to the effect that the Applicant acted unreasonably in refusing to consent to extensions to the stay, to allow for the refinancing and pay out in full of the mortgage loan owing to the Applicant.
50. The position of the Debtor is in large part summed up in paragraphs 42 and 43 of its Factum, and these submissions were repeated in oral argument. The Debtor argues:

Lastly, all hearings and preparation conducted by the Receiver and its counsel could have been avoided if the Receiver had acted reasonably and allowed for the Refinance to take place. Instead, the Receiver booked, attended and forced counsel for the Lender to attend unnecessary hearings while it knew the Refinance was imminent.

The Refinance closed without any input or aid from the Receiver or Lender whose only interest, it seems, was forcing counsel for the Corporation to attend unnecessary hearings and meetings to incur expenses with respect to the Receivership, which are dubious at best.

51. The source for this submission is the lawyer’s own affidavit at paragraphs 29 – 32 (CaseLines B-1-17).
52. The affidavit states at paragraph 53 that certain amounts have been charged by the Receiver and its counsel as set out in chart form. At paragraph 54, the affidavit states that: “I believe that it [attending court and reviewing court documents] brought no value to the Corporation or its creditors and was wasteful. Further, I doubt the necessity of any of .... the work .....”.
53. In my view, it is not the role of the Court to attempt to undertake a lawyer by lawyer, line by line, forensic analysis of the invoices for professional fees. Nor is it the role of the Court

to attempt to evaluate each docket entry and attempt to come to a determination, particularly on a record like this, as to whether each individual activity on a certain day by a certain professional added demonstrable value.

54. Rather, the Court of Appeal was clear in *Diemer* that such an item-by-item evaluation is what should not be undertaken, in favour of a more holistic review of the constellation of all relevant factors, each of which is an input into the ultimate analysis of whether the fees are fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this particular case.
55. Here, I accept that the professional fees of the Receiver and its counsel were not immaterial. Total fees and disbursements of approximately \$248,000 were significant, even considered as against the amount of the outstanding mortgage loan in default of approximately \$6.5 million. However, in my view they were not unreasonable, given the circumstances and the steps that were required to be undertaken. I am not persuaded that they should be reduced as submitted by the Debtor to approximately \$125,000.
56. Again, there is no issue about the loan and the default. There can be no issue about the propriety or necessity of the receivership proceeding or the sales process, both of which were approved by the Court. In the same way and as noted above, there can be no issue about the activities of the Receiver and its counsel as set out in the First and Second Reports, which were also previously approved. The issue is whether the fees and disbursements are fair and reasonable.
57. Just as it is inappropriate to consider each individual docket entry independently, I think caution should be exercised when undertaking a retrospective analysis about whether steps taken in a proceeding were reasonable, at the time they were taken. In practical terms, it is not appropriate in a receivership proceeding such as this, to effectively argue that refinancing was imminent from the outset, even prior to the Receivership Order being granted, then argue vigorously for extensions and delay throughout the proceeding because the refinancing was imminent, and then, only following a sale process order being made, actually finalize that refinancing and then submit that none of the intervening steps ought to have been necessary or reasonable at the time they were taken. The opposite is also accurate: if the refinancing had not been obtained, and the sale process and receivership continued, such facts would not automatically make the preceding steps and the fees in respect thereof necessary, fair and reasonable. In each case, all of the factors need to be considered.
58. I am satisfied that while the receivership property consisted largely of one piece of land and the building thereon, it does not follow that the issues confronting the Receiver were necessarily straightforward or uncomplicated. As admitted and indeed emphasized by the Debtor, the value of the asset reflected its unique and single-purpose: operation of a cannabis facility. That in turn required a Health Canada licence which was not issued until later in the process.
59. The chronology of Court attendances and orders does not persuade me that any of them were improper, unnecessary or duplicative. Indeed, a number of them were brought about expressly at the request of the Debtor in the course of its continued and repeated pleas,

effectively, for more time within which it could arrange replacement financing and pay out the mortgage debt owing to the Applicant.

60. In oral argument, counsel for the Debtor made three main submissions: i) the Receiver has duties to all stakeholders, including the Debtor; ii) the receivership proceeding itself was opposed by the Debtor and by the Second Mortgagees; and iii) the fees charged are unreasonable.
61. As stated above, neither of the first two submissions assists the Debtor at all, in my view. The only issue on this motion is whether the fees and disbursements are fair and reasonable.
62. The Receivership Order already made provides that the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel are authorized to be paid at the applicable standard rates and charges, unless otherwise ordered.
63. As noted above, the fee affidavits and exhibits (i.e., the invoices) are sworn or affirmed statements. I am satisfied that the fees are standard and reasonable. I am satisfied that the steps taken as reflected in the detailed time entries, were reasonable and consistent with the mandate given to the Receiver and its counsel through the Receivership Order. I am unable to conclude that the fees and disbursements charged were excessive or unreasonable.
64. The fees and disbursements of the Receiver and its counsel are approved in the aggregate amount of \$247,953.15.

### **Approval of the Third Report and Activities**

65. While approval of the Third Report and the activities described therein are not challenged by the Debtor (save to the extent described above), I have reviewed them and am satisfied they are appropriate. As observed by Morawetz R.S.J. (as he then was) in *Target Canada Co. (Re)*, 2015 ONSC 7574, 31 C.B.R. (6th) 311, at para. 22, there are good policy and practical reasons for the Court to approve of the activities of a Monitor.
66. The same observations apply to the activities of a court-appointed Receiver. It should not be a novel concept that the activities of any Court officer can and should be considered by the Court as against the mandate, powers and authority of that officer.
67. The Third Report and the activities described in it are approved.

### **Costs**

68. Each of the Receiver and the Debtor submitted a bill of costs, and seeks partial indemnity costs of this motion in the event it is successful. The Receiver seeks the amount of \$18,569.72, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST. The Debtor seeks the amount of \$10,719.18 on the same basis.
69. Section 131 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 provides that the costs of any step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the Court. The Receiver was successful and is entitled to its costs.

70. Having considered the factors set out in r. 57.01 of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as they apply to this matter, in my view an appropriate award of costs is \$12,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, which amount is payable by the Debtor to the Receiver within 60 days.
71. Order to go in accordance with these reasons.

P.J. Osborne J.

**Date: June 6, 2023**

## **TAB 11**



## SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COUNSEL SLIP/ ENDORSEMENT FORM

COURT FILE NO.: CV-23-00707989-00CL

DATE: OCTOBER 23, 2024

3

NO. ON LIST: @11:30AM

TITLE OF PROCEEDING: 1180554 ONTARIO LIMITED VS CBJ DEVELOPMENTS

BEFORE: JUSTICE W.D. BLACK

**PARTICIPANT INFORMATION**For Plaintiff, Applicant, Moving Party, Crown:

Name of Person Appearing	Name of Party	Contact Info
Jonathan Kulathungam	APPL COUN	<a href="mailto:jkulathungam@teplitskyllp.com">jkulathungam@teplitskyllp.com</a>

For Defendant, Respondent, Responding Party, Defence:

Name of Person Appearing	Name of Party	Contact Info
Ryan Shah	RECEIVER COUN	<a href="mailto:ryan.shah@paliareroland.com">ryan.shah@paliareroland.com</a>
Jeff Larry	RECEIVER COUN	<a href="mailto:Jeff.Larry@paliareroland.com">Jeff.Larry@paliareroland.com</a>
Bryan Tannenbaum	RECEIVER	<a href="mailto:btannenbaum@tdbadvisory.ca">btannenbaum@tdbadvisory.ca</a>

For Other, Self-Represented:

Name of Person Appearing	Name of Party	Contact Info
Haddon Murray	3RD PARTY COUN	<a href="mailto:Haddon.Murray@gowlingwlg.com">Haddon.Murray@gowlingwlg.com</a>

**ENDORSEMENT OF JUSTICE W.D. BLACK:**

- [1] This was a motion by the receiver TDB Restructuring Limited (the “Receiver”) seeking approval of the sale of three properties of CBJ-Clearview Garden Estates Inc., CBJ Bridle Park II Inc., and CBJ Developments Inc. (collectively the “Debtors”) to the first mortgagee 1180554 Ontario Limited (“118”) and vesting title in those properties to and in the designated purchaser.
- [2] The Receiver and 118 entered into an asset purchase agreement (“APA”) dated July 24, 2024 contemplating 118’s purchase of the properties through a credit bid.
- [3] The matter was last before Kimmel J. on October 7, 2024.
- [4] At that time, Kimmel J. granted a brief adjournment at the request of the second mortgagee, First Global Financial Corp. (“FGFC”), whose counsel advised Her Honour that his client had received certain materials and details concerning the proposed transaction relatively late in the day, and wanted an opportunity to review the proposed transaction to satisfy itself that, as the Receiver asserted, there was “no actionable transaction available under which there will be surplus funds for distribution to the second mortgagee.”
- [5] In granting the brief adjournment, Kimmel J. admonished the second mortgagee not to “treat this as an invitation to object just for the sake of objecting.” Her Honour observed that the record “discloses a very robust sales process that has not produced a single bid from any third party....despite the fact that the Properties have been listed for sale for almost a year, on and off and thus have been well exposed to the market.”
- [6] To their credit, the second mortgagee and its counsel took Kimmel J’s comments to heart, and advised Receiver’s counsel about a week ago that the second mortgagee would not be taking a position relative to the relief sought by the Receiver.
- [7] Today however, counsel who was in the process of being retained on behalf of an entity called TGP Canada Management Inc. (“TGP”) advised that he was seeking an adjournment on behalf of his soon-to-be client (of another two weeks) in order to have the opportunity to either buy out 118’s position or present a better offer.
- [8] TGP’s soon-to-be counsel was appropriately even-handed in his submissions seeking the adjournment, but was not able to point to any details of any proposed further offer, and, through no fault of his own was mistaken as to the timing of TGP’s initial involvement in this matter. Suffice it to say that, contrary to TGP’s apparent advice to its proposed counsel that it had only become aware of and involved in this proceeding on or about October 8, 2024, there is specific evidence showing TGP’s involvement as of October 4, (TGP sent a letter of that date to Mr. Tannenbaum of the Receiver explaining the nature of TGP’s interest and its wish for an adjournment of the hearing then pending before Kimmel J.). There was also information provided by 118’s counsel (as opposed to evidence in the record) suggesting that TGP has in fact been involved for some months before that.
- [9] Leaving that inconsistency aside, however, there is as noted no evidence before the court as to any substance of TGP’s proposed offer (or offer it will arrange), and simply no evidence to refute the Receiver’s evidence – seemingly confirmed by the market – that there will be no economic interest for anyone following the 118 transaction.

- [10] As such, so long as I find that the sales process and related steps taken by the Receiver meet the Soundair principles – which I do, echoing Kimmel J.’s finding in that regard – there is no basis to further delay these proceedings and the closing of the 118 transaction.
- [11] As noted, the sales process has been robust, has been ongoing over the course of many months, and has yielded no available transaction to compete with the 118 APA. There is nothing before me to suggest that the Receiver has been improvident or that the process has been unfair.
- [12] In the submissions of proposed counsel for TGP, it appears that in fact TGP’s concerns are with FGFC, and that, to the extent TGP has any remedy it would be as against FGFC. I do not have any evidence before me from which I could adjudicate that proposition, and in any event, for the reasons discussed, no basis or need to do so.
- [13] In the circumstances I am denying TGP’s request for an adjournment.
- [14] I am also granting the relief sought by the Receiver, and attach signed orders confirming that relief.



W.D. BLACK J.

**DATE: OCTOBER 23, 2024**

**CAMERON STEPHENS MORTGAGE  
CAPITAL LTD.**  
Applicant

-and-

Court File No.: CV-23-00701672-00CL  
**CONACHER KINGSTON HOLDINGS INC. et al.**

Respondents

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST**

**PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT  
TORONTO**

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**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE RECEIVER  
(RETURNABLE DECEMBER 12, 2025)**

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**PALIARE ROLAND ROSENBERG ROTHSTEIN LLP**  
155 Wellington Street West  
35th Floor  
Toronto, ON M5V 3H1

**Jeffrey Larry** (LSO# 44608D)  
Tel: 416.646.4330  
[jeff.larry@paliareroland.com](mailto:jeff.larry@paliareroland.com)

**Ryan Shah** (LSO# 88250C)  
Tel: 416.646-6356  
[ryan.shah@paliareroland.com](mailto:ryan.shah@paliareroland.com)

Lawyers for the Receiver, TDB Restructuring Limited