

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY)**

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSAL OF
BG FURNITURE LTD.
OF THE TOWN OF WALKERTON
IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO

**BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF
BG FURNITURE LTD.**

December 20, 2016

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CITATION: Mustang GP Ltd. (Re), 2015 ONSC 6562
COURT FILE NOs.: 35-2041153, 35-2041155, 35-2041157
DATE: 2015/10/28

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO – IN BANKRUPTCY

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF MUSTANG GP LTD.

IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF HARVEST ONTARIO PARTNERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF HARVEST POWER MUSTANG GENERATION LTD.

BEFORE: Justice H. A. Rady

COUNSEL: Harvey Chaiton, for Mustang GP Ltd., Harvest Ontario Partners Limited Partnership and Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd.

Joseph Latham for Harvest Power Inc.

Jeremy Forrest for Proposal Trustee, Deloitte Restructuring Inc.

Robert Choi for Badger Daylighting Limited Partnership

Curtis Cleaver for StormFisher Ltd.

No one else appearing.

HEARD: October 19, 2015

ENDORSEMENT

Introduction

[1] This matter came before me as a time sensitive motion for the following relief:

- (a) abridging the time for service of the debtors' motion record so that the motion was properly returnable on October 19, 2015;

- (b) administratively consolidating the debtors' proposal proceeding;
- (c) authorizing the debtors to enter into an interim financing term sheet (the DIP term sheet) with StormFisher Environmental Ltd. (in this capacity, the DIP lender), approving the DIP term sheet and granting the DIP lender a super priority charge to secure all of the debtors' obligations to the DIP lender under the DIP term sheet;
- (d) granting a charge in an amount not to exceed \$150,000 in favour of the debtors' legal counsel, the proposal trustee and its legal counsel to secure payment of their reasonable fees and disbursements;
- (e) granting a charge in an amount not to exceed \$2,000,000 in favour of the debtors' directors and officers;
- (f) approving the process described herein for the sale and marketing of the debtors' business and assets;
- (g) approving the agreement of purchase and sale between StormFisher Environmental Ltd. and the debtors; and
- (h) granting the debtors an extension of time to make a proposal to their creditors.

Preliminary Matter

[2] As a preliminary matter, Mr. Choi, who acts for a creditor of the debtors, Badger Daylighting Limited Partnership, requested an adjournment to permit him an opportunity to review and consider the material, which was late served on October 15, 2015. He sought only a brief adjournment and I was initially inclined to grant one. However, having heard counsel's submissions and considered the material, I was concerned that even a brief adjournment had the potential to cause mischief as

the debtors attempt to come to terms with their debt. Any delay might ultimately cause prejudice to the debtors and their stakeholders. Both Mr. Chaiton and Mr. Latham expressed concern about adverse environmental consequences if the case were delayed. No other stakeholders appeared to voice any objection. As a result, the request was denied and the motion proceeded.

- [3] Following submissions, I reserved my decision. On October 20, 2015, I released an endorsement granting the relief with reasons to follow.

Background

- [4] The evidence is contained in the affidavit of Wayne Davis, the chief executive officer of Harvest Mustang GP Ltd. dated October 13, 2015. He sets out in considerable detail the background to the motion and what has led the debtors to seek the above described relief. The following is a summary of his evidence.
- [5] On September 29, 2015, the moving parties, which are referred to collectively as the debtors, each filed a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal pursuant to s. 50.4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 as amended. Deloitte Restructuring Inc. was named proposal trustee.
- [6] The debtors are indirect subsidiaries of Harvest Power Inc., a privately owned Delaware corporation that develops, builds, owns and operates facilities that generate renewable energy, as well as soil and mulch products from waste organic materials.
- [7] Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd. was established in July 2010 in order to acquire assets related to a development opportunity in London. In October 2010, it purchased a property located at 1087 Green Valley Road from London Biogas Generation Inc., a subsidiary of StormFisher Ltd. The intent was to design, build, own and operate a biogas electricity production facility.

- [8] In November 2011, a limited partnership was formed between Harvest Power Canada Ltd., Harvest Power Mustang GP Ltd. and Waste Management of Canada Corporation, referred to as Harvest Ontario Partners Limited Partnership or Harvest Ontario Partners. It was formed to permit the plant to accept organic waste to be used to generate renewable electricity. After the partnership was formed, Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd. became a 100 percent owned subsidiary of the partnership. In June 2012, its personal property was transferred to the partnership. It remains the registered owner of 1087 Green Valley Road.
- [9] The plant employs twelve part and full time employees.
- [10] The debtors began operating the biogas electrical facility in London in April 2013. Unfortunately, the plant has never met its production expectations, had negative EBITDA from the outset and could not reach profitability without new investment. The debtors had experienced significant “launch challenges” due to construction delays, lower than expected feedstock acquisition, higher than anticipated labour costs, and delays in securing a necessary approval from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency for the marketing and sale of fertilizer produced at the facility.
- [11] Its difficulties were compounded by litigation with its general contractor, arising from the earlier construction of the facility. The lawsuit was ultimately resolved with the debtors paying \$1 million from a holdback held by Harvest Ontario Partners as well as a 24 percent limited partnership interest in the partnership. The litigation was costly and “caused a substantial drain on the debtors’ working capital resources”.
- [12] The debtors’ working capital and operating losses had been funded by its parent company, Harvest Power Inc. However, in early 2015 Harvest Power Inc. advised the debtors that it would not continue to do so. By the year ended September 2015, the debtors had an operating loss of approximately \$4.8 million.

- [13] In January 2015, the debtors defaulted on their obligations to Farm Credit Canada, its senior secured creditor, which had extended a demand credit facility to secure up to \$11 million in construction financing for the plant. The credit facility was converted to a twelve year term loan, secured by a mortgage, a first security interest and various guarantees. In February 2015, FCC began a process to locate a party to acquire its debt and security, with the cooperation of the debtors. FCC also advised the debtors that it would not fund any restructuring process or provide further financing. The marketing process failed to garner any offers from third parties that FCC found acceptable.
- [14] On July 9, 2015, FCC demanded payment of its term loan from Harvest Ontario Partners and served a Notice of Intention to Enforce Security pursuant to s. 244(1) of the *BIA*. In August 2015, an indirect subsidiary of Harvest Power Inc. – 2478223 Ontario Limited – purchased and took an assignment of FCC’s debt and security at a substantial discount.
- [15] Shortly thereafter, StormFisher Ltd., which is a competitor of Harvest Power Inc., advised 2478223 that it was interested in purchasing the FCC debt and security in the hopes of acquiring the debtors’ business. It was prepared to participate in the sale process as a stalking horse bidder and a DIP lender.
- [16] On September 25, 2015, 2478223 assigned the debt and security to StormFisher Environmental Ltd., a subsidiary of StormFisher Ltd., incorporated for the purpose of purchasing the debtors’ assets. The debt and security were purchased at a substantial discount from what 2478223 had paid and included cash, a promissory note and a minority equity interest. StormFisher Ltd. is described as having remained close to the Harvest Power group of companies in the time following its subsidiary’s sale of the property to Harvest Power Generation Ltd. Some of its employees worked under contract for Harvest Power Inc. It was aware of the

debtors' financial difficulties and had participated in FCC's earlier attempted sale process.

[17] On September 29, 2015, the debtors commenced these proceedings under the *BIA*, in order to carry out the sale of the debtors' business as a going concern to StormFisher Environmental Ltd. as a stalking horse bidder or another purchaser. Given the lack of success in the sale process earlier initiated by FCC, and concerns respecting the difficulties facing the renewable energy industry in general and for the debtors specifically, the debtors believe that a stalking horse process is appropriate and necessary.

[18] In consultation with the proposal trustee, the debtors developed a process for the marketing and sale of their business and assets. The following summary of the process is described by Mr. Davis in his affidavit:

- i. the sale process will be commenced immediately following the date of the order approving it;
- ii. starting immediately after the sale process approval date, the debtors and the proposal trustee will contact prospective purchasers and will provide a teaser summary of the debtors' business in order to solicit interest. The proposal trustee will obtain a non-disclosure agreement from interested parties who wish to receive a confidential information memorandum and undertake due diligence. Following the execution of a non-disclosure agreement, the proposal trustee will provide access to an electronic data room to prospective purchasers;
- iii. at the request of interested parties, the proposal trustee will facilitate plant tours and management meetings;

- iv. shortly following the sale process approval date, the proposal trustee will advertise the opportunity in the national edition of the Globe and Mail;
- v. the bid deadline for prospective purchasers will be 35 days following the sale process approval date. Any qualified bid must be accompanied by a cash deposit of 10% of the purchase price;
- vi. the debtors and the proposal trustee will review all superior bids received to determine which bid it considers to be the most favourable and will then notify the successful party that its bid has been selected as the winning bid. Upon the selection of the winning bidder, there shall be a binding agreement of purchase and sale between the winning bidder and the debtors;
- vii. if one or more superior bids is received, the debtors shall bring a motion to the Court within seven business days following the selection of the winning bidder for an order approving the agreement of purchase and sale between the winning bidder and the debtors and to vest the assets in the winning bidder;
- viii. the closing of the sale transaction will take place within one business day from the sale approval date;
- ix. in the event that a superior bid is not received by the bid deadline, the debtors will bring a motion as soon as possible following the bid deadline for an order approving the stalking horse agreement of purchase and sale.

[19] StormFisher Environmental Ltd. is prepared to purchase the business and assets of the debtors on a going-concern basis on the following terms:

A partial credit bid for a purchase price equal to: (i) \$250,000 of the debtors' total secured obligations to StormFisher Environmental Ltd. (plus the DIP loan described below); (ii) any amounts ranking in priority to StormFisher Environmental Ltd.'s security, including the amounts secured by: (a) the administration charge; (b) the D&O charge (both described below); and (c) the amount estimated by the proposal trustee to be the aggregate fees, disbursements and expenses for the period from and after closing of the transaction for the sale the debtors' business to the completion of the *BIA* proceedings and the discharge of Deloitte Restructuring Inc. as trustee in bankruptcy of estate of the debtors.

- [20] The debtors and the proposal trustee prepared a cash flow forecast for September 25, 2015 to December 25, 2015. It shows that the debtors will require additional funds in order to see them through this process, while still carrying on business.
- [21] StormFisher Environmental Ltd. has offered to make a DIP loan of up to \$1 million to fund the projected shortfall in cash flow. In return, the DIP lender requires a charge that ranks in priority to all other claims and encumbrances, except the administration and D&O charges. The administration charge protects the reasonable fees and expenses of the debtors' professional advisors. The D&O charge is to indemnify the debtors for possible liabilities such as wages, vacation pay, source deductions and environmental remedy issues. The latter may arise in the event of a wind-down or shut down of the plant and for which existing insurance policies may be inadequate. According to Mr. Davis, the risk if such a charge is not granted is that the debtors' directors and officers might resign, thereby jeopardizing the proceedings.
- [22] The debtors have other creditors. Harvest Power Partners had arranged for an irrevocable standby letter of credit, issued by the Bank of Montreal to fund the payment that might be required to the Ministry of Environment arising from any environment clean up that might become necessary.
- [23] Searches of the *PPSA* registry disclosed the following registrations:

- (a) Harvest Ontario Partners:
- (i) FCC in respect of all collateral classifications other than consumer goods. On August 12, 2015, change statement filed to reflect the assignment of FCC's Debt and Security to 2478223;
 - (ii) BMO in respect of accounts.
- (b) Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd.
- (i) FCC in respect of all collateral classifications other than consumer goods. On August 12, 2015, change statement filed to reflect the assignment of FCC's Debt and Security to 2478223;
 - (ii) BMO in respect of accounts; and
 - (iii) Roynat Inc. in respect of certain equipment.

[24] There are two registrations on title to 1087 Green Valley Road. The first is for \$11 million in favour of FCC dated February 28, 2012 and transferred to 2478223 on October 8, 2015. The second is a construction lien registered by Badger Daylighting Limited Partnership on July 2, 2015 for \$239,191. The validity and priority of the lien claim is disputed by the debtors and 2478223.

Analysis

a) the administrative consolidation

[25] The administration order, consolidating the debtors' notice of intention proceedings is appropriate for a variety of reasons. First, it avoids a multiplicity of proceedings, the associated costs and the need to file three sets of motion

materials. There is no substantive merger of the bankruptcy estates but rather it provides a mechanism to achieve the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination mandated by the *BIA General Rules*. The three debtors are closely aligned and share accounting, administration, human resources and financial functions. The sale process contemplates that the debtors' assets will be marketed together and form a single purchase and sale transaction. Harvest Ontario Partners and Harvest Power Mustang Generation Ltd. have substantially the same secured creditors and obligations. Finally, no prejudice is apparent. A similar order was granted in *Re Electro Sonic Inc.*, 2014 ONSC 942 (S.C.J.).

b) the DIP agreement and charge

[26] S. 50.6 of the *BIA* gives the court jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge and to grant it a super priority. It provides as follows:

50.6(1) *Interim Financing:* On application by a debtor in respect of whom a notice of intention was filed under section 50.4 or a proposal was filed under subsection 62(1) and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the debtor's property is subject to a security or charge – in an amount that the court considers appropriate – in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the debtor an amount approved by the court as being required by the debtor, having regard to the debtor's cash-flow statement referred to in paragraph 50(b)(a) or 50.4(2)(a), as the case may be. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

50.6(3) *Priority:* The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the debtor.

[27] S. 50.6(5) enumerates a list of factors to guide the court's decision whether to grant DIP financing:

50.6(5) *Factors to be considered:* In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the debtor is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the debtor's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

- (c) whether the debtor's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
- (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made in respect of the debtor;
- (e) the nature and value of the debtor's property
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the trustee's report referred to in paragraph 50(6)(b) or 50.4(2)(b), as the case may be.

[28] This case bears some similarity to *Re P.J. Wallbank Manufacturing*, 2011 ONSC 7641 (S.C.J.). The court granted the DIP charge and approved the agreement where, as here, the evidence was that the debtors would cease operations if the relief were not granted. And, as here, the DIP facility is supported by the proposal trustee. The evidence is that the DIP lender will not participate otherwise.

[29] The Court in *Wallbank* also considered any prejudice to existing creditors. While it is true that the DIP loan and charge may affect creditors to a degree, it seems to me that any prejudice is outweighed by the benefit to all stakeholders in a sale of the business as a going concern. I would have thought that the potential for creditor recovery would be enhanced rather than diminished.

[30] In *Re Comstock Canada Ltd.*, 2013 ONSC 4756 (S.C.J.), Justice Morawetz was asked to grant a super priority DIP charge in the context of a *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* proceeding. He referred to the moving party's factum, which quoted from *Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers*, 2013 SCC 6 as follows:

[I]t is important to remember that the purpose of CCAA proceedings is not to disadvantage creditors but rather to try to provide a constructive solution for all stakeholders when a company has become insolvent. As my colleague, Deschamps J. observed in *Century Services*, at para. 15:

...the purpose of the CCAA... is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets.

In the same decision, at para. 59, Deschamps J. also quoted with approval the following passage from the reasons of Doherty J.A. in *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282, at para. 57 (dissenting):

The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

...

Given that there was no alternative for a going-concern solution, it is difficult to accept the Court of Appeal's sweeping intimation that the DIP lenders would have accepted that their claim ranked below claims resulting from the deemed trust. There is no evidence in the record that gives credence to this suggestion. Not only is it contradicted by the CCAA judge's findings of fact, but case after case has shown that "the priming of the DIP facility is a key aspect of the debtor's ability to attempt a workout" (J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at p. 97). The harsh reality is that lending is governed by the commercial imperatives of the lenders, not by the interests of the plan members or the policy considerations that lead provincial governments to legislate in favour of pension fund beneficiaries. The reasons given by Morawetz J. in response to the first attempt of the Executive Plan's members to reserve their rights on June 12, 2009 are instructive. He indicated that any uncertainty as to whether the lenders would withhold advances or whether they would have priority if advances were made did "not represent a positive development". He found that, in the absence of any alternative, the relief sought was "necessary and appropriate".

[Emphasis in original]

[31] I recognize that in the *Comstock* decision, the court was dealing with a CCAA proceeding. However, the comments quoted above seem quite apposite to this case. After all, the CCAA is an analogous restructuring statute to the proposal provisions of the BIA.

c) administration charge

[32] The authority to grant this relief is found in s. 64.2 of the *BIA*.

64.2 (1) Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs: On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under section 50.4 or a proposal is filed under subsection 62(1) is subject to a security or charge, in an amount that the court considers appropriate, in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the trustee, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the person for the purpose of proceedings under this Division; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for the effective participation of that person in proceedings under this Division.

64.2 (2) Priority: The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the person.

[33] In this case, notice was given although it may have been short. There can be no question that the involvement of professional advisors is critical to a successful restructuring. This process is reasonably complex and their assistance is self evidently necessary to navigate to completion. The debtors have limited means to obtain this professional assistance. See also *Re Colossus Minerals Inc.*, 2014 ONSC 514 (S.C.J.) and the discussion in it.

d) the D & O charge

[34] The *BIA* confers the jurisdiction to grant such a charge at s. 64.1, which provides as follows:

64.1 (1) On application by a person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under section 50.4 or a proposal is filed under subsection 62(1) and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the person is subject to a security or charge – in an amount that the court considers appropriate in favour of any director or officer of the person to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer after the filing of the notice of intention or the proposal, as the case may be.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the person.

(3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the person could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

(4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional default.

[35] I am satisfied that such an order is warranted in this case for the following reasons:

- the D & O charge is available only to the extent that the directors and officers do not have coverage under existing policies or to the extent that those policies are insufficient;
- it is required only in the event that a sale is not concluded and a wind down of the facility is required;
- there is a possibility that the directors and officers whose participation in the process is critical, may not continue their involvement if the relief were not granted;
- the proposal trustee and the proposed DIP lender are supportive;

e) the sale process and the stalking horse agreement of purchaser sale

[36] The court's power to approve a sale of assets in the context of a proposal is set out in s. 65.13 of the *BIA*. However, the section does not speak to the approval of a sale process.

[37] In *Re Brainhunter* (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5th) 41, Justice Morawetz considered the criteria to be applied on a motion to approve a stalking horse sale process in a restructuring application under the *CCAA* and in particular s. 36, which parallels s. 65.13 of the *BIA*. He observed:

13. The use of a stalking horse bid process has become quite popular in recent CCAA filings. In *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), I approved a stalking horse sale process and set out four factors (the “Nortel Criteria”) the court should consider in the exercise of its general statutory discretion to determine whether to authorize a sale process:

- (a) Is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) Will the sale benefit the whole “economic community”?
- (c) Do any of the debtors’ creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) Is there a better viable alternative?

14. The Nortel decision predates the recent amendments to the CCAA. This application was filed December 2, 2009 which post-dates the amendments.

15. Section 36 of the CCAA expressly permits the sale of substantially all of the debtors’ assets in the absence of a plan. It also sets out certain factors to be considered on such a sale. However, the amendments do not directly assess the factors a court should consider when deciding to approve a sale process.

16. Counsel to the Applicants submitted that a distinction should be drawn between the approval of a sales process and the approval of an actual sale in that the Nortel Criteria is engaged when considering whether to approve a sales process, while s. 36 of the CCAA is engaged when determining whether to approve a sale. Counsel also submitted that s. 36 should also be considered indirectly when applying the Nortel Criteria.

17. I agree with these submissions. There is a distinction between the approval of the sales process and the approval of a sale. Issues can arise after approval of a sales process and prior to the approval of a sale that requires a review in the context of s. 36 of the CCAA. For example, it is only on a sale approval motion that the court can consider whether there has been any unfairness in the working out of the sales process.

[38] It occurs to me that the Nortel Criteria are of assistance in circumstances such as this – namely on a motion to approve a sale process in proposal proceedings under the *BIA*.

[39] In *CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd. v. blutip Power Technologies* 2012 ONSC 175 (S.C.J.) the Court was asked to approve a sales process and bidding procedures, which included the use of a stalking horse credit bid. The court reasoned as follows:

6. Although the decision to approve a particular form of sales process is distinct from the approval of a proposed sale, the reasonableness and adequacy of any sales process proposed by a court-appointed receiver must be assessed in light of the factors which a court will take into account when considering the approval of a proposed sale. Those factors were identified by the Court of Appeal in its decision in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; (iii) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process; and, (iv) the interests of all parties. Accordingly, when reviewing a sales and marketing process proposed by a receiver a court should assess:

(i) the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process;

(ii) the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and,

(iii) whether the sales process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale.

7. The use of stalking horse bids to set a baseline for the bidding process, including credit bid stalking horses, has been recognized by Canadian courts as a reasonable and useful element of a sales process. Stalking horse bids have been approved for use in other receivership proceedings, BIA proposals, and CCAA proceedings.

[40] I am satisfied that the sale process and stalking horse agreement should be approved. It permits the sale of the debtors' business as a going concern, with obvious benefit to them and it also maintains jobs, contracts and business relationships. The stalking horse bid establishes a floor price for the debtors' assets. It does not contain any compensation to StormFisher Environmental Ltd. in the event a superior bid is received, and as a result, a superior bid necessarily benefits the debtors' stakeholders rather than the stalking horse bidder. The process seems fair and transparent and there seems no viable alternative, particularly in light of FCC's earlier lack of success. Finally, the proposal trustee supports the process and agreement.

f) Extension of time to file a proposal

[41] It is desirable that an extension be granted under s. 50.4 (9) of the *BIA*. It appears the debtors are acting in good faith and with due diligence. Such an extension is

necessary so the sale process can be carried out. Otherwise, the debtors would be unable to formulate a proposal to their creditors and bankruptcy would follow.

[42] For these reasons, the relief sought is granted.

Justice H.A. Rady
Justice H.A. Rady

Date: October 28, 2015

tab 2

CITATION: Colossus Minerals Inc. (Re), 2014 ONSC 514
COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-10401-00CL
DATE: 20140207

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE *BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, As Amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION OF COLOSSUS MINERALS INC., OF THE CITY OF TORONTO IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO

BEFORE: Mr. Justice H.J. Wilton-Siegel

COUNSEL: S. Brotman and D. Chochla, for the Applicant Colossus Minerals Inc.

L. Rogers and A. Shalviri, for the DIP Agent, Sandstorm Gold Inc.

H. Chaiton, for the Proposal Trustee

S. Zweig, for the Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders and Certain Lenders

HEARD: January 16, 2014

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The applicant, Colossus Minerals Inc. (the “applicant” or “Colossus”), seeks an order granting various relief under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the “BIA”). The principal secured creditors of Colossus were served and no objections were received regarding the relief sought. In view of the liquidity position of Colossus, the applicant was heard on an urgent basis and an order was issued on January 16, 2014 granting the relief sought. This endorsement sets out the Court’s reasons for granting the order.

Background

[2] The applicant filed a notice of intention to make a proposal under s. 50.4(1) of the BIA on January 13, 2014. Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. (the “Proposal Trustee”) has been named the Proposal Trustee in these proceedings. The Proposal Trustee has filed its first report dated January 14, 2014 addressing this application, among other things. The main asset of Colossus is a 75% interest in a gold and platinum project in Brazil (the “Project”), which is held by a subsidiary. The Project is nearly complete. However, there is a serious water control issue that urgently requires additional de-watering facilities to preserve the applicant’s interest in the Project. As none of the applicant’s mining interests, including the Project, are producing, it has

no revenue and has been accumulating losses. To date, the applicant has been unable to obtain the financing necessary to fund its cash flow requirements through to the commencement of production and it has exhausted its liquidity.

DIP Loan and DIP Charge

[3] The applicant seeks approval of a Debtor-in-Possession Loan (the “DIP Loan”) and DIP Charge dated January 13, 2014 with Sandstorm Gold Inc. (“Sandstorm”) and certain holders of the applicant’s outstanding gold-linked notes (the “Notes”) in an amount up to \$4 million, subject to a first-ranking charge on the property of Colossus, being the DIP Charge. The Court has the authority under section 50.6(1) of the BIA to authorize the DIP Loan and DIP Charge, subject to a consideration of the factors under section 50.6(5). In this regard, the following matters are relevant.

[4] First, the DIP Loan is to last during the currency of the sale and investor solicitation process (“SISP”) discussed below and the applicant has sought an extension of the stay of proceedings under the BIA until March 7, 2014. The applicant’s cash flow statements show that the DIP Loan is necessary and sufficient to fund the applicant’s cash requirements until that time.

[5] Second, current management will continue to operate Colossus during the stay period to assist in the SISP. Because Sandstorm has significant rights under a product purchase agreement pertaining to the Project and the Notes represent the applicant’s largest debt obligation, the DIP Loan reflects the confidence of significant creditors in the applicant and its management.

[6] Third, the terms of the DIP Loan are consistent with the terms of DIP financing facilities in similar proceedings.

[7] Fourth, Colossus is facing an imminent liquidity crisis. It will need to cease operations if it does not receive funding. In such circumstances, there will be little likelihood of a viable proposal.

[8] Fifth, the DIP Loan is required to permit the SISP to proceed, which is necessary for any assessment of the options of a sale and a proposal under the BIA. It will also fund the care and maintenance of the Project without which the asset will deteriorate thereby seriously jeopardizing the applicant’s ability to make a proposal. This latter consideration also justifies the necessary adverse effect on creditors’ positions. The DIP Charge will, however, be subordinate to the secured interests of Dell Financial Services Canada Limited Partnership (“Dell”) and GE VFS Canada Limited Partnership (“GE”) who have received notice of this application and have not objected.

[9] Lastly, the Proposal Trustee has recommended that the Court approve the relief sought and supports the DIP Loan and DIP Charge.

[10] For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the Court should authorize the DIP Loan and the DIP Charge pursuant to s. 50.6(1) of the BIA.

Administration Charge

[11] Colossus seeks approval of a first-priority administration charge in the maximum amount of \$300,000 to secure the fees and disbursements of the Proposal Trustee, the counsel to the Proposal Trustee, and the counsel to the applicant in respect of these BIA proceedings.

[12] Section 64.2 of the BIA provides jurisdiction to grant a super-priority for such purposes. The Court is satisfied that such a charge is appropriate for the following reasons.

[13] First, the proposed services are essential both to a successful proceeding under the BIA as well as for the conduct of the SISP.

[14] Second, the quantum of the proposed charge is appropriate given the complexity of the applicant's business and of the SISP, both of which will require the supervision of the Proposal Trustee.

[15] Third, the proposed charge will be subordinate to the secured interests of GE and Dell.

Directors' and Officers' Charge

[16] Colossus seeks approval of an indemnity and priority charge to indemnify its directors and officers for obligations and liabilities they may incur in such capacities from and after the filing of the Notice of Intention (the "D&O Charge"). It is proposed that the D&O Charge be in the amount of \$200,000 and rank after the Administration Charge and prior to the DIP Charge.

[17] The Court has authority to grant such a charge under s. 64.1 of the BIA. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant such relief in the present circumstances for the following reasons.

[18] First, the Court has been advised that the existing directors' and officers' insurance policies contain certain limits and exclusions that create uncertainty as to coverage of all potential claims. The order sought provides that the benefit of the D&O Charge will be available only to the extent that the directors and officers do not have coverage under such insurance or such coverage is insufficient to pay the amounts indemnified.

[19] Second, the applicant's remaining directors and officers have advised that they are unwilling to continue their services and involvement with the applicant without the protection of the D&O Charge.

[20] Third, the continued involvement of the remaining directors and officers is critical to a successful SISP or any proposal under the BIA.

[21] Fourth, the Proposal Trustee has stated that the D&O Charge is reasonable and supports the D&O Charge.

The SISP

[22] The Court has the authority to approve any proposed sale under s. 65.13(1) of the BIA subject to consideration of the factors in s. 65.13(4). At this time, Colossus seeks approval of its proposed sales process, being the SISP. In this regard, the following considerations are relevant.

[23] First, the SISP is necessary to permit the applicant to determine whether a sale transaction is available that would be more advantageous to the applicant and its stakeholders than a proposal under the BIA. It is also a condition of the DIP Loan. In these circumstances, a sales process is not only reasonable but also necessary.

[24] Second, it is not possible at this time to assess whether a sale under the SISP would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale under a bankruptcy. However, the conduct of the SISP will allow that assessment without any obligation on the part of the applicant to accept any offer under the SISP.

[25] Third, the Court retains the authority to approve any sale under s. 65.13 of the BIA.

[26] Lastly, the Proposal Trustee supports the proposed SISP.

[27] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the SISP should be approved at this time.

Engagement Letter with the Financial Advisor

[28] The applicant seeks approval of an engagement letter dated November 27, 2013 with Dundee Securities Limited (“Dundee”) (the “Engagement Letter”). Dundee was engaged at that time by the special committee of the board of directors of the applicant as its financial advisor for the purpose of identifying financing and/or merger and acquisition opportunities available to the applicant. It is proposed that Dundee will continue to be engaged pursuant to the Engagement Letter to run the SISP together with the applicant under the supervision of the Proposal Trustee.

[29] Under the Engagement Letter, Dundee will receive certain compensation including a success fee. The Engagement Letter also provides that amounts payable thereunder are claims that cannot be compromised in any proposal under the BIA or any plan of arrangement under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the “CCAA”).

[30] Courts have approved success fees in the context of restructurings under the CCAA. The reasoning in such cases is equally applicable in respect of restructurings conducted by means of proposal proceedings under the BIA. As the applicant notes, a success fee is both appropriate and necessary where the debtor lacks the financial resources to pay advisory fees on any other basis.

[31] For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the Engagement Letter, including the success fee arrangement, should be approved by the Court and that the applicant should be authorized to continue to engage Dundee as its financial advisor in respect of the SISP.

[32] Dundee has considerable industry experience as well as familiarity with Colossus, based on its involvement with the company prior to the filing of the Notice of Intention.

[33] As mentioned, the SISP is necessary to permit an assessment of the best option for stakeholders.

[34] In addition, the success fee is necessary to incentivize Dundee but is reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with success fees in similar circumstances.

[35] Importantly, the success fee is only payable in the event of a successful outcome of the SISP.

[36] Lastly, the Proposal Trustee supports the Engagement Letter, including the success fee arrangement.

Extension of the Stay

[37] The applicant seeks an extension for the time to file a proposal under the BIA from the thirty-day period provided for in s. 50.4(8). The applicant seeks an extension to March 7, 2014 to permit it to pursue the SISP and assess whether a sale or a proposal under the BIA would be most beneficial to the applicant's stakeholders.

[38] The Court has authority to grant such relief under section 50.4(9) of the BIA. I am satisfied that such relief is appropriate in the present circumstances for the following reasons.

[39] First, the applicant is acting in good faith and with due diligence, with a view to maximizing value for the stakeholders, in seeking authorization for the SISP.

[40] Second, the applicant requires additional time to determine whether it could make a viable proposal to stakeholders. The extension of the stay will increase the likelihood of a feasible sale transaction or a proposal.

[41] Third, there is no material prejudice likely to result to creditors from the extension of the stay itself. Any adverse effect flowing from the DIP Loan and DIP Charge has been addressed above.

[42] Fourth, the applicant's cash flows indicate that it will be able to meet its financial obligations, including care and maintenance of the Project, during the extended period with the inclusion of the proceeds of the DIP Loan.

[43] Lastly, the Proposal Trustee supports the requested relief.

Wilton-Siegel J.

Released: February 7, 2014

tab 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

COMMERCIAL LIST

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE Proposal of P.J. Wallbank Manufacturing Co. Limited

BEFORE: D. M. Brown J.

COUNSEL: J. Fogarty and S-A. Wilson, for the Applicant
G. Moffat, for General Motors LLC
T. Slahta, for TCE Capital Corporation

HEARD: December 21, 2011

REASONS FOR DECISION

I. Overview of motion for approval of DIP financing

[1] P.J. Wallbank Manufacturing Co. Limited, a manufacturer of springs and wireforms for automotive and other industrial customers, filed a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* on December 12, 2011. Doyle Salewski Inc. was appointed as Proposal Trustee. Wallbank moves under section 50.6 of the *BIA* for authorization to borrow under a DIP credit facility from General Motors LLC, as well as the granting of an Interim Financing Charge against its property in favour of GM.

[2] This motion was brought on less than 24 hours notice. From the affidavits of service filed, I am satisfied that notice was given to interested parties in accordance with my directions of yesterday.

II. The Debtor and its creditors

[3] Since 2008 Wallbank has experienced a downturn in its business linked, in part, to a slowdown in the automotive sector and, more recently, to the loss of a major customer this past summer.

[4] Wallbank has several secured creditors. It owes Danbury Financial Services Inc. about \$720,000.00 under a credit facility. Until September, 2011, TCE Capital Corporation factored

Wallbank's accounts receivable, but stopped as a result of a default on that facility. Wallbank owes TCE approximately \$700,000.00. Both Danbury and TCE have registered financing statements against Wallbank over all classes of collateral except "consumer goods". Wallbank owes P. & B. W. Holdings Inc., the trustee of a family trust, \$724,500; the Trust has subordinated its interest in Wallbank's property to each of Danbury and TCE. Wallbank owes \$74,180.53 to three remaining secured creditors: Xerox Canada Inc., Anthony Wallbank and Edward Wallbank. All three have subordinated their security in favour of Danbury and TCE.

[5] As of the date of the NOI Wallbank owed Canada Revenue Agency \$132,467.28 for unpaid source deductions, as well as approximately \$1.22 million to unsecured creditors.

III. The proposed DIP Facility

[6] Danbury has terminated its credit facility with Wallbank, and TCE has ceased factoring the company's receivables. Neither firm is prepared to advance further funds to Wallbank.

[7] Wallbank is a key supplier to GE for springs. GE has agreed to provide immediate funding to Wallbank pursuant to the terms of an Accommodation Agreement dated December 12, 2011 and a DIP Facility Term Sheet.

[8] The Accommodation Agreement offers two types of interim financing. First, GE agreed to provide Initial Financing of up to \$160,450.00 to cover professional fees and to cover Wallbank's post-filing operations until a DIP order was obtained. According to the affidavit from Mr. Anthony Wallbank, the company's President, to date GE has advanced \$193,850 under this facility.

[9] GM is also prepared to make available additional DIP Financing up to a maximum of \$500,000.00, including the amounts advanced under the Initial Financing.¹ Such further advances are conditional on (i) an agreement between GM and Wallbank on a budget for the company's continued operations up until February 26, 2012 and (ii) obtaining an interim financing order consistent with the terms of the Accommodation Agreement. Under the proposed Interim Financing Charge, all advances made by GM under the Accommodation Agreement would be secured by (i) a first priority charge on Wallbank's inventory and post-filing accounts receivable and (ii) a lien on Wallbank's other pre-filing assets junior only to the liens of Danbury, TCE and Xerox, but senior to any other liens.

[10] Wallbank seeks an order that the DIP Facility would be on the terms, and subject to the conditions, set forth in the Accommodation Agreement and the DIP Facility Term Sheet, subject to some amendments reflected in a revised draft order, including certain provisions TCE wished included in the order. The Accommodation Agreement contains several important terms concerning Wallbank's operations:

¹ DIP Facility Term Sheet.

- (i) absent an event of default, GM agrees to refrain from re-sourcing the component parts made by Wallbank for up to 60 days;
- (ii) GM agrees to pay for post-filing orders on a “net 7 days prox” basis;
- (iii) Wallbank agrees to build an inventory of GM-ordered component parts in accordance with an inventory bank production plan to be agreed upon with GM;
- (iv) The parties have identified which tools used by Wallbank belong to GM and to other parties; and,
- (v) Wallbank agrees not to manufacture products for other Large or Medium Customers without GM’s prior consent and without those customers agreeing to abide by all or some of the terms of the Accommodation Agreement, including terms governing the time for the payment of receivables and the price of the products

[11] Under the DIP Facility Term Sheet, the Facility will:

- (i) have a term of up to 60 days, mirroring the No Resource Period agreed to by GM under the Accommodation Agreement;
- (ii) bear interest at a rate of 13%, with interest payable monthly in arrears; and,
- (iii) be repaid upon the sale of any property of Wallbank out of the ordinary course of business.

IV. Analysis

A. The statutory provisions

[12] Section 50.6 of the *BIA* provides, in part, as follows:

50.6 (1) On application by a debtor in respect of whom a notice of intention was filed under section 50.4 or a proposal was filed under subsection 62(1) and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the debtor’s property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the debtor an amount approved by the court as being required by the debtor, having regard to the debtor’s cash-flow statement referred to in paragraph 50(6)(a) or 50.4(2)(a), as the case may be. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

...

(3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the debtor.

...

(5) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the debtor is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the debtor's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the debtor's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made in respect of the debtor;

(e) the nature and value of the debtor's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the trustee's report referred to in paragraph 50(6)(b) or 50.4(2)(b), as the case may be.

B. Consideration of the various factors

B.1 Likely duration of NOI proceedings

[13] The evidence indicates that Wallbank likely will not be subject to NOI proceedings past the end of February, 2012. It requires the DIP Facility to continue operating, and by its terms that facility has a maximum term of 60 days from the date of filing the NOI. The cash-flow statement filed by Wallbank projects that it will have drawn fully on the DIP Facility by the middle of next February.

B.2 Management of Wallbank's affairs

[14] Although current management will continue to operate Wallbank, as described above the Accommodation Agreement places significant restrictions on the company's operations. Simply put, GM wants to use the next 45 days or so to build up an inventory of needed component parts and is insisting that any other customer who wishes to order product from Wallbank must do so on the credit and pricing terms set out in the Accommodation Agreement. Those terms require very prompt payment of receivables and an agreement to pay a higher price for Wallbank's products.

[15] The materials do not disclose how many employees presently work at Wallbank. Some employees are members of the Canadian Auto Workers. The Proposal Trustee reports that a dispute currently exists whereby the CAW is not permitting Wallbank to ship product to Gates Corporation, a result of which could be a reduction by \$40,000.00 in the opening accounts receivable forecast in the cash-flow statement.

B.3 Enhancement of prospects of a viable proposal

[16] According to the Proposal Trustee Wallbank is developing a restructuring plan which would involve either (i) identifying a strategic partner, (ii) restructuring its debts, or (iii) an orderly liquidation of its assets.

[17] Wallbank filed a cash-flow projection for the period ending February 26, 2012. The projection was vetted by a DIP advisor appointed by GM. The cash-flow supports Mr. Wallbank's statement that without the proposed DIP Facility the company will be unable to fund its ongoing business operations and restructuring efforts during the NOI proceedings. The Proposal Trustee concurs with that assessment:

In the event that the DIP Loan is not approved by the Court, the Company may have no choice but to immediately cease operations, and the Company's ability to make a proposal to its creditors will be severely compromised.

[18] The evidence is clear that absent approval of the DIP Facility, Wallbank will close its doors and turn off its lights.

B.4 Report of the Proposal Trustee

[19] In its December 20, 2011 report the Proposal Trustee stated that it was satisfied that Wallbank is proceeding in good faith with its proposal, supported the need for interim financing, and concluded that "the benefits of granting such an Order far outweigh the prejudice to the Company, the creditors, employees and customers that these stakeholders would experience if the Order were not granted."

B.5 Nature and value of Wallbank's property

[20] Although Wallbank filed evidence about its current indebtedness, it did not file any detailed historical evidence about balance sheet or profit/loss position. The current value of its assets is unclear; the evidence suggests that Wallbank has operated at a loss for at least the past two years.

B.6 Confidence of major creditors

[21] According to the Proposal Trustee certain customers support Wallbank's proposal efforts: GM, Omex, Dayco, Magna Corporation, Stacktole, 3M, Bontaz and Admiral Tool.

[22] As to creditors, GM, of course, supports Wallbank's motion. The Trust has indicated that it does not oppose the order, but without prejudice to its right to move to vary the order at some later date. In light of changes made to the proposed DIP Order as a result of negotiations amongst the parties, Danbury does not oppose the order sought. Xerox was served earlier today with the motion materials, but has not communicated any position to Wallbank's counsel.

[23] TCE does not oppose the order sought, as revised, provided the order is made subject to three conditions:

- (i) The order would be without prejudice to TCE's asserted position with respect to its ownership of factored receivables;
- (ii) Wallbank, TCE and GM will agree on a process for the collection and remittance of accounts receivable; and,
- (iii) GM waives its rights of set-off relating to pre-November 30, 2011 accounts receivable purchased by TCE, save and except for Allowed Set-Offs as defined in section 2.4(B) of the Accommodation Agreement.

Both Wallbank and GM are amenable to those conditions. I accept those conditions and make them part of my order.

B.7 Prejudice to creditors as a result of the Interim Financing Charge

[24] Although, like any charge, the Interim Financing Charge will impact all creditors' positions to some degree, the terms of the charge's priority have been negotiated to minimize the prejudice to Danbury and TEC. As well, given the immediate cessation of Wallbank's activities would result from the failure to approve the DIP Facility and Interim Financing Charge, on balance the benefit to all stakeholders of the proposed DIP Facility significantly outweighs any prejudice.

[25] Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the Accommodation Agreement contemplated that both components of the Initial Financing advanced by GM – professional fees and the funding of operations – would be secured by the Interim Financing Charge. Section 50.6(1) of the *BIA* provides that a charge “may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made”. Wallbank advised that all funds made available by GM for professional fees are unspent and remain in counsel's trust account. Wallbank intends to return those funds to GM which plans, in turn, to advance similar amounts to Wallbank in the event a DIP Order is made. GM confirmed that the amounts advanced to date under section 2.1(C) of the Accommodation Agreement would not be subject to the Interim Financing Charge, but would be secured by the security described in the opening language of section 2.1 of the Accommodation Agreement. In my view the proposed treatment of the funds relating to professional fees is consistent with the intent of section 50.6(1) of the *BIA* and I approve it.

B.8 Conclusion

[26] For these reasons I am satisfied that it is appropriate to authorize Wallbank to enter into the DIP Facility agreement and to grant the proposed Interim Financing Charge. Accordingly, an order shall go in the form submitted by the applicant, which I have signed.

(original signed by)

D. M. Brown J.

Date: December 21, 2011

tab 4

CITATION: Danier Leather Inc. (Re), 2016 ONSC 1044
COURT FILE NO.: 31-CL-2084381
DATE: 20160210

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

**IN THE MATTER OF INTENTION TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF DANIER LEATHER
INC.**

BEFORE: Penny J.

COUNSEL: *Jay Swartz and Natalie Renner* for Danier

Sean Zweig for the Proposal Trustee

Harvey Chaiton for the Directors and Officers

Jeffrey Levine for GA Retail Canada

David Bish for Cadillac Fairview

Linda Galessiere for Morguard Investment, 20 ULC Management, SmartReit and
Ivanhoe Cambridge

Clifton Prophet for CIBC

HEARD: February 8, 2016

ENDORSEMENT

The Motion

[1] On February 8, 2016 I granted an order approving a SISP in respect of Danier Leather Inc., with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

[2] Danier filed a Notice of Intention to make a proposal under the BIA on February 4, 2016. This is a motion to :

- (a) approve a stalking horse agreement and SISP;
- (b) approve the payment of a break fee, expense reimbursement and signage costs obligations in connection with the stalking horse agreement;
- (c) authorize Danier to perform its obligations under engagement letters with its financial advisors and a charge to secure success fees;

- (d) approve an Administration Charge;
- (e) approve a D&O Charge;
- (f) approve a KERP and KERP Charge; and
- (g) grant a sealing order in respect of the KERP and a stalking horse offer summary.

Background

[3] Danier is an integrated designer, manufacturer and retailer of leather and suede apparel and accessories. Danier primarily operates its retail business from 84 stores located throughout Canada. It does not own any real property. Danier employs approximately 1,293 employees. There is no union or pension plan.

[4] Danier has suffered declining revenues and profitability over the last two years resulting primarily from problems implementing its strategic plan. The accelerated pace of change in both personnel and systems resulting from the strategic plan contributed to fashion and inventory miscues which have been further exacerbated by unusual extremes in the weather and increased competition from U.S. and international retailers in the Canadian retail space and the depreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the American dollar.

[5] In late 2014, Danier implemented a series of operational and cost reduction initiatives in an attempt to return Danier to profitability. These initiatives included reductions to headcount, marketing costs, procurement costs and capital expenditures, renegotiating supply terms, rationalizing Danier's operations, improving branding, growing online sales and improving price management and inventory mark downs. In addition, Danier engaged a financial advisor and formed a special committee comprised of independent members of its board of directors to explore strategic alternatives to improve Danier's financial circumstances, including soliciting an acquisition transaction for Danier.

[6] As part of its mandate, the financial advisor conducted a seven month marketing process to solicit offers from interested parties to acquire Danier. The financial advisor contacted approximately 189 parties and provided 33 parties with a confidential information memorandum describing Danier and its business. Over the course of this process, the financial advisor had meaningful conversations with several interested parties but did not receive any formal offers to provide capital and/or to acquire the shares of Danier. One of the principal reasons that this process was unsuccessful is that it focused on soliciting an acquisition transaction, which ultimately proved unappealing to interested parties as Danier's risk profile was too great. An acquisition transaction did not afford prospective purchasers the ability to restructure Danier's affairs without incurring significant costs.

[7] Despite Danier's efforts to restructure its financial affairs and turn around its operations, Danier has experienced significant net losses in each of its most recently completed fiscal years and in each of the two most recently completed fiscal quarters in the 2016 fiscal year. Danier currently has approximately \$9.6 million in cash on hand but is projected to be cash flow

negative every month until at least September 2016. Danier anticipated that it would need to borrow under its loan facility with CIBC by July 2016. CIBC has served a notice of default and indicate no funds will be advanced under its loan facility. In addition, for the 12 months ending December 31, 2015, 30 of Danier's 84 store locations were unprofitable. If Danier elects to close those store locations, it will be required to terminate the corresponding leases and will face substantial landlord claims which it will not be able to satisfy in the normal course.

[8] Danier would not have had the financial resources to implement a restructuring of its affairs if it had delayed a filing under the BIA until it had entirely used up its cash resources. Accordingly, on February 4, 2016, Danier commenced these proceedings for the purpose of entering into a stalking horse agreement and implementing the second phase of the SISP.

The Stalking Horse Agreement

[9] The SISP is comprised of two phases. In the first phase, Danier engaged the services of its financial advisor to find a stalking horse bidder. The financial advisor corresponded with 22 parties, 19 of whom had participated in the 2015 solicitation process and were therefore familiar with Danier. In response, Danier received three offers and, with the assistance of the financial advisor and the Proposal Trustee, selected GA Retail Canada or an affiliate (the "Agent") as the successful bid. The Agent is an affiliate of Great American Group, which has extensive experience in conducting retail store liquidations.

[10] On February 4, 2016, Danier and the Agent entered into the stalking horse agreement, subject to Court approval. Pursuant to the stalking horse agreement, the Agent will serve as the stalking horse bid in the SISP and the exclusive liquidator for the purpose of disposing of Danier's inventory. The Agent will dispose of the merchandise by conducting a "store closing" or similar sale at the stores.

[11] The stalking horse agreement provides that Danier will receive a net minimum amount equal to 94.6% of the aggregate value of the merchandise, provided that the value of the merchandise is no less than \$22 million and no more than \$25 million. After payment of this amount and the expenses of the sale, the Agent is entitled to retain a 5% commission. Any additional proceeds of the sale after payment of the commission are divided equally between the Agent and Danier.

[12] The stalking horse agreement also provides that the Agent is entitled to (a) a break fee in the amount of \$250,000; (b) an expense reimbursement for its reasonable and documented out-of-pocket expenses in an amount not to exceed \$100,000; and (c) the reasonable costs, fees and expenses actually incurred and paid by the Agent in acquiring signage or other advertising and promotional material in connection with the sale in an amount not to exceed \$175,000, each payable if another bid is selected and the transaction contemplated by the other bid is completed. Collectively, the break fee, the maximum amount payable under the expense reimbursement and the signage costs obligations represent approximately 2.5% of the minimum consideration payable under the stalking horse agreement. Another liquidator submitting a successful bid in the course of the SISP will be required to purchase the signage from the Agent at its cost.

[13] The stalking horse agreement is structured to allow Danier to proceed with the second phase of the SISP and that process is designed to test the market to ascertain whether a higher or better offer can be obtained from other parties. While the stalking horse agreement contemplates liquidating Danier's inventory, it also establishes a floor price that is intended to encourage bidders to participate in the SISP who may be interested in going concern acquisitions as well.

The SISP

[14] Danier, in consultation with the Proposal Trustee and financial advisor, have established the procedures which are to be followed in conducting the second phase of the SISP.

[15] Under the SISP, interested parties may make a binding proposal to acquire the business or all or any part of Danier's assets, to make an investment in Danier or to liquidate Danier's inventory and furniture, fixtures and equipment.

[16] Danier, in consultation with the Proposal Trustee and its financial advisors, will evaluate the bids and may (a) accept, subject to Court approval, one or more bids, (b) conditionally accept, subject to Court approval, one or more backup bids (conditional upon the failure of the transactions contemplated by the successful bid to close, or (c) pursue an auction in accordance with the procedures set out in the SISP.

[17] The key dates of the second phase of the SISP are as follows:

- (1) The second phase of the SISP will commence upon approval by the Court
- (2) Bid deadline: February 22, 2016
- (3) Advising interested parties whether bids constitute "qualified bids":
No later than two business days after bid deadline
- (4) Determining successful bid and back-up bid (if there is no auction):
No later than five business days after bid deadline
- (5) Advising qualified bidders of auction date and location (if applicable):
No later than five business days after bid deadline
- (6) Auction (if applicable): No later than seven business days after bid deadline
- (7) Bringing motion for approval: Within five business days following determination by Danier of the successful bid (at auction or otherwise)
- (8) Back-Up bid expiration date: No later than 15 business days after the bid deadline, unless otherwise agreed
- (9) Outside date: No later than 15 business days after the bid deadline

[18] The timelines in the SISP have been designed with regard to the seasonal nature of the business and the fact that inventory values will depreciate significantly as the spring season approaches. The timelines also ensure that any purchaser of the business as a going concern has the opportunity to make business decisions well in advance of Danier's busiest season, being fall/winter. These timelines are necessary to generate maximum value for Danier's stakeholders and are sufficient to permit prospective bidders to conduct their due diligence, particularly in light of the fact that is expected that many of the parties who will participate in the SISP also participated in the 2015 solicitation process and were given access to a data room containing non-public information about Danier at that time.

[19] Danier does not believe that there is a better viable alternative to the proposed SISP and stalking horse agreement.

[20] The use of a sale process that includes a stalking horse agreement maximizes value of a business for the benefit of its stakeholders and enhances the fairness of the sale process. Stalking horse agreements are commonly used in insolvency proceedings to facilitate sales of businesses and assets and are intended to establish a baseline price and transactional structure for any superior bids from interested parties, *CCM Master Qualified Fund Ltd. v. blutip Power Technologies*, 2012 ONSC 1750 at para. 7 [Commercial List].

[21] The Court's power to approve a sale of assets in a proposal proceeding is codified in section 65.13 of the BIA, which sets out a list of non-exhaustive factors for the Court to consider in determining whether to approve a sale of the debtor's assets outside the ordinary course of business. This Court has considered section 65.13 of the BIA when approving a stalking horse sale process under the BIA, *Re Colossus Minerals Inc.*, 2014 CarswellOnt 1517 at paras. 22-26 (S.C.J.).

[22] A distinction has been drawn, however, between the approval of a sale process and the approval of an actual sale. Section 65.13 is engaged when the Court determines whether to approve a sale transaction arising as a result of a sale process, it does not necessarily address the factors a court should consider when deciding whether to approve the sale process itself.

[23] In *Re Brainhunter*, the Court considered the criteria to be applied on a motion to approve a stalking horse sale process in a restructuring proceeding under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. Citing his decision in *Nortel*, Justice Morawetz (as he then was) confirmed that the following four factors should be considered by the Court in the exercise of its discretion to determine if the proposed sale process should be approved:

- (1) Is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (2) Will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (3) Do any of the debtors' creditors have a bona fide reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (4) Is there a better viable alternative?

Re Brainhunter, 2009 CarswellOnt 8207 at paras. 13-17 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Re Nortel Networks Corp.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 at para. 49 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

[24] While *Brainhunter* and *Nortel* both dealt with a sale process under the CCAA, the Court has recognized that the CCAA is an analogous restructuring statute to the proposal provisions of the BIA, *Re Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd.*, 2010 SCC 60 at para 24; *Re Indalex Ltd.*, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 at paras. 50-51.

[25] Furthermore, in *Mustang*, this Court applied the *Nortel* criteria on a motion to approve a sale process backstopped by a stalking horse bid in a proposal proceeding under the BIA, *Re Mustang GP Ltd.*, 2015 CarswellOnt 16398 at paras. 37-38 (S.C.J.).

[26] These proceedings are premised on the implementation of a sale process using the stalking horse agreement as the minimum bid intended to maximize value and act as a baseline for offers received in the SISP. In the present case, Danier is seeking approval of the stalking horse agreement for purposes of conducting the SISP only.

[27] The SISP is warranted at this time for a number of reasons.

[28] First, Danier has made reasonable efforts in search of alternate financing or an acquisition transaction and has attempted to restructure its operations and financial affairs since 2014, all of which has been unsuccessful. At this juncture, Danier has exhausted all of the remedies available to it outside of a Court-supervised sale process. The SISP will result in the most viable alternative for Danier, whether it be a sale of assets or the business (through an auction or otherwise) or an investment in Danier.

[29] Second, Danier projects that it will be cash flow negative for the next six months and it is clear that Danier will be unable to borrow under the CIBC loan facility to finance its operations (CIBC gave notice of default upon Danier's filing of the NOI). If the SISP is not implemented in the immediate future, Danier's revenues will continue to decline, it will incur significant costs and the value of the business will erode, thereby decreasing recoveries for Danier's stakeholders.

[30] Third, the market for Danier's assets as a going concern will be significantly reduced if the SISP is not implemented at this time because the business is seasonal in nature. Any purchaser of the business as a going concern will need to make decisions about the raw materials it wishes to acquire and the product lines it wishes to carry by March 2016 in order to be sufficiently prepared for the fall/winter season, which has historically been Danier's busiest.

[31] Danier and the Proposal Trustee concur that the SISP and the stalking horse agreement will benefit the whole of the economic community. In particular:

- (a) the stalking horse agreement will establish the floor price for Danier's inventory, thereby maximizing recoveries;
- (b) the SISP will subject the assets to a public marketing process and permit higher and better offers to replace the Stalking horse agreement; and

- (c) should the SISP result in a sale transaction for all or substantially all of Danier's assets, this may result in the continuation of employment, the assumption of lease and other obligations and the sale of raw materials and inventory owned by Danier.

[32] There have been no expressed creditor concerns with the SISP as such. The SISP is an open and transparent process. Absent the stalking horse agreement, the SISP could potentially result in substantially less consideration for Danier's business and/or assets.

[33] Given the indications of value obtained through the 2015 solicitation process, the stalking horse agreement represents the highest and best value to be obtained for Danier's assets at this time, subject to a higher offer being identified through the SISP.

[34] Section 65.13 of the BIA is also indirectly relevant to approval of the SISP. In deciding whether to grant authorization for a sale, the court is to consider, among other things:

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the trustee approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c) whether the trustee filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

[35] In the present case, in addition to satisfying the *Nortel* criteria, the SISP will result in a transaction that is at least capable of satisfying the 65.13 criteria. I say this for the following reasons.

[36] The SISP is reasonable in the circumstances as it is designed to be flexible and allows parties to submit an offer for some or all of Danier's assets, make an investment in Danier or acquire the business as a going concern. This is all with the goal of improving upon the terms of the stalking horse agreement. The SISP also gives Danier and the Proposal Trustee the right to extend or amend the SISP to better promote a robust sale process.

[37] The Proposal Trustee and the financial advisor support the SISP and view it as reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

[38] The duration of the SISP is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances having regard to Danier's financial situation, the seasonal nature of its business and the fact that many potentially interested parties are familiar with Danier and its business given their participation in the 2015 solicitation process and/or the stalking horse process.

[39] A sale process which allows Danier to be sold as a going concern would likely be more beneficial than a sale under a bankruptcy, which does not allow for the going concern option.

[40] Finally, the consideration to be received for the assets under the stalking horse agreement appears at this point, to be *prima facie* fair and reasonable and represents a fair and reasonable benchmark for all other bids in the SISP.

The Break Fee

[41] Break fees and expense and costs reimbursements in favour of a stalking horse bidder are frequently approved in insolvency proceedings. Break fees do not merely reflect the cost to the purchaser of putting together the stalking horse bid. A break fee may be the price of stability, and thus some premium over simply providing for out of pocket expenses may be expected, Daniel R. Dowdall & Jane O. Dietrich, "Do Stalking Horses Have a Place in Intra-Canadian Insolvencies", 2005 ANNREVINSOLV 1 at 4.

[42] Break fees in the range of 3% and expense reimbursements in the range of 2% have recently been approved by this Court, *Re Nortel Networks Corp.*, [2009] O.J. No. 4293 at paras. 12 and 26 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Re W.C. Wood Corp. Ltd.*, [2009] O.J. No. 4808 at para. 3 (S.C.J. [Commercial List], where a 4% break fee was approved.

[43] The break fee, the expense reimbursement and the signage costs obligations in the stalking horse agreement fall within the range of reasonableness. Collectively, these charges represent approximately 2.5% of the minimum consideration payable under the stalking horse agreement. In addition, if a liquidation proposal (other than the stalking horse agreement) is the successful bid, Danier is not required to pay the signage costs obligations to the Agent. Instead, the successful bidder will be required to buy the signage and advertising material from the Agent at cost.

[44] In the exercise of its business judgment, the Board unanimously approved the break fee, the expense reimbursement and the signage costs obligations. The Proposal Trustee and the financial advisor have both reviewed the break fee, the expense reimbursement and the signage costs obligations and concluded that each is appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances. In reaching this conclusion, the Proposal Trustee noted, among other things, that:

- (i) the maximum amount of the break fee, expense reimbursement and signage costs obligations represent, in the aggregate 2.5% of the imputed value of the consideration under the stalking horse agreement, which is within the normal range for transactions of this nature;

- (ii) each stalking horse bidder required a break fee and expense reimbursement as part of their proposal in the stalking horse process;
- (iii) without these protections, a party would have little incentive to act as the stalking horse bidder; and
- (iv) the quantum of the break fee, expense reimbursement and signage costs obligations are unlikely to discourage a third party from submitting an offer in the SISP.

[45] I find the break fee to be reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

Financial Advisor Success Fee and Charge

[46] Danier is seeking a charge in the amount of US\$500,000 to cover its principal financial advisor's (Concensus) maximum success fees payable under its engagement letter. The Consensus Charge would rank behind the existing security, *pari passu* with the Administration Charge and ahead of the D&O Charge and KERP Charge.

[47] Orders approving agreements with financial advisors have frequently been made in insolvency proceedings, including CCAA proceedings and proposal proceedings under the BIA. In determining whether to approve such agreements and the fees payable thereunder, courts have considered the following factors, among others:

- (a) whether the debtor and the court officer overseeing the proceedings believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration are fair and reasonable;
- (b) whether the financial advisor has industry experience and/or familiarity with the business of the debtor; and
- (c) whether the success fee is necessary to incentivize the financial advisor.

Re Sino-Forest Corp., 2012 ONSC 2063 at paras. 46-47 [Commercial List]; *Re Colossus Minerals Inc.*, *supra*.

[48] The SISP contemplates that the financial advisor will continue to be intimately involved in administering the SISP.

[49] The financial advisor has considerable experience working with distressed companies in the retail sector that are in the process of restructuring, including seeking strategic partners and/or selling their assets. In the present case, the financial advisor has assisted Danier in its restructuring efforts to date and has gained a thorough and intimate understanding of the business. The continued involvement of the financial advisor is essential to the completion of a successful transaction under the SISP and to ensuring a wide-ranging canvass of prospective bidders and investors.

[50] In light of the foregoing, Danier and the Proposal Trustee are in support of incentivizing the financial advisor to carry out the SISP and are of the view that the quantum and nature of the remuneration provided for in the financial advisor's engagement letter are reasonable in the circumstances and will incentivize the Financial advisor.

[51] Danier has also engaged OCI to help implement the SISP in certain international markets in the belief that OCI has expertise that warrants this engagement. OCI may be able to identify a purchaser or strategic investor in overseas markets which would result in a more competitive sales process. OCI will only be compensated if a transaction is originated by OCI or OCI introduces the ultimate purchaser and/or investor to Danier.

[52] Danier and the Proposal Trustee believe that the quantum and nature of the success fee payable under the OCI engagement letter is reasonable in the circumstances. Specifically, because the fees payable to OCI are dependent on the success of transaction or purchaser or investor originated by OCI, the approval of this fee is necessary to incentivize OCI.

[53] Accordingly, an order approving the financial advisor and OCI engagement letters is appropriate.

[54] A charge ensuring payment of the success fee is also appropriate in the circumstances, as noted below.

Administration Charge

[55] In order to protect the fees and expenses of each of the Proposal Trustee, its counsel, counsel to Danier, the directors of Danier and their counsel, Danier seeks a charge on its property and assets in the amount of \$600,000. The Administration Charge would rank behind the existing security, *pari passu* with the Consensus Charge and ahead of the D&O Charge and KERP Charge. It is supported by the Proposal Trustee.

[56] Section 64.2 of the BIA confers on the Court the authority to grant a charge in favour of financial, legal or other professionals involved in proposal proceedings under the BIA.

[57] Administration and financial advisor charges have been previously approved in insolvency proposal proceedings, where, as in the present case, the participation of the parties whose fees are secured by the charge is necessary to ensure a successful proceeding under the BIA and for the conduct of a sale process, *Re Colossus Minerals Inc.*, 2014 CarswellOnt 1517 at paras. 11-15 (S.C.J.).

[58] This is an appropriate circumstance for the Court to grant the Administration Charge. The quantum of the proposed Administration Charge is fair and reasonable given the nature of the SISP. Each of the parties whose fees are to be secured by the Administration Charge has played (and will continue to play) a critical role in these proposal proceedings and in the SI. The Administration Charge is necessary to secure the full and complete payment of these fees. Finally, the Administration Charge will be subordinate to the existing security and does not prejudice any known secured creditor of Danier.

D&O Charge

[59] The directors and officers have been actively involved in the attempts to address Danier's financial circumstances, including through exploring strategic alternatives, implementing a turnaround plan, devising the SISP and the commencement of these proceedings. The directors and officers are not prepared to remain in office without certainty with respect to coverage for potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities.

[60] Danier maintains directors and officers insurance with various insurers. There are exclusions in the event there is a change in risk and there is potential for there to be insufficient funds to cover the scope of obligations for which the directors and officers may be found personally liable (especially given the significant size of the Danier workforce).

[61] Danier has agreed, subject to certain exceptions, to indemnify the directors and officers to the extent that the insurance coverage is insufficient. Danier does not anticipate it will have sufficient funds to satisfy those indemnities if they were ever called upon.

[62] Danier seeks approval of a priority charge to indemnify its directors and officers for obligations and liabilities they may incur in such capacities from and after the filing of the NOI. It is proposed that the D&O Charge be in an amount not to exceed \$4.9 million and rank behind the existing security, the Administration Charge and the Consensus Charge but ahead of the KERP Charge.

[63] The amount of the D&O Charge is based on payroll obligations, vacation pay obligations, employee source deduction obligations and sales tax obligations that may arise during these proposal proceedings. It is expected that all of these amounts will be paid in the normal course as Danier expects to have sufficient funds to pay these amounts. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the D&O charge will be called upon.

[64] The Court has the authority to grant a directors' and officers' charge under section 64.1 of the BIA.

[65] In *Colossus Minerals* and *Mustang*, *supra*, this Court approved a directors' and officers' charge in circumstances similar to the present case where there was uncertainty that the existing insurance was sufficient to cover all potential claims, the directors and officers would not continue to provide their services without the protection of the charge and the continued involvement of the directors and officers was critical to a successful sales process under the BIA.

[66] I approve the D&O Charge for the following reasons.

[67] The D&O Charge will only apply to the extent that the directors and officers do not have coverage under the existing policy or Danier is unable to satisfy its indemnity obligations.

[68] The directors and officers of Danier have indicated they will not continue their involvement with Danier without the protection of the D&O Charge yet their continued involvement is critical to the successful implementation of the SISP.

[69] The D&O Charge applies only to claims or liabilities that the directors and officers may incur after the date of the NOI and does not cover misconduct or gross negligence.

[70] The Proposal Trustee supports the D&O Charge, indicating that the D&O Charge is reasonable in the circumstances.

[71] Finally, the amount of the D&O Charge takes into account a number of statutory obligations for which directors and officers are liable if Danier fails to meet these obligations. However, it is expected that all of these amounts will be paid in the normal course. Danier expects to have sufficient funds to pay these amounts. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the D&O charge will be called upon.

Key Employee Retention Plan and Charge

[72] Danier developed a key employee retention plan (the "KERP") that applies to 11 of Danier's employees, an executive of Danier and Danier's consultant, all of whom have been determined to be critical to ensuring a successful sale or investment transaction. The KERP was reviewed and approved by the Board.

[73] Under the KERP, the key employees will be eligible to receive a retention payment if these employees remain actively employed with Danier until the earlier of the completion of the SISP, the date upon which the liquidation of Danier's inventory is complete, the date upon which Danier ceases to carry on business, or the effective date that Danier terminates the services of these employees.

[74] Danier is requesting approval of the KERP and a charge for up to \$524,000 (the "KERP Charge") to secure the amounts payable thereunder. The KERP Charge will rank in priority to all claims and encumbrances other than the existing security, the Administration Charge, the Consensus Charge and the D&O Charge.

[75] Key employee retention plans are approved in insolvency proceedings where the continued employment of key employees is deemed critical to restructuring efforts, *Re Nortel Networks Corp. supra*.

[76] In *Re Grant Forest Products Inc.*, Newbould J. set out a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court should consider in determining whether to approve a key employee retention plan, including the following:

- (a) whether the court appointed officer supports the retention plan;
- (b) whether the key employees who are the subject of the retention plan are likely to pursue other employment opportunities absent the approval of the retention plan;
- (c) whether the employees who are the subject of the retention plan are truly "key employees" whose continued employment is critical to the successful restructuring of Danier;

- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed retention payments is reasonable; and
- (e) the business judgment of the board of directors regarding the necessity of the retention payments.

Re Grant Forest Products Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 3344 at paras. 8-22 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

[77] While *Re Grant Forest Products Inc.* involved a proceeding under the CCAA, key employee retention plans have frequently been approved in proposal proceedings under the BIA, see, for example, *In the Matter of the Notice of Intention of Starfield Resources Inc.*, Court File No. CV-13-10034-00CL, Order dated March 15, 2013 at para. 10.

[78] The KERP and the KERP Charge are approved for the following reasons:

- (i) the Proposal Trustee supports the granting of the KERP and the KERP Charge;
- (ii) absent approval of the KERP and the KERP Charge, the key employees who are the subject of the KERP will have no incentive to remain with Danier throughout the SISP and are therefore likely to pursue other employment opportunities;
- (iii) Danier has determined that the employees who are the subject of the KERP are critical to the implementation of the SISP and a completion of a successful sale or investment transaction in respect of Danier;
- (iv) the Proposal Trustee is of the view that the KERP and the quantum of the proposed retention payments is reasonable and that the KERP Charge will provide security for the individuals entitled to the KERP, which will add stability to the business during these proceedings and will assist in maximizing realizations; and
- (v) the KERP was reviewed and approved by the Board.

Sealing Order

[79] There are two documents which are sought to be sealed: 1) the details about the KERP; and 2) the stalking horse offer summary.

[80] Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides the court with discretion to order that any document filed in a civil proceeding can be treated as confidential, sealed, and not form part of the public record.

[81] In *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, the Supreme Court of Canada held that courts should exercise their discretion to grant sealing orders where:

- (1) the order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

- (2) the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right of free expression, which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

[2002] S.C.J. No. 42 at para. 53 (S.C.C.).

[82] In the insolvency context, courts have applied this test and authorized sealing orders over confidential or commercially sensitive documents to protect the interests of debtors and other stakeholders, *Re Stelco Inc.*, [2006] O.J. No. 275 at paras. 2-5 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Re Nortel Networks Corp.*, *supra*.

[83] It would be detrimental to the operations of Danier to disclose the identity of the individuals who will be receiving the KERP payments as this may result in other employees requesting such payments or feeling underappreciated. Further, the KERP evidence involves matters of a private, personal nature.

[84] The offer summary contains highly sensitive commercial information about Danier, the business and what some parties, confidentially, were willing to bid for Danier's assets. Disclosure of this information could undermine the integrity of the SISP. The disclosure of the offer summary prior to the completion of a final transaction under the SISP would pose a serious risk to the SISP in the event that the transaction does not close. Disclosure prior to the completion of a SISP would jeopardize value-maximizing dealings with any future prospective purchasers or liquidators of Danier's assets. There is a public interest in maximizing recovery in an insolvency that goes beyond each individual case.

[85] The sealing order is necessary to protect the important commercial interests of Danier and other stakeholders. This salutary effect greatly outweighs the deleterious effects of not sealing the KERPs and the offer summary, namely the lack of immediate public access to a limited number of documents filed in these proceedings.

[86] As a result, the *Sierra Club* test for a sealing order has been met. The material about the KERP and the offer summary shall not form part of the public record pending completion of these proposal proceedings.

Penny J.

Date: February 10, 2016

tab 5

CITATION: U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (Re), 2014 ONSC 6145
COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-10695-00CL
DATE: 20141022

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-36 AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT
WITH RESPECT TO U.S. STEEL CANADA INC.

BEFORE: Mr. Justice H. Wilton-Siegel

COUNSEL: *R. Paul Steep, Jamey Gage and Heather Meredith*, for the Applicant

Kevin Zych, for the Monitor

Michael Barrack, Robert Thornton and Grant Moffat, for United States Steel Corporation and the proposed DIP Lender

Gale Rubenstein, Robert J. Chadwick and Logan Willis, for Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario and the Superintendent of Financial Services (Ontario)

Ken Rosenberg and Lily Harmer, for the United Steelworkers International Union and the United Steelworkers Union, Local 8782

Sharon L.C. White, for the United Steelworkers Union, Local 1005

Shayne Kukulowicz and Larry Ellis, for the City of Hamilton

Steve Weisz and Arjo Shalviri, for Caterpillar Financial Services Limited

S. Michael Citak, for various trade creditors

Kathryn Esaw and Patrick Corney, for the Independent Electricity System Operator

Andrew Hatnay, for certain retirees and for the proposed representative counsel

HEARD AND ENDORSED: October 8, 2014

RELEASED: October 22, 2014

ENDORSEMENT

[1] U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (the "Applicant") brought an application for protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA") on September 16, 2014, and was granted the requested relief pursuant to an initial order of Morawetz R.S.J. dated

September 16, 2014 (the “Initial Order”). The Initial Order contemplated that any interested party, including the Applicant and the Monitor, could apply to this court to vary or amend the Initial Order at a comeback motion scheduled for October 6, 2014 (the “Comeback Motion”).

[2] The Comeback Motion was adjourned from October 6, 2014 to October 7, 2014, and further adjourned on that date to October 8, 2014. On October 8, 2014, the Court heard various motions of the Applicant and addressed certain other additional scheduling matters, indicating that written reasons would follow with respect to the substantive matters addressed at the hearing. This endorsement constitutes the Court’s reasons with respect to the five substantive matters addressed in two orders issued at the hearing.

[3] In this endorsement, capitalized terms that are not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Initial Order.

DIP Loan

[4] The Applicant seeks approval of a debtor-in-possession loan facility (the “DIP Loan”), the terms of which are set out in an amended and restated DIP facility term sheet dated as of September 16, 2014 (the “Term Sheet”) between the Applicant and a subsidiary of USS (the “DIP Lender”).

[5] The Term Sheet contemplates a DIP Loan in the maximum amount of \$185 million, to be guaranteed by each of the present and future, direct or indirect, wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Applicant. The Term Sheet provides for a maximum availability under the DIP Loan that varies on a monthly basis to reflect the Applicant’s cash flow requirements as contemplated in the cash flow projections attached thereto. Advances bear interest at 5% per annum, 7% upon an event of default, and are prepayable at any time upon payment of an exit fee of \$5.5 million together with the lender’s fees and costs described below. The Term Sheet provides for a commitment fee in the amount of \$3.7 million payable out of the first advance. The Applicant is also obligated to pay the lender’s legal fees and any costs of realization or disbursement pertaining to the DIP Loan and these CCAA proceedings.

[6] The Term Sheet contains a number of affirmative covenants, including compliance with a timetable for the CCAA proceedings. The DIP Loan terminates on the earliest to occur of certain events, including: (1) the implementation of a compromise or plan of arrangement; (2) the sale of all or substantially all of the Applicant’s assets; (3) the conversion of the CCAA proceedings into a proceeding under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; (4) December 31, 2015, being the end of the proposed restructuring period according to the timetable; and (5) the occurrence of an event of default, at the discretion of the DIP lender.

[7] A condition precedent to funding under the DIP Loan is an order of this Court granting a charge in favour of the DIP lender (the “DIP Lender’s Charge”) having priority over all security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (herein, collectively “Encumbrances”) other than the Administration Charge (Part I), the Director’s Charge and certain permitted liens set out in the Term Sheet, which include existing and future purchase money security interests and certain equipment financing security registrations listed in a schedule to the Term Sheet (the “Permitted Priority Liens”).

[8] The terms and conditions of the DIP Loan, as set out in the Term Sheet, have been the subject of extensive negotiation in the period prior to the hearing of this motion. The DIP Loan is supported by the monitor and USS, and is not opposed by any of the other major stakeholders of the Applicant, including the Province of Ontario and the United Steelworkers International Union and the United Steelworkers Union, Locals 1005 and 8782 (collectively, the “USW”).

[9] The existence of a financing facility is of critical importance to the Applicant at this time in order to ensure stable continuing operations during the CCAA proceedings and thereby to provide reassurance to the Applicant’s various stakeholders that the Applicant will continue to have the financial resources to pay its suppliers and employees, and to carry on its business in the ordinary course. As such, debtor-in-possession financing is a pre-condition to a successful restructuring of the Applicant. In particular, the Applicant requires additional financing to build up its raw materials inventories prior to the Seaway freeze to avoid the risk of operating disruptions and/or sizeable cost increases during the winter months.

[10] The Monitor, who was present during the negotiations regarding the terms of the DIP Loan, the Chief Restructuring Officer (the “CRO”) and the Financial Advisor to the Applicant have each advised the Court that in their opinion the terms of the DIP Loan are reasonable, are consistent with the terms of other debtor-in-possession financing facilities in respect of comparable borrowers, and meet the financial requirements of the Applicant. The Monitor has advised in its First Report that it does not believe it likely that a superior DIP proposal would have been forthcoming.

[11] The Court has the authority to approve the DIP Loan under s. 11 of the CCAA. I am satisfied that, for the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to do so in the present circumstances.

[12] The Court also has the authority under s. 11.2 of the CCAA to grant the requested priority of the DIP Lender’s Charge to secure the DIP Loan. In this regard, s. 11.2(4) of the CCAA sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered by a court in addressing such a motion. In addition, Pepall J. (as she then was) stressed the importance of three particular criteria in *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)*, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 at paras. 32-34 (S.C.), [2009] O.J. No. 4286 [*Canwest*]. In my view, the DIP Lender’s Charge sought by the Applicant is appropriate based on those factors for the reasons that follow.

[13] First, notice has been given to all of the secured parties likely to be affected, including USS as the only secured creditor having a general security interest over all the assets of the Applicant. Notice has also been given broadly to all PPSA registrants, various governmental agencies, including environmental agencies and taxing authorities, and to all pension and retirement plan beneficiaries pursuant to the process contemplated by the Notice Procedure Order.

[14] Second, the maximum amount of the DIP Loan is appropriate based on the anticipated cash flow requirements of the Applicant, as reflected in its cash flow projections for the entire restructuring period, in order to continue to carry on its business during the restructuring period. The cash flows to January 30, 2015 are the subject of a favourable report of the Monitor in its First Report.

[15] Third, the Applicant's business will continue to be managed by the Applicant's management with the assistance of the CRO during the restructuring period. The Applicant's board of directors will continue in place, a majority of whom are independent individuals with significant restructuring and steel-industry experience. The Applicant's parent and largest creditor, USS, is providing support to the Applicant by providing the DIP Loan through a subsidiary. Equally important, the existing operational relationships between the Applicant and USS will continue.

[16] Fourth, for the reasons set out above, the DIP Loan will assist in, and enhance, the restructuring process.

[17] Fifth, the DIP Lender's Charge does not secure any unsecured pre-filing obligations owed to the DIP lender or its affiliates. It will not prejudice any of the other parties having security interests in property of the Applicant. In particular, the DIP Charge will rank behind the Permitted Priority Liens. Although it will rank ahead of any deemed trust contemplated by the *Pension Benefits Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8, the DIP Loan contemplates continued payment of the pension contributions required under the Pension Agreement dated as of March 31, 2006, as amended by the Amendment to Pension Agreement dated October 31, 2007 (collectively, the "Stelco Pension Agreement") and Ontario Regulation 99/06 under the *Pension Benefits Act* (the "Stelco Regulation").

[18] Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the DIP Charge having the priority contemplated above. As was the case in *Timminco Ltd. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 948 at paras. 46-47, [2012] O.J. No. 596 [*Timminco*], it is not realistic to conceive of the DIP Loan proceeding in the absence of the DIP Lender's Charge receiving the priority being requested on this motion, nor is it realistic to investigate the possibility of third-party debtor-in-possession financing without a similar priority. The proposed DIP Loan, subject to the benefit of the proposed DIP Lender's Charge, is a necessary pre-condition to continuation of these restructuring proceedings under the CCAA and avoidance of a bankruptcy proceeding. I am satisfied that, in order to further these objectives, it is both necessary and appropriate to invoke the doctrine of paramouncy, as contemplated in *Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steel Workers*, 2013 SCC 6, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 [*Sun Indalex*] such that the provisions of the CCAA will override the provisions of the *Pension Benefits Act* in respect of the priority of the DIP Lender's Charge.

Administration Charge and Director's Charge

[19] The Initial Order provides for an Administration Charge (Part I) to the maximum amount of \$6.5 million, a Director's Charge to a maximum amount of \$39 million, and an Administration Charge (Part II) to a maximum amount of \$5.5 million plus \$1 million. On this motion, the Applicant seeks to amend the Initial Order, which was granted on an *ex parte* basis, to provide that the Administration Charge (Part I) and the Director's Charge rank ahead of all other Encumbrances in that order, and the Administration Charge (Part II) ranks ahead of all Encumbrances except the prior-ranking court-ordered charges and the Permitted Priority Liens.

[20] The Court's authority to grant a super-priority in respect of the fees and expenses to be covered by the Administration Charge (Part I) and the Administration Charge (Part II) is found in s. 11.52 of the CCAA. Similarly, s. 11.51 of the CCAA provides the authority to grant a

similar charge in respect of the fees and expenses of the directors to be secured by the Director's Charge.

[21] As discussed above, the Applicant has fulfilled the notice requirements in respect of those provisions by serving the motion materials for this Comeback Motion to the parties on the service list and by complying with the requirements of the Notice Procedure Order.

[22] It is both commonplace and essential to order a super-priority in respect of charges securing professional fees and disbursements and directors' fees and disbursements in restructurings under the CCAA. I concur in the expression of the necessity of such security as a pre-condition to the success of any possible restructuring, as articulated by Morawetz R.S.J. in *Timminco* at para. 66.

[23] In *Canwest*, at para. 54, Pepall J. (as she then was) set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in approving an administration charge. Morawetz R.S.J. addressed those factors in his endorsement respecting the granting of the Initial Order approving the Administration Charge (Part I) and the Administration Charge (Part II). Similarly, Morawetz R.S.J. also addressed the necessity for, and appropriateness of, approving the Director's Charge in such endorsement.

[24] In my opinion, the same factors support the super-priority sought by the Applicant for the Administration Charge (Part I), the Director's Charge and the Administration Charge (Part II). Further, I am satisfied that the requested priority of these charges is necessary to further the objectives of these CCAA proceedings and that it is also necessary and appropriate to invoke the doctrine of paramountcy, as contemplated in *Sun Indalex*, such that the provisions of the CCAA will override the provisions of the *Pension Benefits Act* in respect of the priority of these Charges. I am satisfied that the beneficiaries of the Administration Charge (Part I) and the Administration Charge (Part II) will not likely provide services to the Applicant in these CCAA proceedings without the proposed security for their fees and disbursements. I am also satisfied that their participation in the CCAA proceedings is critical to the Applicant's ability to restructure. Similarly, I accept that the Applicant requires the continued involvement of its directors to pursue its restructuring and that such persons, particularly its independent directors, would not likely continue in this role without the benefit of the proposed security due to the personal exposure associated with the Applicant's financial position.

The KERP

[25] The Applicant has identified 28 employees in management and operational roles who it considers critical to the success of its restructuring efforts and continued operations as a going concern. It has developed a key employee retention programme (the "KERP") to retain such employees. The KERP provides for a cash retention payment equal to a percentage of each such employee's annual salary, to be paid upon implementation of a plan of arrangement or completion of a sale, upon an outside date, or upon earlier termination of employment without cause.

[26] The maximum amount payable under the KERP is \$2,570,378. The Applicant proposes to pay such amount to the Monitor to be held in trust pending payment.

[27] The Court's jurisdiction to authorize the KERP is found in its general power under s. 11 of the CCAA to make such order as it sees fit in a proceeding under the CCAA. The following factors identified in case law support approval of the KERP in the present circumstances.

[28] First, the evidence supports the conclusion that the continued employment of the employees to whom the KERP applies is important for the stability of the business and to assist in the marketing process. The evidence is that these employees perform important roles in the business and cannot easily be replaced. In addition, certain of the employees have performed a central role in the proceedings under the CCAA and the restructuring process to date.

[29] Second, the Applicant advises that the employees identified for the KERP have lengthy histories of employment with the Applicant and specialized knowledge that cannot be replaced by the Applicant given the degree of integration between the Applicant and USS. The evidence strongly suggests that, if the employees were to depart the Applicant, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to have adequate replacements in view of the Applicant's current circumstances.

[30] Third, there is little doubt that, in the present circumstances and, in particular, given the uncertainty surrounding a significant portion of the Applicant's operations, the employees to be covered by the KERP would likely consider other employment options if the KERP were not approved

[31] Fourth, the KERP was developed through a consultative process involving the Applicant's management, the Applicant's board of directors, USS, the Monitor and the CRO. The Applicant's board of directors, including the independent directors, supports the KERP. The business judgment of the board of directors is an important consideration in approving a proposed KERP: see *Timminco Ltd. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 506 at para.73, [2012] O.J. No. 472. In addition, USS, the only secured creditor of the Applicant, supports the KERP.

[32] Fifth, both the Monitor and the CRO support the KERP. In particular, the Monitor's judgment in this matter is an important consideration. The Monitor has advised in its First Report that it is satisfied that each of the employees covered by the KERP is critical to the Applicant's strategic direction and day-to-day operations and management. It has also advised that the amount and terms of the proposed KERP are reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances and in the Monitor's experience in other CCAA proceedings.

[33] Sixth, the terms of the KERP, as described above, are effectively payable upon completion of the restructuring process.

Appointment of Representative Counsel for the Non-USW Active and Retiree Beneficiaries

[34] The beneficiaries entitled to benefits under the Hamilton Salaried Pension Plan, the LEW Salaried Pension Plan, the LEW Pickling Facility Plan who are not represented by the USW, the Legacy Pension Plan, the Steinman Plan, the Opportunity GRRSP, RBC's and RA's who are not represented by the USW and beneficiaries entitled to OEPB's who are not represented by the USW (collectively, the "Non-USW Active and Retiree Beneficiaries") do not currently have representation in these proceedings. The defined terms in this section have the meanings ascribed thereto in the affidavit of Michael A. McQuade referred to in the Initial Order.

[35] The Applicant proposes the appointment of six representatives and representative counsel to represent the interests of the Non-USW Active and Retiree Beneficiaries. The Court has authority to make such an order under the general authority in section 11 of the CCAA and pursuant to Rules 10.01 and 12.07 of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. I am satisfied that such an order should be granted in the circumstances.

[36] In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the factors addressed in *Canwest Publishing (Re)*, 2010 ONSC 1328, [2010] O.J. No. 943. In this regard, the following considerations are relevant.

[37] The Non-USW Active and Retiree Beneficiaries are an important stakeholder group in these proceedings under the CCAA and deserve meaningful representation relating to matters of recovery, compromise of rights and entitlement to benefits under the plans of which they are beneficiaries or changes to other compensation. Current and former employees of a company in proceedings under the CCAA are vulnerable generally on their own. In the present case, there is added concern due to the existence of a solvency deficiency in the Applicant's pension plans and the unfunded nature of the OPEB's.

[38] Second, the contemplated representation will enhance the efficiency of the proceedings under the CCAA in a number of ways. It will assist in the communication of the rights of this stakeholder group on an on-going basis during the restructuring process. It will also provide an efficient and cost-effective means of ensuring that the interests of this stakeholder group are brought to the attention of the Court. In addition, it will establish a leadership group who will be able to organize a process for obtaining the advice and directions of this group on specific issues in the restructuring as required.

[39] Third, the contemplated representation will avoid a multiplicity of retainers to the extent separate representation is not required. In this regard, I note that at the present time, there is a commonality of interest among all the non-USW Active and Retiree Beneficiaries in accordance with the principles referred to in *Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)*, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 at para. 62 (S.C.), [2009] O.J. No. 3280 [*Nortel*]. In particular, at the present time, none of the CRO, the proposed representative counsel and the proposed representatives see any material conflict of interest between the current and former employees. In these circumstances, as in *Nortel*, I am satisfied that representation of the employees' interests can be accomplished by the appointment of a single representative counsel, knowledgeable and experienced in all facets of employee claims. If the interests of such parties do in fact diverge in the future, the Court will be able to address the need for separate counsel at such time. In this regard, the proposed representative counsel has advised the Court that it and the proposed representatives are alert to the possibility of such conflicts potentially arising and will bring any issues of this nature to the Court's attention.

[40] Fourth, the balance of convenience favours the proposed order insofar as it provides for notice and an opt-out process. The proposed representation order thereby provides the flexibility to members of this stakeholder group who do not wish to be represented by the proposed representatives or the proposed representative counsel to opt-out in favour of their own choice of representative and of counsel.

[41] Fifth, the proposed representative counsel, Koskie Minsky LLP, have considerable experience representing employee groups in other restructurings under the CCAA. Similarly, the proposed representatives have considerable experience in respect of the matters likely to be addressed in the proceedings, either in connection with the earlier restructuring of the Applicant or in former roles as employees of the Applicant.

[42] Sixth, the proposed order is supported by the Monitor and a number of the principal stakeholders of the Applicant and is not opposed by any of the other stakeholders appearing on this motion.

Extension of the Stay

[43] Lastly, the Applicant seeks an order extending the provisions of the Initial Order, including the stay provisions thereof, until January 23, 2015. Section 11.02(2) of the CCAA gives the Court the discretionary authority to extend a stay of proceedings subject to satisfaction of the conditions set out in s. 11.02(3). I am satisfied that these requirements have been met in the present case, and that the requested relief should be granted, for the following reasons.

[44] First, the stay is necessary to provide the stability required to allow the Applicant an opportunity to work towards a plan of arrangement. Since the Initial Order, the Applicant has continued its operations without major disruption. In the absence of a stay, however, the evidence indicates the Applicant will have a cash flow deficiency that will render the objective of a successful restructuring unattainable. As mentioned, the Monitor has advised that, based on its review, the Applicant should have adequate financial resources to continue to operate in the ordinary course and in accordance with the terms of the Initial Order during the stay period.

[45] Second, I am satisfied that the Applicant is acting in good faith and with due diligence to facilitate the restructuring process. In this regard, the Applicant has had extensive discussions with its principal stakeholders to address significant objections to the initial draft of the Term Sheet that were raised by such stakeholders.

[46] Third, the Monitor and the CRO support the extension.

[47] Lastly, while it is not anticipated that the restructuring will have proceeded to the point of identification of a plan of arrangement by the end of the proposed stay period, the Applicant should be able to make significant steps toward that goal during this period. In particular, the Applicant intends to commence a process of discussions with its stakeholders as well as to explore restructuring options through a sales or restructuring recapitalization process (the "SARP") contemplated by the Term Sheet. An extension of the stay will ensure stability and continuity of the applicant's operations while these discussions are conducted, without which the Applicant's restructuring options will be seriously limited if not excluded altogether. In addition, the Applicant should be able to take steps to provide continuing assurance to its stakeholders that it will be able to continue to operate in the ordinary course during the anticipated restructuring period, without interruption, notwithstanding the current proceedings under the CCAA.

[48] Accordingly, I am satisfied that an extension of the Initial Order will further the purposes of the Act and the requested extension should be granted.

Wilton-Siegel J.

Date: October 22, 2014

tab 6

Case Name:
Brainhunter Inc. (Re)

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of
Brainhunter Inc., Brainhunter Canada Inc., Brainhunter
(Ottawa) Inc., Protec Employment Services Ltd., Treklogic
Inc., Applicants**

[2009] O.J. No. 5578

62 C.B.R. (5th) 41

2009 CarswellOnt 8207

183 A.C.W.S. (3d) 905

Court File No. 09-8482-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

G.B. Morawetz J.

Heard: December 11, 2009.

Judgment: December 18, 2009.

(25 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Motion by the debtors for an extension of the stay period, approval of the bid process and approval of the stalking horse plan of arrangement allowed -- Proposed purchaser under the stalking horse was an insider and a related party -- Applicants proposed to sell business as a going concern -- A sales transaction was warranted at this time and that the sale would be of benefit to the economic community -- No creditor opposed sale.

Motion by the debtors for an extension of the stay period, approval of the bid process and approval of the stalking horse plan of arrangement. The applicants submitted that, absent the certainty that the applicants' business would continue as a going concern which was created by the stalking horse

plan and the bid process, substantial damage would result to the applicants' business due to the potential loss of clients, contractors and employees. The proposed purchaser under the stalking horse was an insider and a related party. A Special Committee, the advisors, the key creditor groups and the Monitor all supported the applicants' process.

HELD: Motion allowed. The bid process and the stalking horse were approved. There was a distinction between the approval of the sales process and the approval of a sale. The applicants established that a sales transaction was warranted at this time and that the sale would be of benefit to the economic community. No better alternative had been put forward. In addition, no creditor had come forward to object to a sale of the business. It was not appropriate or necessary for the court to substitute its business judgment for that of the applicants. The applicants were acting in good faith and with due diligence and the circumstances made the granting of an extension appropriate.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 36

Counsel:

Jay Swartz and Jim Bunting, for the Applicants.

G. Moffat, for Deloitte & Touche Inc., Monitor.

Joseph Bellissimo, for Roynat Capital Inc.

Peter J. Osborne, for R. N. Singh and Purchaser.

Edmond Lamek, for the Toronto-Dominion Bank.

D. Dowdall, for Noteholders.

D. Ullmann, for Procom Consultants Group Inc.

ENDORSEMENT

1 **G.B. MORAWETZ J.:**-- At the conclusion of the hearing on December 11, 2009, I granted the motion with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

2 The Applicants brought this motion for an extension of the Stay Period, approval of the Bid Process and approval of the Stalking Horse APA between TalentPoint Inc., 2223945 Ontario Ltd., 2223947 Ontario Ltd., and 2223956 Ontario Ltd., as purchasers (collectively, the "Purchasers") and each of the Applicants, as vendors.

3 The affidavit of Mr. Jewitt and the Report of the Monitor dated December 1, 2009 provide a detailed summary of the events that lead to the bringing of this motion.

4 The Monitor recommends that the motion be granted.

5 The motion is also supported by TD Bank, Roynat, and the Noteholders. These parties have the significant economic interest in the Applicants.

6 Counsel on behalf of Mr. Singh and the proposed Purchasers also supports the motion.

7 Opposition has been voiced by counsel on behalf of Procom Consultants Group Inc., a business competitor to the Applicants and a party that has expressed interest in possibly bidding for the assets of the Applicants.

8 The Bid Process, which provides for an auction process, and the proposed Stalking Horse APA have been considered by Breakwall, the independent Special Committee of the Board and the Monitor.

9 Counsel to the Applicants submitted that, absent the certainty that the Applicants' business will continue as a going concern which is created by the Stalking Horse APA and the Bid Process, substantial damage would result to the Applicants' business due to the potential loss of clients, contractors and employees.

10 The Monitor agrees with this assessment. The Monitor has also indicated that it is of the view that the Bid Process is a fair and open process and the best method to either identify the Stalking Horse APA as the highest and best bid for the Applicants' assets or to produce an offer for the Applicants' assets that is superior to the Stalking Horse APA.

11 It is acknowledged that the proposed purchaser under the Stalking Horse APA is an insider and a related party. The Monitor is aware of the complications that arise by having an insider being a bidder. The Monitor has indicated that it is of the view that any competing bids can be evaluated and compared with the Stalking Horse APA, even though the bids may not be based on a standard template.

12 Counsel on behalf of Procom takes issue with the \$700,000 break fee which has been provided for in the Stalking Horse APA. He submits that it is neither fair nor necessary to have a break fee. Counsel submits that the break fee will have a chilling effect on the sales process as it will require his client to in effect outbid Mr. Singh's group by in excess of \$700,000 before its bid could be considered. The break fee is approximately 2.5% of the total consideration.

13 The use of a stalking horse bid process has become quite popular in recent CCAA filings. In *Re Nortel Networks Corp.* [2009] O.J. No. 3169, I approved a stalking horse sale process and set out four factors (the "Nortel Criteria") the court should consider in the exercise of its general statutory discretion to determine whether to authorize a sale process:

- (a) Is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) Will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (c) Do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) Is there a better viable alternative?

14 The Nortel decision predates the recent amendments to the CCAA. This application was filed December 2, 2009 which post-dates the amendments.

15 Section 36 of the CCAA expressly permits the sale of substantially all of the debtors' assets in the absence of a plan. It also sets out certain factors to be considered on such a sale. However, the amendments do not directly assess the factors a court should consider when deciding to approve a sale process.

16 Counsel to the Applicants submitted that a distinction should be drawn between the approval of a sales process and the approval of an actual sale in that the Nortel Criteria is engaged when considering whether to approve a sales process, while s. 36 of the CCAA is engaged when determining whether to approve a sale. Counsel also submitted that s. 36 should also be considered indirectly when applying the Nortel Criteria.

17 I agree with these submissions. There is a distinction between the approval of the sales process and the approval of a sale. Issues can arise after approval of a sales process and prior to the approval of a sale that requires a review in the context of s. 36 of the CCAA. For example, it is only on a sale approval motion that the court can consider whether there has been any unfairness in the working out of the sales process.

18 In this case, the Special Committee, the advisors, the key creditor groups and the Monitor all expressed support for the Applicants' process.

19 In my view, the Applicants have established that a sales transaction is warranted at this time and that the sale will be of benefit to the "economic community". I am also satisfied that no better alternative has been put forward. In addition, no creditor has come forward to object to a sale of the business.

20 With respect to the possibility that the break fee may deter other bidders, this is a business point that has been considered by the Applicants, its advisors and key creditor groups. At 2.5% of the amount of the bid, the break fee is consistent with break fees that have been approved by this court in other proceedings. The record makes it clear that the break fee issue has been considered and, in the exercise of their business judgment, the Special Committee unanimously recommended to the Board and the Board unanimously approved the break fee. In the circumstances of this case, it is not appropriate or necessary for the court to substitute its business judgment for that of the Applicants.

21 For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the Bid Process and the Stalking Horse APA be approved.

22 For greater certainty, a bid will not be disqualified as a Qualified Bid (or a bidder as a Qualified Bidder) for the reason that the bid does not contemplate the bidder offering employment to all or substantially all of the employees of the Applicants or assuming liabilities to employees on terms comparable to those set out in s. 5.6 of the Stalking Horse Bid. However, this may be considered as a factor in comparing the relative value of competing bids.

23 The Applicants also seek an extension of the Stay Period to coincide with the timelines in the Bid Process. The timelines call for the transaction to close in either February or March, 2010 depending on whether there is a plan of arrangement proposed.

24 Having reviewed the record and heard submissions, I am satisfied that the Applicants have acted, and are acting, in good faith and with due diligence and that circumstances exist that make the granting of an extension appropriate. Accordingly, the Stay Period is extended to February 8, 2010.

25 An order shall issue to give effect to the foregoing.

G.B. MORAWETZ J.

tab 7

Case Name:
Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)

**RE:IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of
Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited, Nortel
Networks Global Corporation, Nortel Networks International
Corporation and Nortel Networks Technology Corporation,
Applicants
APPLICATION UNDER the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

[2009] O.J. No. 3169

55 C.B.R. (5th) 229

2009 CanLII 39492

2009 CarswellOnt 4467

Court File No. 09-CL-7950

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

G.B. Morawetz J.

Heard: June 29, 2009.

Judgment: June 29, 2009.

Released: July 23, 2009.

(59 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Application of Act -- Debtor company -- Motion by applicants for approval of bidding procedure and Sale Agreement allowed -- Applicants had been granted CCAA protection and were involved in insolvency procedures in four other countries -- Bidding procedures set deadline for entry and involved auction -- Sale Agreement was for some of applicants' business units -- Neither proposal involved formal plan of compromise with creditors or vote, but CCAA was flexible and could be

broadly interpreted to ensure objective of preserving business was met -- Proposal was warranted, beneficial and there was no viable alternative.

Motion by the applicants for the approval of their proposed bidding process and Sale Agreement. The applicants had been granted CCAA protection and were involved in insolvency proceedings in four other countries. The Monitor approved of the proposal. The bidding process set a deadline for bids and involved an auction. The Sale Agreement was for some of the applicants' business units. The applicants argued the proposal was the best way to preserve jobs and company value. The purchaser was to assume both assets and liabilities. There was no formal plan for compromise with creditors or vote planned.

HELD: Motion allowed. The CCAA was flexible and could be broadly interpreted to ensure that its objectives of preserving the business were achieved. The proposal was warranted and beneficial and there was no viable alternative. A sealing order was also made with respect to Appendix B, which contained commercially sensitive documents.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11(4)

Counsel:

Derrick Tay and Jennifer Stam, for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al.

Lyndon Barnes and Adam Hirsh, for the Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation and Nortel Networks Limited.

J. Carfagnini and J. Pasquariello, for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor.

M. Starnino, for the Superintendent of Financial Services and Administrator of PBGF.

S. Philpott, for the Former Employees.

K. Zych, for Noteholders.

Pamela Huff and Craig Thorburn, for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.

David Ward, for UK Pension Protection Fund.

Leanne Williams, for Flextronics Inc.

Alex MacFarlane, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

Arthur O. Jacques and Tom McRae, for Felske and Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee).

Robin B. Schwill and Matthew P. Gottlieb, for Nortel Networks UK Limited.

A. Kauffman, for Export Development Canada.

D. Ullman, for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit, for IBM.

ENDORSEMENT

G.B. MORAWETZ J.:--

INTRODUCTION

1 On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

2 I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

3 An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

4 The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

5 The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

6 The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

7 The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is \$650 million.

BACKGROUND

8 The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

9 At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

10 The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

11 In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

12 On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

13 In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

- (a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and
- (b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

14 Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

- (a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;
- (b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and
- (c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

15 Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

16 In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

17 The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

18 The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about

July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

19 The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

20 The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

21 Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

22 Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

23 The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

ISSUES AND DISCUSSION

24 The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

25 The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

26 Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

27 Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

28 The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

29 The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused, [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337. ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

- (a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;
- (b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and
- (c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 43; *Re PSINet Ltd.* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

32 In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Re Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc.* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 165 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, *Re PSINet, supra*, *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, *Re Stelco Inc.* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 1, *Re Tiger Brand Knitting Co.* (2005) 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315, *Re Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hardrock Paving Co.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 and *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3rd) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

36 In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

... we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, at paras. 5, 9.

37 Similarly, in *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

38 Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

[If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra*, at para. 3.

39 In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining

factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Re Boutique San Francisco Inc.* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Quebec S. C.), *Re Winnipeg Motor Express Inc.* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Re Calpine Canada Energy Limited* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale ... be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.* (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C.C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

43 In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

44 I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

45 The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering L.P. v. Forest and Marine Financial Limited Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319.

46 At paragraphs 24-26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring" ... Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal - thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged ...
26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary ...

47 It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

- (a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

- (a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;
- (b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;
- (c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;
- (d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;
- (e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;
- (f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and
- (g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3rd) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

DISPOSITION

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

55 Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

56 I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

57 Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

58 In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

59 Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

G.B. MORAWETZ J.

tab 8

Case Name:
W.C. Wood Corp. Ltd. (Re)

**IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a proposed plan of compromise
or arrangement of W.C. Wood Corporation Ltd.,
W.C. Wood Holdings Inc. and W.C. Wood Corporation
Inc., Applicants**

[2009] O.J. No. 4808

61 C.B.R. (5th) 69

2009 CarswellOnt 7113

182 A.C.W.S. (3d) 258

Court File No. CV-09-8194-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

F.J.C. Newbould J.

Heard: November 5, 2009.
Judgment: November 9, 2009.

(19 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Directions -- Motion by Monitor for directions allowed -- Companies under protection had sought to sell business as a going concern -- Consent compromise order provided for two tier liquidation process -- Pending offer to purchase ongoing business existed, with liquidation of assets to follow if transaction did not close -- Monitor sought directions in respect of inclusion of competitor that sought access to premises to conduct due diligence on assets -- Companies expressed concern that site visit would prejudice pending bid for business -- Court approved Monitor's proposal of granting competitor access in event that pending offer did not complete.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36,

Counsel:

D. Rob English and Sam Babe, for the Monitor.

Kevin McElcheran, for the applicants.

Elizabeth Pillon, for One Rock Capital Partners, LLC.

Clifton P. Prophet, for Electrolux North America.

Evan Cobb, for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

Aaron Rousseau, for Whirlpool Corporation.

ENDORSEMENT

1 F.J.C. NEWBOULD J.:-- The Monitor, BDO Dunwoody Ltd., moves for advice and directions with respect to the inclusion of Electrolux North America ("Electrolux") in a liquidation sales process being conducted pursuant to my order of October 26, 2009. The issue that has arisen is whether Electrolux should be permitted access to the applicants' premises prior to November 13, 2009, on which date One Rock Capital Partners, LLC ("One Rock") must decide whether to firm up its Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA").

2 The order of October 26, 2009 was a compromise order made on consent as a result of an application brought by the lenders of the applicants to have a receiver of the applicants appointed and to have the assets of the applicants sold in a liquidation process. There had been marketing efforts for some time before that which had led to an offer from One Rock to buy the business of the applicants on a going concern basis. The lenders were not happy with the One Rock offer, including the fact that it did not provide for a deposit, contained many conditions and was subject to financing which the lenders thought would unlikely materialize. After negotiations, the consent order was made which provided for a two-track process.

3 In substance, the consent order authorized the applicants to sign the APA with One Rock so long as the APA was firm, with all conditions satisfied or waived, and the deposit received by the monitor by November 13, 2009. The order also directs the Monitor to solicit liquidation proposals, subject to confidentiality considerations, by November 13, 2009 and directs the parties to attend at Court on November 16, 2009. At that time, if One Rock is ready to close by November 27, 2009 without condition, and if the APA provides for payment in full of the first priority DIP lenders, the APA is to be approved. If the conditions are not met, the Monitor is to be appointed a receiver and proceed to a liquidation sale proposal. The order further provides that if a liquidation proposal is accepted because it offers greater value than the One Rock purchase price, One Rock is entitled to a break fee of 4 percent of its purchase price so long as One Rock was ready and able to close.

4 Prior to the order of October 26, 2009, the applicants had engaged in a process to attempt to sell the business on a going concern basis. During that going sales concern process, the Monitor was contacted by counsel to Electrolux, which is the leading North American manufacturer of freezers and a competitor to the applicants, who together were the only North American manufacturer of

freezers. The Monitor was told, amongst other things, that if the going concern sales process did not succeed, Electrolux would be interested in participating in a liquidation sale of the assets and that Electrolux had a particular interest in the intellectual property of the applicants.

5 Pursuant to the October 26, 2009 order, the Monitor has solicited liquidation proposals. Electrolux requested, and was provided by the Monitor, with copies of the information package and asset listings that have been provided to other potential bidders of the assets after signing a confidentiality agreement. Electrolux has requested access to the applicants' premises to conduct a due diligence on the assets that would be sold under a liquidation scenario, but to date has not been given access in light of concerns raised by a number of interested parties. The concerns relate to a perceived competitive advantage to Electrolux over the business of the applicants being sold to One Rock because of what Electrolux could learn on an inspection of the premises, with a resultant loss of the One Rock purchase under the APA.

6 Mr. Angi, the president and chief executive officer of the applicants, has sworn in his affidavit dated November 4, 2009 as follows:

5. Electrolux is the only other freezer manufacturer with manufacturing facilities in North America.
6. The One Rock APA is the last remaining chance available to the Company to sell its business as a going concern. If that transaction is not closed, the Company's business will be liquidated.
8. As a competitor, Electrolux would benefit from the liquidation of W.C. Wood. In fact, it would be difficult for Electrolux to buy the Company's business as a going concern because of *Competition Act* restrictions.
10. A site visit by Electrolux could scuttle the current going concern agreement with One Rock for the following reasons:
 - (a) One Rock has clearly stated they will not consummate the sale if Electrolux is allowed in the plants;
 - (b) A site visit by Electrolux will inevitably compromise "trade secrets" relative to the plants and manufacturing processes of the Company, valuable Intellectual Property assets that are critical to the going concern sale;
 - (c) It is not only the Company's trade secrets that are at risk but also licensed intellectual property belonging to Whirlpool and the continuing relationship with Whirlpool is a key condition of the One Rock APA;
 - (d) Electrolux does not need to visit the plants to submit a liquidation bid as it has the pertinent information and can provide a preliminary bid that can be updated with a visit if the One Rock APA conditions are not met by Nov. 13th.

7 Mr. Lee, the secretary of One Rock, has sworn in his affidavit of November 4, 2009 as follows:

5. One Rock has serious concerns that access to the Premises by Electrolux would prejudice the ongoing value of their own bid. Many of the reasons for our con-

cerns were previously outlined in the Angi Affidavit. In addition, an on-site visit would prejudice the One Rock bid, as this would permit Electrolux the opportunity to gain highly sensitive information, allowing it to potentially reverse engineer certain product costs based on its view of the Applicants' internal operations, which would in turn prejudice One Rock should they be the ultimate purchaser, competing in the market with Electrolux.

6. It is worth noting that Electrolux has more capacity than it requires and it is well known in the industry that Electrolux has recently closed plants and laid off employees in the US as a result of overcapacity in their operations, therefore, it likely has no good faith interest in the equipment or other assets of the Applicants. I believe that any offer by Electrolux would only be in respect of the Applicants' trademark and other intellectual property. Electrolux could easily obtain this information from a public search, without access to the Applicants' confidential information or access to its premises.
7. Should Electrolux be permitted access to the Premises, One Rock believes that the potential prejudice to their bid, and the value of any ongoing sale will have been adversely affected and as such they will be forced to withdraw from the APA and step away from purchasing the Applicants' assets. This would be an unfortunate consequence, and one we wish to avoid.

8 Mr. Spina, a product line manager of Electrolux, has sworn in his affidavit of November 5, 2009 in response to the application brought by the Monitor that after the October 26, 2009 order was made, Electrolux requested physical access to the premises of the applicants to examine the equipment of the applicants "with a view to formulating a bid for some or all of the equipment and intellectual property of the applicants." He also stated:

[Electrolux] remains interested and engaged in the process of purchasing the equipment and intellectual property of the Applicants, after, and subject to, being afforded a reasonable opportunity to undertake meaningful due diligence on such assets.

9 The competitive concerns expressed to the Monitor by the applicants and others and referred to in the Ninth Report of the Monitor, including the concerns raised in the affidavit of Mr. Angi of the applicants and Mr. Lee of One Rock, were not addressed by Mr. Spina in his affidavit.

10 Because of the concerns that One Rock will not proceed with the APA if Electrolux is given access to the premises of the applicants, the Monitor has proposed a process as follows:

- a) Electrolux will not be permitted access prior to noon on November 13, 2009, or thereafter if One Rock waives its conditions at that time;
- b) If One Rock fails to waive its conditions by 12:00 noon on November 13, 2009, access will be granted to Electrolux commencing no later than November 16, 2009;
- c) If the One Rock APA is terminated, the date for delivery of a liquidation proposal from Electrolux to the Monitor should be extended from November 16, 2009 to 12:00 noon on November 23, 2009 and other bidders who are required to submit their bids by November 13, 2009 shall be notified accordingly, such that any liquidation proposal that may be accepted by the

Monitor by November 16, 2009 shall be subject to the Monitor's review of any subsequent Electrolux offer.

11 The Monitor points out that one potential prejudice to this recommendation is that if Electrolux made a liquidation offer higher than the One Rock APA value, that offer could have been accepted and a break fee paid to the applicants creating additional recovery for other creditors. The Monitor points out that this potential prejudice is only theoretical as no indications of value have been received. The Monitor further states, however, that there are obvious benefits to a going concern sale, especially with regard to the interests of employee stakeholders. The Monitor concludes that his recommendation represents his best business judgment.

12 Electrolux is opposed to the Monitor's proposal. It wishes to have access on a timely basis prior to November 13, 2009, the date when One Rock must decide whether or not to firm up its purchase under the APA, in order to be in a position to make an offer for one or more of the assets of the applicants, if it decides to do so, by November 13, 2009. It takes the position that the integrity of the liquidation sale process must be protected, which requires that Electrolux be given the same access to the premises as other potential bidders in the liquidation sale process. In that way, Electrolux might be in a position to make a sufficiently high offer greater than the One Rock APA value to cause the Monitor to terminate the One Rock APA in favour of the Electrolux offer and pay One Rock its 4 percent break fee.

13 In my view, the proposal of the Monitor should be accepted. It is not a perfect world and the CCAA process is certainly no different. I have reached this conclusion for a number of reasons.

14 I cannot say on the basis of the record before me that the competitive concerns of One Rock are not valid. While it is contended by Electrolux that the position of One Rock is just a self-serving position in order to preserve its contract, no evidence has been offered on behalf of Electrolux contradicting those concerns. Electrolux has filed no affidavit material stating that it would not gain a competitive advantage against the business of the applicants by having access to the applicants' premises and internal operations. The order of October 26, 2009, which directed the Monitor to solicit liquidation proposals, stated that it was subject to confidentiality considerations. The concern raised by One Rock objectively can be reasonably viewed as being such a confidentiality concern.

15 The One Rock bid was the only going concern bid received and it was ultimately accepted pursuant to the October 26, 2009 order. The Monitor's confidential liquidation analysis provided to the court on October 26, 2009 compared the estimated realizations in the event of a sale to One Rock to the estimated realizations of a liquidation. This analysis indicated that the proceeds from the sale on a going concern basis to One Rock would exceed the estimated realizations of a liquidation. The prospects of Electrolux bidding a higher value than the One Rock APA value for one or more of the assets on a liquidation basis are unknown, but certainly one cannot say on this record that the prospects are sufficiently good to cause the One Rock APA to be lost.

16 There is some doubt on the basis of the record before me that Electrolux requires access to the premises in order to make a bid for what it is interested in. Electrolux's counsel told the Monitor that Electrolux was particularly interested in the intellectual property, which is consistent with the evidence of Mr. Lee of One Rock that Electrolux has overcapacity and has been closing some plants and laying off employees and that it is the intellectual property which he believes Electrolux is interested in. Presumably access to the premises of the applicants would not be needed for infor-

mation regarding trade marks or other intellectual property, which would be available from a public search.

17 The One Rock purchase on a going concern basis, apart from its likely advantageous price, would also be advantageous to the stakeholders of the applicants, including its employees, suppliers and customers. Whirlpool is a supplier and customer of the applicants. It also licenses intellectual property to the applicants and is a DIP lender. Counsel for Whirlpool stated that although Whirlpool would stand to gain if a higher offer from a liquidation sale materialized, Whirlpool nevertheless supports the Monitor's position. Whirlpool does not expect Electrolux to make an offer in excess of or close to the going concern value to be paid by One Rock and sees a benefit to a continuing relationship with One Rock as a supplier and customer.

18 CIT Business Credit Canada Inc., the agent for the secured lenders to the applicants, was the party that previously moved to have a receiver appointed and scuttle the One Rock offer. It too supports the position of the Monitor. This perhaps is understandable as the One Rock APA is anticipated to pay the lenders debt in full, which might not be the case in a liquidation scenario that would also undoubtedly take some considerable period of time. That uncertainty as to the amount that might be received on a liquidation, and the length of time that would be involved in obtaining it, is good reason not to cause the One Rock APA to be lost if it can be avoided.

19 In the circumstances, the proposal of the Monitor is accepted and the stay under the Initial Order is extended until November 30, 2009. The draft order submitted by the Monitor appears reasonable.

F.J.C. NEWBOULD J.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSAL OF BG FURNITURE LTD.
OF THE TOWN OF WALKERTON IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO

Court No. 35-2199056
Estate No. 35-2199056

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

Proceedings commenced at Toronto

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